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 People detest hypocrisy, and one of the reasons people hold politics in such low 
regard is that politics appears rife with hypocrisy. The proliferation of hypocrisy in 
politics can leave many feeling disenchanted and cynical about political affairs. Yet even 
those with a strong aversion to political hypocrisy are likely to admit there are occasions 
when an act that has been characterized as hypocritical is actually acceptable in politics. 
In some cases, the offense of hypocrisy may not be very serious, or conditioned by 
circumstances; in other cases, the accusation may not even be valid. 
 This study examines the question of when hypocrisy is more or less acceptable in 
politics. This issue is explored through a series of case studies drawn from events that 
occurred in American politics between 2014-2016, an era characterized by high political 
polarization, high-stakes showdowns between congressional Republicans and the 
Democratic administration of President Barack Obama, the 2016 presidential primaries, 
and 2016 presidential election between Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump. The study is 
organized by type, with a focus on basic violations of principle; logical inconsistencies; 
 
 
double standards involving partisan competition; discrepancies between the public affairs 
of public officials and their private lives; and flip-flops. The study finds that the most 
useful and powerful accusations of hypocrisy are those that effectively assert that a 
political figure has inappropriately prioritized narrow partisan concerns over a broader 
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The Ties That Bind 
 
 The first guest on the October 25, 2012, episode of CBS’s Late Show with David 
Letterman was businessman and television personality Donald Trump. Trump had 
become a fairly frequent visitor to the Late Show following the 2004 debut of his reality 
TV program The Apprentice but had been boycotting Letterman’s show for over a year 
after the late-night host called Trump a racist for questioning the legitimacy of President 
Barack Obama’s personal educational achievements. Only after Letterman apologized to 
Trump on-air did the real estate mogul agree to return as a guest.1 
 After discussing their falling out and Trump’s obsession with Obama’s birth 
certificate (Trump often speculated Obama had not been born in the United States and 
was therefore ineligible to serve as president) Letterman shifted the conversation to 
Trump’s endorsement of Republican Mitt Romney for president. With the 2012 
presidential election less than two weeks away, Trump reiterated his support for Romney 
by praising the former Massachusetts governor for his tough rhetoric on China, a country 
Trump said had been “ripping our heart out” while “we do just nothing to protect 
ourselves.” Trump had become a loud and reliable critic of China, routinely denouncing 
the nation for manipulating its currency and “stealing” Americans jobs.2 
 Letterman had come prepared for this line of argument, however. After some 
banter, Letterman produced a set of shirts and ties from Trump’s clothing line: 
Letterman: Now where were these made? 
Trump: These were made—I don’t know where they were made, but they were 
made someplace, but they’re great. … Number-one-selling tie anywhere in the 
world…. 
Letterman: [Holding up the shirts] Where are the shirts made? 




Trump: Well that’s good. We employ people in Bangladesh. That’s good. 
Letterman: Ties. Where are the ties made? 
Trump: [The people of Bangladesh] have to work too. 
Letterman: These are beautiful ties. 
Trump: They are great ties. 
Letterman: The ties are made in, where, China? 
Voice (Off-camera): China. 
Letterman: The ties are made in China. 
 
Letterman then looked at Trump, who grinned and nodded his head sheepishly, first to 
the host and then to the camera. The audience swelled with laughter, cheers, and 
applause. Letterman couldn’t keep a satisfied smile off his face. As the segment came to 
an end, Trump defended his business practices by arguing it was very difficult to find 
products in the United States that weren’t made in China given the way the Chinese 
government toyed with its currency. Letterman countered by stating he had no objection 
to people anywhere in the world finding jobs but would prefer that American companies 
prioritize the hiring of American workers. Letterman then suggested Trump shut down 
the “Donald Trump factory in Beijing” and “put up a tie factory in Jamaica, Queens.” 
Trump replied he would love to.3 
 Four years later, Trump would be running for president himself at the top of the 
Republican ticket. With the issue of trade a cornerstone of his campaign, Trump 
promised to get tough with China, bring back outsourced manufacturing jobs, and either 
terminate or renegotiate trade deals he contended hurt American workers and the 
American economy.4 To undercut this message, his Democratic opponent, former First 
Lady, Senator, and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, used Trump’s Late Show 
appearance in one of the most effective television ads of that campaign.5 The ad (titled 
“Someplace”) simply replayed footage of the exchange between Letterman and Trump 
with few edits or captions, allowing the raw, unmediated, and now seemingly scandalous 
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event to speak for itself. Clinton’s ad implied Trump was not a principled protectionist 
but instead a grandstander raging against a problem he was actually complicit in 
perpetuating. And if people found that convincing—that Trump was not what he claimed 
to be on one of his signature issues—they just might begin to doubt Trump’s devotion to 
the rest of his beliefs. 
 In other words, the ad wanted to convince viewers that Donald Trump does not 
practice what he preaches. That he does not put his money where his mouth is. That when 
he points an accusatory finger at others, three point back at him. That he is all talk and no 
action. That he is a hypocrite. 
 
Hypocrisy as a Political Problem 
 People detest hypocrisy. Or at least that’s what we like to tell ourselves. 
 The word “hypocrite” is not a compliment but rather a pejorative. It wasn’t 
always that way. The origins of the word “hypocrisy” can be traced back to the ancient 
Greek theater, where an actor distinct from the chorus was called a hupokrites. The term 
was purely descriptive and carried no moral weight, but it is easy to see how a word used 
to describe someone acting a part while wearing a mask (as was the custom in Greek 
theater) could be repurposed to chastise those accused of presenting themselves as 
something they were not.6 Hypocrisy had acquired its pejorative nature by the time of 
Christ, as is evident in the Gospel of Matthew when Jesus condemned a group of 
Pharisees as hypocrites for attempting to flatter him with what he considered to be 
duplicitous and insincere expressions of admiration designed to lure him into a trap that 
would either diminish or eliminate him as a rival moral authority. By pretending to be 
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better than they actually were in order to win the approval of others, this group of 
Pharisees came to exemplify the classical definition of hypocrisy.7 
 Today, the word “hypocrisy” is commonly used to condemn a wide range of 
behavior, including violating held moral principles, acting illogically, excusing oneself 
from standards one believes other similarly situated people ought to follow, promise 
breaking, and concealing one’s true self behind an inauthentic persona. What all these 
examples of hypocrisy seem to have in common is that they all involve an accusation of 
improperly inconsistent behavior, or behavior in which someone’s words and/or deeds 
are at odds with one another in a way that might be considered incorrect, inappropriate, 
or (as is often the case) morally wrong. That’s a fairly broad definition that may sweep 
into its net a few examples that don’t belong there, but it does a pretty good job capturing 
the many kinds of behavior people would recognize as hypocrisy. 
 Let’s not get too hung up on semantics, however. People share a pretty common 
understanding of what qualifies as hypocrisy and tend to know it when they see it. 
Consider the example below (Figure 1) which eastbound travelers on the Pennsylvania 
Turnpike in 2014 could have spotted on a roadside billboard somewhere between 








Big Green Radicals/Environmental Policy Alliance, “Billboards Showcase Celebrity 




Some who saw the billboard likely thought nothing of it; they may have had no clue as to 
the identity of the man on the sign (for the record, that’s movie star and environmental 
advocate Robert Redford), why it’s a big deal he zips around aboard his own personal 
airplane, or what it means to live “green.” Yet those with just a little bit of knowledge 
about the issue at hand could probably discern that the billboard was making a rather 
unflattering assertion about Redford. Knowing they only had a few seconds to convey 
their message to speeding motorists, the designers of the billboard turned to a simple, 
familiar formula—“A endorses B. Then A acts in opposition to B.”—that is nearly 
guaranteed to touch a nerve in passersby and send them on their way with a poorer 
impression of the actor. Seven words, two phrases, one juxtaposition: It’s practically a 
form of political attack poetry aimed at accusing Robert Redford of behaving in an 
improperly inconsistent fashion, or in other words, of being a hypocrite. 
 Of course, the interest group responsible for the billboard’s message never 
directly accused Redford of hypocrisy in their advertisement, but that’s the clear 
implication of their sign. Still, anyone desiring more concrete proof of their intentions 
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can just visit the website listed on the billboard, where a simple search will lead you to a 
picture of Redford with the word “HYPOCRITE” stamped in large green capital letters 





Big Green Radicals/Environmental Policy Alliance, “Robert Redford’s Alarmist and 




As mentioned above, people tend to know hypocrisy when they see it. 
 We also have an intuitive sense that hypocrisy is wrong. How wrong? Well, in 
Inferno, Dante situated hypocrites within the sixth bolgia (between the bolgie for corrupt 
politicians and thieves) of the eighth circle of Hell, which was reserved for the fraudulent 
(think seducers, sorcerers, sowers of discord, etc.) and only one circle away from Satan 
himself.8 Maybe that seems a little excessive. Yet while people may not be inclined to 
condemn an adulterous pastor, a health food nut dining out at a fast food restaurant, or a 
parent with a bad habit who tells their children to “do as I say, not as I do” to eternal 
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damnation for their particular hypocrisies, many would probably find their behavior 
scandalous and hard to admire. 
 People’s strong aversion to hypocrisy helps explain why so many hold politics in 
such low regard. Politics, after all, is rife with incidents and allegations of hypocrisy. 
Donald Trump’s double standard on outsourcing jobs to China has already been 
reviewed. But there’s also Hillary Clinton’s metamorphosis on the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership,9 Mitt Romney’s change of heart on abortion,10 and Barack Obama’s 
“evolution” on gay marriage.11 There was Senator John Kerry’s famous flip-flop on war 
funding during the 2004 election (“I actually did vote for the $87 billion before I voted 
against it”)12 and John McCain’s about-face on the Bush tax cuts prior to the 2008 
election.13 Republican Representative Paul Ryan denounced the 2009 stimulus package 
as ineffective and a waste of money yet sought stimulus funds for his constituents.14 
Democratic Senator Harry Reid slammed the Koch Brothers for attempting to enrich 
themselves through multimillion dollar campaign donations yet defended similar efforts 
undertaken by casino magnate Sheldon Adelson, who happened to be a major political 
player in Reid’s home state of Nevada.15 When senators of either party are in the majority 
in the Senate, they often denounce the filibuster as a tool of obstruction and call for its 
abolition; when those same senators find themselves in the minority, they suddenly 
morph into defenders of the status quo and have no problem using it to block 
legislation.16 Political consultant Corry Bliss once dismissed as a “joke” criticism of a 
campaign he was working on in Kansas for using stock footage of Ukrainian sunflowers 
on the campaign’s website despite having criticized a rival campaign two years earlier in 
Connecticut for using stock footage of a Norwegian submarine in a campaign ad.17 Vice 
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President Al Gore won a Nobel Peace Prize for warning the world about the dangers of 
climate change even though studies found his own home leaves a massive carbon 
footprint.18 Representative Tim Murphy ran for office on a 100% pro-life record yet 
encouraged his mistress to get an abortion.19 Big government liberals have regulated soft 
drinks but consider government crackdowns on illegal immigration too heavy-handed. 
Conservatives decry government overreach and want the free market to work without 
government interference but have supported crop subsidies and transvaginal ultrasounds 
for women seeking abortions. Many pro-life politicians support the death penalty; many 
politicians who oppose capital punishment won’t defend the life of an unborn child. The 
list could go on and on. 
 This is not a new phenomenon either. Some would say hypocrisy in American 
politics is as old as the nation’s founding documents: “We hold these truths to be self-
evident: that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with 
certain unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,” 
wrote a well-known slaveowner. 
 It is often deeply satisfying to see politicians outed as hypocrites. The charge is so 
potent and damning that opposition researchers focus on it when digging up dirt on 
candidates for public office.20 Yet daily encounters with political hypocrisy can leave 
citizens feeling cynical and complacent as well: Cynical in the sense that despite their 
protestations, political figures still engage in hypocrisy, and complacent in the sense that 
despite their dislike of hypocrisy, they reluctantly come to accept it as something like an 
incurable disease endemic to politics. They are left to wonder why a problem so many 
people find appalling and disgraceful remains so intractable. 
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 The proliferation of hypocrisy in politics can be both infuriating and 
disheartening. What is needed is a more constructive and discerning way to think about 
political hypocrisy. Reconsider for a moment all the examples of political hypocrisy that 
have been mentioned so far in this introduction. Those examples actually describe a range 
of presumedly improperly inconsistent behavior. For example, Clinton, Romney, Obama, 
Kerry, and McCain are all accused of flip-flopping, or changing their position on an issue 
to nearly its opposite. On the other hand, Ryan and Reid appear to be engaged in a double 
standard, which occurs when people excuse themselves or their allies from adhering to a 
standard they expect others to obey. The pro-life and pro-choice advocates stand accused 
of a logical inconsistency. Might these distinctions in type shape the way individual cases 
of hypocrisy are evaluated? 
 Additionally, there are conditions unique to each case that might affect appraisals 
of them. For instance, would people be more forgiving of a flip-flop if a politician 
changed their mind in light of new information or because of a change in their moral 
reasoning? What if, as a democratically-elected representative, they changed their mind 
to better reflect the popular will of their constituents or to better position themselves to 
win re-election? Sometimes, as team players, politicians engage in hypocrisy to improve 
their party’s strategic position vis a vis their opponent’s; how acceptable is that, does it 
matter what their ultimate policy ambitions are, and should people then accept similar 
behavior from their opponents when it rebounds back onto them? Or what if the 
hypocrisy is the by-product of a compromise forged with an opponent to pass legislation? 
How should these and other circumstances alter people’s assessments of hypocrisy? 
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 Furthermore, some of these examples seem more serious than others. For 
instance, while the accusation involving the filibuster finds legislators waffling on an 
issue central to the nature of democracy (should legislation require a mere majority or 
supermajority to pass?) the accusation concerning the proper use of stock photos in 
campaign ads seems on the face of it downright trivial. Consequently, people might 
decide not to sweat the small hypocrisies. But how does someone distinguish between the 
more serious and less serious cases of hypocrisy? For instance, while the preceding 
examples have all in some way touched on inconsistencies in the public records of 
political figures, the examples concerning Al Gore and Tim Murphy (as well as Donald 
Trump and Robert Redford, for that matter) concern inconsistencies between their public 
political work and their private personal behavior. Is it really a big deal if a politician’s 
private life is inconsistent with the values they espouse in public so long as they always 
act publicly in accordance with their publicly-stated values? This is but one question that 
could be asked concerning the seriousness of a case of hypocrisy. 
 Finally, some might wonder if all the accusations of hypocrisy listed above are 
actually valid. For example, is there no room in a conservative ideology for assertive 
government action? Are liberals ideologically required to consider every government 
action acceptable? Is it possible to be pro-life and supportive of capital punishment (or 
pro-choice and opposed to the death penalty) and avoid the label of hypocrite? Does it 
even make sense in terms of hypocrisy to compare someone’s position on abortion to 
someone’s position on capital punishment? Some accusations of hypocrisy may fail 
because they lack valid points of comparison or distort the terms of comparison. 
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 It’s not just that some accusations of hypocrisy may fail to pass muster, though. 
It’s that important differences pertaining to factors such as type, circumstance, and 
severity will likely affect evaluations of individual cases. This is not really unusual nor 
should it be unexpected: Distinctions along similar lines are routinely made when 
assessing illegal, immoral, or other bad behavior. 
 Even those with a strong aversion to hypocrisy will probably admit there are 
occasions when hypocrisy should be considered more or less acceptable in politics. 
That’s not an easy assertion to accept, however, as it seems to throw the door wide open 
for people to become hypocrites about anti-hypocrisy, for someone to agitate against the 
improperly inconsistent behavior they spot in some but not others. This raises a question 
central to any study of hypocrisy: How can someone ever claim legitimacy as a critic of 
hypocrisy if they are found to have tolerated or indulged in it themselves? 
 It is important not to allow this paradox to sabotage a sincere effort to work 
through the problem of political hypocrisy, however. Some of the difficulty here can be 
assuaged with a dose of modesty. Perfect behavioral consistency—including those 
moments when a self-proclaimed anti-hypocrite is summoned to denounce an act of 
hypocrisy itself—is an impossibly high standard to meet. It seems wiser to approach an 
ethical study of hypocrisy not as a zealot (whose righteous façade is only bound to crack) 
but with humility in the knowledge that, despite sincere concerns about hypocrisy and our 
potential for moral improvement, we remain flawed, un-angelic human beings prone to 
succumbing to such ordinary vices as hypocrisy. 
 More importantly, however, is that if people intend to take political hypocrisy 
seriously, then they should be judicious enough to avoid issuing blanket condemnations 
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of hypocrisy. An act of hypocrisy should not automatically earn its perpetrator a one-way 
ticket to the inner circles of Hell. Hypocrisy is too complicated to warrant such a 
sentence. The severity of an act of hypocrisy varies on a case-by-case basis, both in its 
direct consequences and how it fits into its perpetrator’s record of behavior. Accusations 
of hypocrisy also need to be carefully assessed in order to determine their validity, 
potential for excusal, and moral significance. 
 This scrutiny is especially important when dealing with hypocrisy in politics, as 
the very nature of politics sometimes makes hypocrisy inevitable. In some situations, for 
instance, a political choice may allow a politician to evade the charge of hypocrisy on one 
issue but leave them vulnerable to the accusation on another. Some of these decisions 
may be unavoidable too, forced upon politicians by unanticipated circumstances or a 
clever opposition. There are other times when hypocrisy may serve a useful political 
purpose, or when something that someone considers hypocrisy is actually preferable to 
what Ralph Waldo Emerson may have considered a “foolish consistency.”21 Sometimes 
the nature of political competition may permit a certain degree of hypocrisy; at other 
times it may levy a strong imposition against it. In other cases, an accusation of hypocrisy 
may not actually bear itself out upon closer examination, remain contingent on technical 
details or specific circumstances, or only rise to a level of moral significance if it violates 
certain conditions. A conscientious citizen will give careful thought and consideration to 
accusations of hypocrisy. 
 If people are to draw meaningful conclusions about political hypocrisy, it is 
essential for them to be able to distinguish between those cases that don’t qualify, those 
that are insignificant, those that are forgivable, those that are regrettable, those that 
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deserve reprobation, and those that are inexcusable. Hence the question at the heart of 
this work: Under what circumstances is hypocrisy more or less acceptable in politics? 
 
Literature Review 
 Given people’s frustration with its regularity in politics, one would expect to find 
a wealth of literature on the topic of political hypocrisy. Surprisingly, however, there are 
only a few major works on the subject, and, while insightful, their inquiries into the 
permissibility of hypocrisy in politics ultimately reach broad conclusions that do not 
acknowledge the problem’s typological diversity nor offer practical advice as to how to 
make sense of it on a day-to-day basis. 
 Any exploration of hypocrisy in politics should begin with Judith Shklar’s 1984 
book Ordinary Vices, a study of common yet immoral behavior like cruelty, snobbery, 
betrayal, and misanthropy. Shklar devotes an early chapter in her book to hypocrisy, one 
replete with observations any student of the subject should heed: That our disgust of 
hypocrisy is enhanced by its prevalence in human affairs;22 that intractable ideological 
conflict is as likely as moral consensus to generate accusations of hypocrisy, since 
opposing sides speaking past one another’s moral claims will turn to accusations of 
hypocrisy in an attempt to undermine their opponents’ credibility as moral agents;23 and 
that, paradoxically, we only encourage hypocrisy by insisting upon greater moral 
rectitude from others, as such demands encourage people to go to greater lengths to hide 
hypocritical behavior behind projections of fidelity and sincerity, a maneuver that 
ultimately favors those most skilled at deception.24 
 Midway through her essay, Shklar turns her focus to liberal governments, which 
she observes are more often accused of hypocrisy by those who abide by them than by 
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their opponents. Shklar attributes this curiosity to the gap that develops between the 
grand aspirations democracies are founded upon (and the great expectations that follow) 
and the realities of governance.25 For example, because debates over policy in liberal 
governments often reference the government’s founding principles, those upset with the 
actions undertaken by their government will often claim those policies contradict the 
government’s core values. This is particularly acute when the aggrieved feel the 
government—which is supposed to be representative of the people’s will—has dismissed 
their concerns or consists of officials who are out of touch with public sentiments.26 Add 
to this the tension between ideology and compromise inherent to coalition building as 
well as the competing demands of campaigning and governing and it is not hard to see 
how citizens in liberal democracies may come to believe the very nature of their 
government fosters widespread hypocrisy.27 
 Shklar, however, cautions readers against getting too agitated over hypocrisy’s 
presence in liberal regimes. Shklar argues hypocrisy is necessary to grease democracy’s 
wheels so that social and political animosities do not ultimately paralyze government. 
Without hypocrisy, politicians would find themselves unable to flatter, cajole, and 
negotiate with those whose support they need to govern effectively. Politicians who 
spoke too frankly or refused to disguise their contempt for others could easily lead the 
government into gridlock. Subsequently, Shklar heaps greater scorn upon the anti-
hypocrite for putting ideological purity ahead of public-spiritedness.28 
 Shklar concludes we should not condemn liberal orders for generating or even 
tolerating hypocrisy, as hypocrisy seems to be a necessary vice that can actually help 
liberal political systems function smoothly; furthermore, a liberal political system that 
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sought to eliminate hypocrisy from its politics would struggle to resolve political disputes 
and may even begin to exhibit illiberal political tendencies. Rather than fret so much over 
hypocrisy, Shklar instead encourages people to direct their outrage toward more serious 
vices like cruelty.29 
 Shklar’s advice is certainly wise; an all-consuming revulsion of hypocrisy can 
poison people’s perception of politics with cynicism, distract from more significant 
political concerns, and prevent people from appreciating the benefits society derives from 
politics. Yet for all her insights into hypocrisy, Shklar does not really address the 
question of when people should object to its presence in politics. This is problematic for 
her argument, since the political cynicism Shklar is so keen to caution her readers about 
is not only the byproduct of a boundless contempt for hypocrisy but also generated by 
genuinely odious acts of hypocrisy. But at a more basic level, even if people take her 
advice and decline to get too worked up over political hypocrisy, there are certainly times 
when it is so offensive or problematic that it ought to be called out. Shklar seems to admit 
as much in the final paragraph of her essay, writing that her “considerations are not to be 
taken as an endorsement of hypocrisy, least of all the naïve kind”30 (which she defined 
earlier in her essay as acts that are consciously wrong.)31 
 Additionally, Shklar also admits in her concluding remarks that accusations of 
hypocrisy in liberal societies can do some good, arguing, 
The only voice that damns hypocrisy to some purpose is one that laments that the 
society in which we live does not live up to its declared principles, promises, and 
possibilities. This outraged jeremiad is the mark of a moralistic rather than a 
moral society, perhaps; but it is not without effect, because this type of 
antihypocrite does at least have a sense of what is wrong, rather than only an urge 
to spread the blame. He may well frighten politicians enough to inhibit them to a 
significant degree. Even the participants in the system of hypocrisy and 
counterhypocrisy perform unintended services to liberal societies. Each fears the 
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other enough to restrain himself. Their discourse conveys little moral urgency, but 
it does maintain some standards of decency.32 
 
This final point reveals Shklar’s argument is actually rather broad: We should not obsess 
over hypocrisy in politics as there are more serious vices to worry about and we should 
not condemn liberal political systems for the hypocrisy inherent to them, but there are 
some unspecified hypocrisies that are wrong that we should object to while some 
accusations of hypocrisy can help maintain the moral order. How Shklar would apply 
these conclusions to conventional political affairs, however, remains a mystery. 
 Ruth Grant’s 1997 book Hypocrisy and Integrity: Machiavelli, Rousseau, and the 
Ethics of Politics builds on Shklar’s observations about the presence of hypocrisy in 
liberal political systems. Grant argues any attempt to address concerns related to the 
presence of hypocrisy in politics by adherents of the liberal tradition is doomed to fail. In 
Grant’s view, liberal regimes—by promising to create a political order built on 
transparency, honesty, and rationality—have deluded themselves into believing they can 
transcend the debasing features of politics, including hypocrisy. The problem, of course, 
is that despite these claims, hypocrisy not only abounds in liberal systems, but in many 
cases appears to be woven into the very fabric of the liberal political order. Despite 
heralding liberty, justice, and equality as their central values, many liberal political 
regimes are still the site of oppression, social injustice, and capitalistic economic 
exploitation. Additionally, the social mores of liberal societies encourage citizens to hide 
their authentic selves behind more socially-acceptable bourgeois masks.33 For some 
liberal citizens, the hypocrisy at the heart of liberal societies goes unnoticed, rendering 
them complicit in its perpetuation. Those who do notice it react in one of three ways: 
Either as a complacent moderate who tolerates hypocrisy to preserve a personally 
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advantageous status quo; as a zealous anti-hypocrite who insists upon even greater 
political purity (thus setting the system up for further disappointments); or as a cynic who 
loses faith not only in liberalism but in the values it espouses.34 
 Grant turns to Machiavelli and Rousseau—two philosophers outside the liberal 
tradition—to rescue liberalism from its predicament. In Machiavelli and Rousseau, Grant 
finds two thinkers who assume politics is driven more by passion than reason and who 
argue that political relationships are built not only on interest but (more importantly) 
dependence. Their outlook on politics strikes Grant as a more realistic view of the 
political realm, one that admits flattery and emotional appeals are often more powerful 
than cold, rational arguments, and that the actions of political actors will often be 
constrained by their inextricable relationships with others who may wield some influence 
over them or whose beliefs they may despise. No politician would be able to function in 
this world without indulging in some hypocrisy.35 The way forward for Grant, then, is 
neither a wholescale condemnation of hypocrisy, an abject rejection of politics, nor a 
complacent acceptance of the status quo, but rather the development of models of 
political action that accept the necessity of hypocrisy within politics: For example, a 
moderate who attempts to address public problems by weighing the points of view and 
political motivations of others in order to craft policies that have the potential to gain 
widespread popular support, or a moralist who presses their case for moral causes without 
allowing the ideal policy to stand in the way of an improvement that is politically 
possible.36 
 Grant, like Shklar, seeks to remind her readers of the political uses of hypocrisy. 
In the process, she redeems prudence and the willingness to compromise as political 
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virtues. (She also warns that a reflexive impulse to seek the middle ground or strike a 
bargain can be problematic if one sells out too much on principle; the best politicians it 
seems will know how to strike the right kind of balance in a given situation.)37 Grant’s 
conclusions are certainly worth bearing in mind, as it is often forgotten by the citizens of 
liberal systems that politics is in part an artistic undertaking whose practitioners need a 
measure of creative flexibility to react to events, direct the efforts of government, give 
meaning to public undertakings, and negotiate with other politicians to address public 
concerns.38 
 There are two main issues with Grant’s arguments, however. In the first place, her 
assumptions about liberalism are too harsh. The idea that liberals can’t make sense of 
hypocrisy or don’t possess an appreciation for prudence, compromise, and the art of 
politics (or have no appreciation for the political use of hypocrisy) is too sweeping an 
attack, particularly for a political ideology that looks upon negotiation, deliberation, and 
inclusion as political virtues. The more fundamental issue is that many people hold a dim 
view of politics and its practice generally. What is actually necessary is a greater 
appreciation for the give-and-take inherent to democratic politics, which sources both 
within and outside the liberal tradition can provide. 
 Secondly, Grant, like Shklar, does not delve into questions concerning the 
circumstantial permissibility of hypocrisy in liberal politics. She is mostly interested in 
hypocrisy as it is broadly-conceived, of how the ideals of a political system (liberalism) 
are not completely aligned with its operational practices. Many liberals, however, 
understand why the gap between liberalism’s ideals and its administration exists and have 
already come to terms with that; for instance, they understand governments must be 
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empowered to act on behalf of “the people” but know it is virtually impossible to act in 
accordance with the will of every single citizen that constitutes “the people.” These 
liberals take concerns about the ideological integrity of liberalism seriously but are 
already where Grant wants them to be: Prepared to work as politically-astute citizens 
within a respectable yet inevitably compromised liberal political system. They don’t need 
to be awakened to the realities disclosed by Grant, but instead seek practical guidance to 
help them assess the mundane political hypocrisies they encounter as engaged citizens. 
 David Runciman responds to these critiques of Shklar and Grant’s scholarship in 
his 2008 book Political Hypocrisy: The Mask of Power, From Hobbes to Orwell and 
Beyond. Runciman rejects Grant’s claim that liberalism lacks the intellectual framework 
to make sense of hypocrisy’s presence in politics.39 Instead, Runciman turns to a number 
of writers associated with the liberal tradition (Hobbes, Mandeville, the American 
founders, Bentham, Victorian writers such as Anthony Trollope, and Orwell) who have 
thought seriously about the political problem of hypocrisy. Because these authors have an 
appreciation for the liberal project generally and understand the realities that shape and 
complicate the practice of politics within liberal systems, Runciman argues these authors 
offer the most useful insights into the subject matter. As Runciman writes, 
These [liberal] authors have some of the most interesting and useful things to say 
about hypocrisy, precisely because they were conscious of its hold on political 
life, even as they tried to escape it. In other words, they were struggling with the 
problem from the inside, and could see that it was a problem, unlike those 
(Machiavelli, Rousseau, Nietzsche) who have looked at the hypocrisy of liberal 
(or in an earlier guise, “Christian”) politics from the outside, and saw only how 
easy it would be to pull aside the mask, which is what they did. 
 The writers that I will be discussing in this book are the ones who were 
willing to keep the mask in place, despite or because of the fact that they were 
also truth-tellers, committed to looking behind the mask, and revealing what they 
found there. Keeping the mask in place while being aware of what lies behind the 
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mask is precisely the problem of hypocrisy for liberal societies; indeed, it is one 
of the deepest problems of politics that we face.40 
 
 Additionally, Runciman aims to pick up where Shklar left off and reach more 
specific conclusions regarding the permissibility of political hypocrisy.41 Rather than 
draw sweeping claims about hypocrisy as it is generally conceived, Runciman instead 
turns to the authors he reviews in order to determine when people ought to accept or 
reject hypocrisy in politics. His study shows there are different types of hypocrisy that 
vary in terms of form, intention, object, etc. In drawing these distinctions, Runciman 
hopes to identify the circumstances in which hypocrisy is a problem in politics rather than 
a mere irritant, a side effect resulting from the pursuit of other political goods, or even a 
benefit of some kind. 
 By discussing various types of hypocrisy and the circumstances in which they 
might arise, Runciman’s approach yields a more pointed set of conclusions one can apply 
to various political situations. For those looking for practical counsel regarding the 
permissibility of hypocrisy in politics, Runciman’s work is a good place to start. Still, his 
work is structured as a collection of philosophical insights one might draw upon when 
trying to assess hypocrisy. That is helpful in putting various concerns about hypocrisy on 
the table, but once the issues Runciman raises are illuminated, what would be useful is a 
more systematic approach drawn from and directly applicable to a wide range of actual 
political situations. This study hopes to address that gap in the literature. 
 
Political Hypocrisy, Public-Spiritedness, and the Crisis of Democracy 
 The main objective of this study is to examine hypocrisy as it appears in the 
political world in order to determine when and under what circumstances it is more or 
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less acceptable in politics. It is the author’s hope that someone who reads this work will 
gain useful intellectual tools that will help them better evaluate the various instances of 
political hypocrisy they will inevitably encounter in the political world. 
 Yet beyond those interested in the topic of political hypocrisy, this work should 
also be of interest to those concerned with the health and well-being of democracy. This 
is a timely topic. Many people today argue that democracy is in crisis not only around the 
world but in the United States as well. It is not simply a matter that authoritarian 
governments in Russia and China are flexing their muscles on the world stage and 
challenging the preeminence of democratic regimes. It is that a number of 
democratically-elected leaders around the world (i.e., Venezuela, Hungary, Turkey, the 
Philippines, etc.) have proceeded once in office to significantly erode their nations’ 
democratic institutions and norms, while other countries (including the United Kingdom, 
France, and Germany) have witnessed the rise of illiberal nationalistic political 
movements that often scoff at democratic traditions, traffic in demagoguery, and whose 
intentions many fear would set their nations on a path to authoritarianism. This anxiety is 
acutely felt in the United States, where the norm-shattering presidency of Donald Trump 
has left many Americans worried about their nation’s commitment to the public interest, 
the rule of law, equality, civil and human rights, freedom of the press, toleration of 
political differences, the integrity of independent political institutions, the constitutional 
system of checks and balances, honest and transparent governance, and the legitimacy of 
democratic processes.42 
 Multiple books—including (but not limited to) Demagoguery and Democracy by 
Patricia Roberts-Miller (2017), How Democracies Die by Steven Levitsky and Daniel 
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Ziblatt (2018), The People vs. Democracy: Why Our Freedom is in Danger and How to 
Save It by Yascha Mounk (2018), How Fascism Works: The Politics of Us and Them by 
Jason Stanley (2018), How to Save a Constitutional Democracy by Tom Ginsburg and 
Aziz Huq (2018), Why Liberalism Failed by Patrick Deneen (2019), The Road to 
Unfreedom: Russia, Europe, America by Timothy Snyder (2019), Can It Happen Here? 
Authoritarianism in America edited by Cass Sunstein (2019), and Crises of Democracy 
by Adam Przeworski (2019)—have addressed this “crisis of democracy.” This work does 
not address that topic head-on nor offer an explanation of its causes. It instead arrives at 
the topic by way of its study of political hypocrisy, a subject that repeatedly reveals just 
how important civic virtues—specifically the virtue of public-spiritedness—are to the 
maintenance of democracy. 
 It may seem obvious that democracies will be better off if their citizens and public 
servants act in accordance with democratic virtues. Yet many democracies—including 
the United States’—are premised on the idea that democratic governments do not need a 
virtuous people or virtuous office holders to function adequately. Instead, a greater 
emphasis has been placed on the importance of institutional design. This is the lesson 
James Madison imparted in Federalist 51 (1788): Since men are not “angels” and cannot 
be trusted to rule benevolently, it is instead necessary to safeguard liberty by “contriving 
the interior structure” of the government so that political power is distributed across the 
branches and throughout a diverse and extended republic. Each player in that system 
would possess enough power to check and balance others, to pursue their own 
prerogatives, resist encroachment, and counter rivals if necessary.43 Madison did not 
argue that virtuous people were needed for the United States’ new constitution to 
23 
 
succeed; instead, he based his argument for adopting the new system on its unique, 
carefully-calibrated institutional design and what he insisted was its ability to advance 
only that which was truly in the national interest while reining in bad actors. 
 The United States has operated continuously under its constitution for over 230 
years. Credit for its political endurance is often attributed to the institutional design of its 
government, which proponents argue has allowed the nation to weather multiple crises 
without sustaining a breakdown in democratic governance. There is no doubt that 
institutional design plays a critical—even at times decisive—role in the resilience of 
democratic regimes. Yet that resilience should not be attributed to institutional design 
alone. Civic virtue, or the moral qualities attendant to good citizenship and conscientious 
leadership, is also important and often underappreciated. 
 While modern political theory has often been described as downplaying the 
importance of civic virtue in favor of a greater emphasis on statecraft, the emphasis 
modern theorists placed on civic virtue should not go unacknowledged. Scholars have 
located arguments reinforcing the need for civic virtue in the works of Machiavelli and 
classical liberals like John Locke, Adam Smith, Madison and Hamilton, and John Stuart 
Mill.44 Classical, modern, and contemporary accounts of republicanism give civic virtue a 
central role in its political theory; as Philip Pettit wrote in Republicanism (1997), “One of 
the recurrent themes in the [republican] tradition is that the republic requires a basis in 
widespread civility; it cannot live by law alone.”45 Alexis de Tocqueville, a skeptic when 
it came to democracy, attributed its success in the United States to the mores of its 
citizens, whose “habits of the heart” as developed through religion, education, and local 
associations contributed more he believed to the maintenance of the democratic republic 
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in its earliest decades than the nation’s physical circumstances or laws.46 Despite the 
emphasis given to civic virtue by political thinkers at the dawn of the liberal era, interest 
in the subject eventually fell by the wayside as scholars and political figures focused on 
the merits of pluralism. It was not until the late twentieth century that contemporary 
scholars revived interest in citizenship theory and civic virtue as topics worthy of serious 
inquiry.47 
 Many elements drove the renewed scholarly attention to civic virtue. One 
significant factor was a growing realization that institutional design alone could not 
guarantee the adequate functioning or even success of democratic regimes. As William 
Galston observed, “[The] operation of liberal institutions is affected in important ways by 
the character of its citizens (and leaders) and that at some point the attenuation of 
individual virtue will create pathologies with which liberal political contrivances, 
however technically perfect their design, simply cannot cope. To an extent difficult to 
measure but impossible to ignore, the viability of liberal society depends on its ability to 
engender a virtuous citizenry.”48 This point was given added force by Steven Levitsky 
and Daniel Ziblatt in their 2018 book How Democracies Die. Drawing on two decades of 
work studying the collapse of democracies around the world, Levitsky and Ziblatt found 
that since the end of the Cold War, most democracies that backslid into authoritarianism 
did so when political leaders and political parties allowed demagogues to violate the 
informal democratic norms that had regulated democratic governance. Even though these 
demagogues claimed credibility for their actions by using the mechanisms of democracy 
to scale back democracy, their actions entailed violating norms that would have 
restrained past leaders. Rather than defend the primacy of those norms, partisan leaders 
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and citizens instead remained quiet as their nations’ democracies slowly but surely broke 
down.49 It was not enough for those nations to have well-designed democratic political 
institutions; it was also essential for the leaders and citizens of those nations to possess 
the civic virtue necessary to operate those institutions and ward off those who would 
hijack them. 
 Amidst deep political polarization, close electoral competition, and the norm-
shattering presidency of Donald Trump, there is growing concern in the United States 
that the nation’s current supply of civic virtue is proving insufficient to sustain its 
democratic traditions. Additionally, it is beginning to dawn on some that not only may 
the United States not be able to rely upon its vaunted constitutional system of checks and 
balances to arrest the nation’s democratic decline, but that the system itself—with its 
stark separation of executive and legislative power and various anti-majoritarian 
features—may be a driver of this dysfunction.50 One way to potentially reverse this 
democratic decline would be to reform the United States’ constitutional system. Such 
institutional reform is certainly worth consideration, but, if current concerns about the 
low stock of civic virtue in the United States are true, embarking on institutional reform 
in today’s environment may be akin to opening a political pandora’s box. An alternative, 
then, would be to take steps to replenish the nation’s supply of civic virtue so that its 
citizens and leaders reaffirm the principles and norms of democracy and raise the 
expectation that they ought to be put into practice. 
 Replenishing a democratic nation’s supply of civic virtue requires a reassertion of 
democratic norms, and one norm that is crucial for democracies to affirm in this regard is 
the norm of public-spiritedness, or the idea that political action ought to be motivated by 
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an unselfish concern for the public good, the well-being of society at large, and the 
widely-shared and broadly-defined values that shape and maintain the participatory 
public sphere. This norm encourages citizens and leaders to think beyond narrow 
concerns related to self-, group-, and partisan-interest and instead take into account the 
well-being of others and the nation as a whole and general ideas concerning right and 
wrong when engaged in politics.51 
 Public-spiritedness appears to be a fairly well-established norm in the United 
States. Public debates about public policies are usually argued in terms of the public 
interest, and the media present them as such. Citizens tend to claim that a sense of civic 
duty and an interest in society’s well-being rather than the pursuit of self-interest drives 
them to the polls. Politicians typically say they are motivated to seek office not out of a 
desire to secure public benefits for themselves but to serve their country and fellow 
citizens and craft good policies.52 When self-interest does appear to motivate political 
action (perhaps in the form of a business interest or someone professing to be the victim 
of an injustice) self-interested arguments are often reconfigured in terms of the public 
interest to win broader appeal; furthermore, as Steven Kelman writes, “Norms about 
public spirit in politics restrain the content of the demands that the self-interested can 
make. And, by implicitly accepting that their claims will be judged against a standard of 
what policy would be right, the self-interested open their case to scrutiny and make it 
easier to reject.”53 Even those who write their own self-interest into their conception of 
the public good can often only be faulted for failing to appreciate a broader notion of the 
public good rather than disregarding the public good altogether.54 
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 Yet self-, group-, and partisan-interests remain a potent force in politics, and such 
interests frequently tempt citizens and politicians who would typically affirm the norm of 
public-spiritedness into violating it. It is at this point that accusations of hypocrisy come 
into play. When someone is accused of hypocrisy, people are often drawn immediately to 
what that accusation suggests about the accused’s character. But as many of the case 
studies in this work reveal, accusations of hypocrisy in politics strike at something 
deeper. More than anything else, the discovery of hypocrisy—the accusation of which is 
so often used to call out someone for pursuing a narrow interest at the expense of a 
previously professed commitment to a political position expressed in terms of the public 
interest—offends our sense that politics ought to be animated by the norm of public-
spiritedness. More specifically, hypocrisy offends the norm of public-spiritedness by 
elevating excessively partisan, self-interested, and competitive political concerns over 
public-spirited norms such as impartiality, fairmindedness, egalitarianism, honesty, and 
rational governance. Accusing someone of hypocrisy, then, is one way to reassert the 
norm of public-spiritedness, reaffirm the importance of civic virtue, and pull democracy 
back toward its participatory ideals. 
 Accusations of hypocrisy can serve as powerful intellectual countermeasures to 
the threats posed by the current crisis of democracy. Make no mistake: Hypocrisy has 
always been present in politics, so the presence of hypocrisy in contemporary politics is 
by no means novel. Additionally, accusations of hypocrisy can be just as potent in more 
conventional political eras when democratic norms are stronger. The current crisis of 
democracy, however—brought about in part in the United States by deep political 
polarization and close electoral competition that compels citizens and leaders to resort to 
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a hardball, win-at-all-costs brand of politics—makes this a unique moment in American 
political history. Within this political environment, time-honored political norms 
associated with civic virtue—including the norm of public-spiritedness—are too often 
sacrificed to the pursuit of partisan political advantage. In times like these, accusations of 
hypocrisy can help sustain democracy and counter the most pernicious effects of 
polarization by insisting upon the importance of norms associated with civic virtue and 
public-spiritedness. 
 Yet while it is important for the well-being of democracies to nurture civic virtue 
and police lapses in public-spiritedness with accusations of hypocrisy, citizens should be 
careful about taking accusations of hypocrisy at face value. Sometimes such accusations 
are not valid or are thrown around simply to tarnish an opponent. Also, as mentioned 
earlier, there will be times when hypocrisy may be more or less acceptable. This will be 
especially true when other important democratic principles are involved, as they often 
are. 
 For example, competition and contestation are considered critical features of 
democracy, as they allow citizens to challenge authority, pose alternative policies, debate 
the public good, and express opinions concerning the direction of their government. A 
system featuring and responsive to political competition is preferable to one that 
squelches competition and public disagreement.55 Competitive political systems, 
however, also encourage citizens and politicians to think strategically about how they 
communicate with others, determine political priorities, forge alliances and negotiate 
compromises, and use the system to their advantage. Hypocrisy easily arises when what 
began as public-spirited political competition becomes preoccupied with gamesmanship. 
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If citizens of a democracy care about the principles underpinning democracy, they will 
need to find some way to reconcile the norm of contestation with the norm of public-
spiritedness, which is often asserted through accusations of hypocrisy. This suggests 
people’s dislike of hypocrisy must accommodate itself to some degree with the realities 
of competitive politics. 
 Similarly, it has been argued that hypocrisy can be used to call out partisans who 
sacrifice norms of public-spiritedness to the pursuit of partisan political advantage. But it 
is also worth remembering that partisan ideologies are themselves public-spirited 
expressions of the public good. How fair is it to accuse a partisan of hypocrisy—and, by 
extension, of somehow violating a norm attached to public-spiritedness—when that 
partisan’s hypocrisy is actually a defense of a partisan ideology that is itself a vision of 
the public good? Might there be times when a partisan principle is more important than a 
democratic norm? 
 People know hypocrisy when they see it. It’s an improper inconsistency, behavior 
in which someone’s words and/or deeds are at odds with one another in a way that is 
somehow morally wrong. What people often don’t appreciate in politics is that 
accusations of hypocrisy are not merely accusations of inconsistency but also of a failure 
to act in accordance with the norm of public-spiritedness, a principle all citizens and 
politicians in a democracy are expected to adhere to and uphold. But there are also times 
when hypocrisy may be more or less permissible in politics. These cases arise when 
norms of public-spiritedness come into conflict with one another or with other democratic 
norms. To determine the permissibility of hypocrisy, these norms must be weighed 
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against one another. The main body of this work represents an attempt to work through 
this dilemma. 
 
Methodology and Organization 
 This study distinguishes itself from prior scholarly work on hypocrisy by 
employing a methodological approach that allows for a more direct engagement with the 
various types of political hypocrisy as well as a more direct focus on questions 
concerning the permissibility of hypocrisy in politics. While it builds on the theoretical 
contributions of previous scholars, this study grounds its inquiry in case studies drawn 
from the real world of politics. 
 Through its use of case studies, the discussions of political hypocrisy in this work 
originate from actual accusations related to a variety of actual events. This approach 
allows for a more complete assessment of and comparison between the types of 
hypocrisy found in politics as well as a greater consideration of the ways in which real-
world political phenomena and circumstances are relevant to questions concerning the 
permissibility of hypocrisy in politics. 
 Most importantly, this study encounters hypocrisy in politics the way citizens 
encounter it—through the news, political commentary, and the back-and-forth between 
political antagonists—and reckons with it in light of the genuine political stakes and 
consequences involved. Hypocrisy is not a hypothetical, abstract concept here but 
something readers may have already encountered and wrestled with. The ultimate goal is 
to help guide concerned citizens through the puzzle of political hypocrisy by building up 
something like a case law on the subject, one drawn from a variety of circumstances and 
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accusations, tested and applicable within the real-world crucible of politics, and 
ultimately more nuanced, specific, and immediate in its analysis and conclusions than its 
predecessors. 
 All the cases featured in this work concern American politics and (for the most 
part) were drawn from events that occurred between 2014 and 2016, or roughly the final 
three years of Barack Obama’s presidency. This was not a quiet time in American 
politics. In addition to a standoff over a Supreme Court vacancy and the rise of ISIS in 
the Middle East as well as contentious debates over such topics as undocumented 
immigration, gun control, same-sex marriage, and racial inequality in the criminal justice 
system, this period of time also included the hotly-contested 2014 midterm elections, 
competitive presidential primaries in both major parties, and the 2016 presidential 
campaign between Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton. It is an understatement to say that 
a daily reading of the news provided an ample supply of material—approximately 1,000 
examples drawn from all corners of the political world—for this study to work with. 
 That said, it should be acknowledged that this study’s use of case studies raises 
the concern that the observations and conclusions contained in this text are conditioned 
by the historical circumstances of its time period. This is an inescapable problem for any 
scholarly work founded upon case studies, but it seems best to acknowledge that potential 
limitation up front. Two historical phenomena that shaped politics in this time period 
stand out in particular. 
 First, this study was conducted during a period of intense political polarization in 
the United States.56 In politically polarized times, differences between the parties are 
magnified, partisans increasingly dismiss the ideas and representatives of the opposition 
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as unacceptable, and centrism and moderation fall out of fashion among the politically 
engaged. When the competition for political power is close, polarization can encourage 
heated political rivalry. While there is some debate about whether contemporary 
polarization is a phenomenon mainly experienced and driven by political elites or one 
with roots in the broader electorate as well, and whether the current era is the result of a 
shift in people’s opinions toward greater ideological consistency or people merely sorting 
themselves into the parties that most accurately represent their views,57 scholars have 
identified a number of potential causes for the increase in polarization over the past forty 
years. These causes include increased economic inequality;58 heightened racial, ethnic, 
and religious divides;59 the rise of hyper-partisan media outlets and online media that 
make it easy for users to filter out dissenting views;60 and closely contested competitions 
for political power.61 No matter the underlying cause, however, the important thing to 
remember is that political polarization is often regarded as the defining feature of modern 
American politics as well as a major contributor to today’s political dysfunction. 
 It is hard to know how times of heightened political polarization shape or alter 
people’s attitudes regarding political hypocrisy. Engaged party members may consider 
hypocrisy a serious problem, one that afflicts more moderate and conciliatory party 
members (whose records appear to reflect a less-than-adequate devotion to party 
principles) as well as the opposition (who, when not branded as extremists, are 
sometimes portrayed as either confused moralists who don’t deserve the moral credibility 
they’ve assigned themselves or charlatans tapping into party members’ demands for 
ideological consistency in the pursuit of personal political power.) Their complaints may 
range from righteous indignation at a perceived violation of party orthodoxy to mere 
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nitpicking. At the same time, engaged party members might sweep much of their own 
party’s hypocrisy under the rug for the sake of party unity (which may only inflame the 
opposition’s outrage over hypocrisy.) If high polarization produces political gridlock, 
less-partisan citizens hoping for a more functional government might disregard behavior 
partisans consider hypocritical and instead praise politicians who prioritize pragmatism 
over strict ideological consistency. 
 On the other hand, times of low political polarization may produce different 
assumptions about political hypocrisy. People in such eras may not think of political 
hypocrisy as a major public problem or find themselves more willing to ignore it in order 
to preserve social unity and pragmatic political relationships. Ideologues would probably 
still consider hypocrisy problematic, but perhaps their critiques would be broader in 
nature and aimed more at a system that they felt was too complacent to care about 
principles. It is also possible, however, that most accusations of hypocrisy would 
originate from within the establishment and mainstream society as a way to control for 
dissent. 
 This is all speculation, of course. It may be that accusations of hypocrisy and 
people’s attitudes toward hypocrisy don’t vary much depending on whether there are high 
or low levels of political polarization. It may also be that any conclusions this study 
draws about hypocrisy are just as applicable to times of low polarization as they are to 
times of high polarization. It remains possible, however, that hypocrisy takes on a certain 
charge in times of high political polarization, and that this modern era of polarization 
conditions our assumptions about politics and our assessments of hypocrisy in ways we 
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are not fully aware of in the moment. While those concerns cannot be obviated, this study 
is aware they exist and has tried to account for them in its analysis. 
 The second historical circumstance that needs to be acknowledged is Donald 
Trump’s startling and victorious 2016 presidential campaign. When this study began in 
2014, it was widely assumed Hillary Clinton would enter the Democratic primary for 
president as a prohibitive frontrunner while the Republican contest would be a wide-open 
race with many viable contenders. Given Clinton’s reputation as a moderate in a party 
that was becoming increasingly liberal and the hardline conservatism that had asserted 
itself as a political force in the Republican Party, those campaigns alone were expected to 
generate plenty of accusations of hypocrisy for this study to draw from. That assumption 
certainly proved true. 
 What was not anticipated was Trump’s entry into the race and his rapid ascent to 
the top of the Republican primary field. Trump’s campaign was engulfed in controversy 
from the start, and it was almost as quickly pummeled by charges of hypocrisy. It did not 
take long for this study to be inundated by accusations of hypocrisy directed at Trump. 
Those accusations involved both major political issues as well as matters of relative 
insignificance; concerned both his public, political behavior as well as his private conduct 
and business affairs; originated from all corners of the political universe; and took the 
form of nearly every variety of hypocrisy imaginable. It is easy to implicate politicians of 
every stripe in acts of hypocrisy; Trump’s propensity for it, however, was astounding. 
 It is tempting to use the accusations of hypocrisy directed at Trump and his 
supporters as the basis for many of the case studies in this work, as they often provide 
excellent illustrations for the points that need to be made about hypocrisy in politics. 
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Doing so, however, would threaten to turn this work into an expose on Trump rather than 
an investigation of hypocrisy. Furthermore, the alleged hypocrisies of Donald Trump 
seem to be a special case deserving special attention. Therefore, none of the case studies 
in the main portion of this study are centered on Trump, who instead emerges as an 
incidental player in the political dramas that unfold within. Instead, the focus is placed on 
more conventional political hypocrisies and their more conventional perpetrators. 
 The cases that were ultimately selected for inclusion here were chosen for a 
number of reasons. Efforts were made when appropriate and opportune to draw on 
examples from across the ideological spectrum and from different branches and levels of 
government in order to present as diverse a picture of political hypocrisy as possible. In 
some cases, the examples used are vivid and drawn from memorable political events; in 
others, the examples are quirkier or even trivial and drawn from obscure or mundane 
events. Most importantly, however, they represent the different types of hypocrisy found 
in American politics. This study is subsequently organized along those lines. 
 The first case study, “The Torture Report,” examines the hypocrisy surrounding 
the United States’ use of torture during the War on Terror, a practice forbidden in the 
United States by both law and treaty and that the US government had criticized other 
nations for engaging in as a violation of basic human rights. This case study concerns a 
straightforward violation of principle, which is the most basic type of political hypocrisy, 
and explains why hypocrisy—a moral condemnation based upon the accused hypocrite’s 
own moral and ethical standards—is such a potent criticism in liberal societies and so 
damaging to the accused hypocrite’s credibility as a moral leader and as a steward of the 
public good. It also considers counterarguments offered by political realists who contend 
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principles can be violated in dire circumstances. The second case study, “Supreme 
Rationale,” maintains the focus on violations of principle by reviewing Justice Anthony 
Kennedy’s majority opinion in Obergefell v. Hodges (2015), the Supreme Court case that 
effectively legalized same-sex marriage throughout the United States. Critics of 
Kennedy’s opinion claimed Kennedy was a hypocrite for violating a principle he had 
articulated in past opinions concerning democratic rule (which stated the people, either 
directly or through their elected representatives, should be allowed to determine their 
own laws) but this case study demonstrates that violations of principle are rarely this 
straightforward, as the demands of equally important principles (in this case, the principle 
of democratic rule and the principle of equality) need to be weighed against one another 
in order to determine which principle takes priority over the other in a given situation. 
 The third case study, “The Consistent Life Ethic,” takes as its subject the issues of 
abortion and capital punishment and whether it is hypocritical for people who consider 
themselves “pro-life” to oppose abortion yet support the state’s use of the death penalty 
(and vice versa.) The alleged hypocrisy in this case study is an example of a logical 
inconsistency, a type of hypocrisy resulting from someone’s flawed reasoning. The 
appeal of this type of accusation is strong—it often suggests the accused is too confused 
or dimwitted to serve as a political or moral authority and that they have a poor 
understanding of what a rational assessment of the public good should lead them to 
believe—but while all accusations of hypocrisy require a review of the alleged 
hypocrite’s reasoning, accusers should be careful in these cases not to mistake a mental 
error for a moral error and to allow for the possibility that the accused have used a 
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different line of reasoning based on different assumptions to arrive at their own 
conclusions. 
 The next three case studies—“The Latte Salute” (concerning Republican outrage 
over a faux pas committed by President Obama that resembled a gaffe committed years 
earlier by President George W. Bush that went unchecked by those same Republicans,) 
“Confirmation Bias” (concerning the shifting standards adopted by Republicans and 
Democrats when it came to filling Supreme Court vacancies,) and “Settling the Score” 
(concerning Republican attempts to dismiss reports authored by the Congressional 
Budget Office when those reports were not to their liking)—focus on double standards, 
the most common type of hypocrisy found in politics. Double standards occur when 
people excuse themselves from following principles or standards they have or still expect 
others to follow. People’s aversion to double standards—which basically amount to 
treating one group of people differently than another—is rooted in their dislike of 
unfairness and a sense that the accused hypocrite has placed self-, group-, or partisan 
ambitions ahead of public-spirited principles that citizens and civic leaders have a 
responsibility to honor and uphold. Instances of double standards in politics, however, 
need to be assessed in light of democracy’s competitive nature, which allows in many 
situations for the expression of favoritism and the pursuit of personal or partisan 
advantage. In some cases, (such as when partisans hold rivals accountable for mistakes 
they are just as liable to make but that their rival’s fellow partisans are unlikely to draw 
attention to,) an engagement in hypocrisy can actually be beneficial; in other cases, (such 
as the violation of unwritten rules and norms that informally regulate political 
competition,) the hypocrisy can be debilitating and should be frowned upon. 
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 The seventh case study, which focuses on a married congressman who ran for 
office on a “family values” platform but who was then discovered to have had an 
extramarital affair, concerns personal failings, a type of double standard in which one’s 
publicly-espoused values are inconsistent with their personal behavior. While these types 
of hypocrisy are often more forgivable so long as the politician’s public behavior remains 
consistent with the principles that underlie their public service, their misconduct has 
much greater potential to undermine their credibility as a public servant if their political 
career was premised on the quality of their personal character. 
 The final case study, which explores three governors’ reversal of support for the 
Common Core educational initiative, deals with flip-flops, or instances in which someone 
switches their position on a political issue to something nearly opposite of what they once 
believed. Flip-flops often suggest to citizens that the flip-flopper lacks core convictions 
or cannot be trusted to provide an honest assessment of or pursue what they believe to be 
the public good while in office. Unlike double standards, flip-flops have a tendency to 
unnerve fellow partisans, although fellow partisans may also forgive a flip-flopper for 
moving closer to their preferred position. In evaluating flip-flops, it is important to 
consider if new information or changed circumstances can justify someone’s change of 
mind. In some cases, given the notion that democracies ought to reflect the beliefs of the 
people, it may even be acceptable for a public official to abandon an unpopular position 
to more closely align the government’s actions with popular opinion. 
 The conclusion reviews the essential findings of the case studies and connects 
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1. THE TORTURE REPORT 
 In December 2014, the United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 
under the leadership of Chairman Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) released a comprehensive 
study of the Central Intelligence Agency’s detention and interrogation program. The 
study detailed the CIA’s use of torture during the first five years of the United States’ so-
called “War on Terror,” which commenced as a response to al Qaeda’s attacks on the 
World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001. In 
addition to describing the numerous methods of torture inflicted upon detainees by 
American personnel, the report also concluded that the use of torture was not an effective 
means of gaining intelligence or cooperation from detainees; that the CIA had 
underreported the number of individuals it had detained, and had wrongly detained over 
two dozen individuals; that interrogators sometimes exceeded the CIA’s own guidelines 
for interrogation yet were rarely punished for doing so; that internal CIA critiques of the 
program were often ignored; and that the CIA had lied to policymakers about the severity 
of its interrogation methods and the conditions of prisoner confinement, and had often 
impeded executive and legislative oversight of the program.1  
 The Senate select committee’s report was hardly a revelation, since the United 
States’ use of torture during the War on Terror was well-known by December 2014. Its 
publication was newsworthy, however, because it was a thoroughly documented 
admission by an official arm of the United States government that the United States had 
routinely engaged in torture. Current and former CIA officials condemned the release of 
the report and its findings, arguing the study reached a number of incorrect conclusions 
and would inflame anti-American sentiment around the world.2 Many Republicans (with 
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the notable exception of Senator John McCain of Arizona) also criticized the report’s 
declassification on the grounds that it was the product of a partisan process, contained 
inaccuracies, and threatened to damage the image of the United States overseas; for their 
part, Democrats generally praised the release of the report as a way to formally set the 
record straight on torture.3 
 Following publication of the study, President Barack Obama issued a statement 
supporting its release. While acknowledging the service and sacrifice of United States 
intelligence operatives during the War on Terror, Obama also used his comments to 
reaffirm his opposition to torture. A key passage from his statement (beginning with the 
statement’s opening sentence) follows below: 
Throughout our history, the United States of America has done more than any 
other nation to stand up for freedom, democracy, and the inherent dignity and 
human rights of people around the world. … In the years after 9/11, with 
legitimate fears of further attacks and with the responsibility to prevent more 
catastrophic loss of life, the previous administration faced agonizing choices 
about how to pursue al Qaeda and prevent additional terrorist attacks against our 
country. As I have said before, our nation did many things right in those 
difficult years. At the same time, some of the actions that were taken were 
contrary to our values. That is why I unequivocally banned torture when I took 
office, because one of our most effective tools in fighting terrorism and keeping 
Americans safe is staying true to our ideals at home and abroad.4 
 
“Some of the actions that were taken were contrary to our values.” In stating this, 
Obama basically admitted that by engaging in torture—an action “contrary to [the 
nation’s] values”—the United States had engaged in hypocrisy. Granted, Obama doesn’t 
use the word “hypocrisy” in his statement; perhaps as President he hoped to save some 
face by avoiding such a strong condemnatory term, or maybe it was just so obvious that 
hypocrisy was the charge that he didn’t feel the need to use it. Regardless, the gist of his 
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statement—again, that the United States took actions that were contrary to its values—
amounts to an admission of hypocrisy. 
 This work begins with this particular case study because it is a clear-cut, 
straightforward example of political hypocrisy. In this case, a political actor (the 
government of the United States) claimed adherence to a principle (specifically, a 
principle prohibiting the use of torture) and then proceeded to violate that principle. Acts 
such as these are easily condemned as moral failings, their perpetrators easily accused of 
wrongdoing (or at least behaving in a less than morally optimal way.) 
 This is too simplistic, however. Hypocrisy is not mere wrongdoing. In politics, for 
instance, politicians accuse each other of doing the wrong thing all the time. Political 
opponents regularly accuse each other of voting the wrong way on contested legislation. 
Rather than accuse their opponents of hypocrisy, though, politicians in such situations 
instead argue their opponents are acting the wrong way and in accordance with the wrong 
set of moral values, leading inevitably to debates about the right and wrong ways to run a 
country. Politicians can make this case without resorting to accusations of hypocrisy. All 
they would need to do is cite reasons why they believe they are in the right and their 
opponents are wrong. 
 An accusation of hypocrisy, then, is a particular kind of accusation of 
wrongdoing, one in which someone is accused of acting in a way that runs counter to 
their own earlier articulated beliefs and principles concerning the right or proper way to 
act. In other words, a hypocrite (in the moral sense of the term) is someone who does 
something wrong according to their own standards of right. They are improperly 
inconsistent with themselves. Someone who accuses another of hypocrisy does not base 
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their moral claim of wrongdoing on an objective moral code or their own standards of 
right and wrong, but by referencing the beliefs and prior actions of the accused. In this 
way, the accused condemn themselves. 
 It is fairly easy to prove that the United States acted hypocritically and violated its 
own held principles when it initiated a torture program following 9/11. The United States, 
after all, is a signatory of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (of which Article 5 
reads, “No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment”);5 the Geneva Conventions (of which Convention III, Part III, Section 1, 
Article 17, paragraph 4 reads, “No physical or mental torture, nor any other form of 
coercion, may be inflicted on prisoners of war to secure from them information of any 
kind whatever”);6 and the 1985 United Nations Convention Against Torture (of which 
Article 2.2 reads, “No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a 
threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked 
as a justification of torture.”)7 Principles against torture and ensuring due process for the 
accused are further enshrined in the domestic law of the United States in the Bill of 
Rights, specifically in the 5th and 6th Amendments (due process) and the 8th Amendment 
(“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual 
punishments inflicted.”) Torture is also criminalized in the United States criminal code 
(see Title 18, Chapter 113C.)8 Furthermore, the United States has positioned itself as one 
of the world’s most prominent advocates for human rights and has often made that 
advocacy a cornerstone of its foreign policy. It has frequently condemned nations that 
have not protected the human rights of their own citizens, and actually released State 
Department reports criticizing nations (namely China, Indonesia, Iran, Jordan, Libya, 
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North Korea, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Tunisia, Turkey) for using methods of 
torture (waterboarding, stress positions, forced standing, forced nudity, threats of harm to 
person and family, sleep deprivation, loud music, prolonged solitary confinement, 
confinement in small spaces) that the United States was using when those reports were 
published.9 It is abundantly clear that in sanctioning the use of torture, the United States 
by its own standards committed a grievous wrong and thus behaved hypocritically. 
 Yet is it really necessary to call out the United States for hypocrisy on this matter 
if our purpose is to simply call out the United States for its immoral behavior? To revisit 
the last sentence of the previous paragraph, isn’t it abundantly clear that in sanctioning 
the use of torture, the United States committed a grievous wrong not just by its own 
standards but regardless of its own standards? What does the accusation of hypocrisy add 
to the moral condemnation? What is its utility? 
 To illustrate this quandary, consider the very basic example of someone who 
murders another human being. That’s wrong regardless of whether the murderer has a 
principle against killing other people or not. Even if the murderer did have a principle 
against killing other people, an accusation of hypocrisy would seem to add little to 
anyone’s moral condemnation of the murderer. People don’t usually rush out to condemn 
a murderer as a hypocrite (“You said you opposed killing others, but then you did!”) 
when they can simply condemn a murderer as a murderer (“You killed someone!”) The 
pejorative “murderer” is more severe than and does not need the reinforcement of the 
pejorative “hypocrite.” 
 An accusation of hypocrisy can be used, however, to make an end run around a 
political argument whose strength may be seen to depend in part on the arbitrary 
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subjective authority of its advocate. In liberal democracies, individuals are free to believe 
whatever they want for whatever reasons they cite, while tolerance of other people and 
their ideas is considered a virtue. While some arguments or beliefs could be said to be 
objectively better than others, someone in a liberal society can always as a last resort opt 
to fall back on their subjective authority as a sovereign citizen and respond to a political 
argument by saying, “That’s simply what I believe, and you happen to believe something 
different. It comes down to your beliefs against mine, so we’ll have to agree to disagree.” 
Consequently, democratic societies—which often tout their openness to all ideas as an 
ideal way to ascertain the truth or determine the best course of action—can easily devolve 
into stalemates between sides who insist their subjective beliefs are right and deserving of 
tolerance in the public sphere.10 
 When someone is discovered to be a hypocrite, however, their own subjective 
authority works against them, as their accuser does not need to rely on their (the 
accuser’s) own subjective beliefs to counter the hypocrite’s arguments but can cite 
instead the hypocrite’s own previously-articulated beliefs to undermine the hypocrite’s 
case. If it is believed the self is supreme and impervious to any outside critique that can 
be written off as subjective, no one is in a better position to critique the self than itself. 
Hence the allure of the accusation of hypocrisy in a system that elevates the authority of 
the sovereign self over that of any outside independent authority, as a hypocrite basically 
bears witness against oneself. 
 In other words, don’t just take the accuser’s word for it: Accusations of 
hypocrisy—and their implications of wrongdoing—are based upon the premises 
established by the accused rather than the accuser. It is hard for the accused to escape the 
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charge of wrongdoing when it is their own argument that condemns them. The accusation 
of wrongdoing is also most devastating when it is made by someone who agrees with the 
hypocrite’s original position, as the hypocrite’s new position is no longer consistent with 
a position the accuser believes is right and that perhaps motivated the accuser to support 
the hypocrite in the first place. The accuser’s accusation of hypocrisy then becomes an 
accusation of not only wrongdoing but betrayal of both the accuser and the hypocrite’s 
own values. 
 This gets a little more complicated when the accuser is an opponent who actually 
prefers the hypocrite’s new position. For example, a politician who raises taxes when 
they had earlier pledged not to raise taxes may be accused of hypocrisy not only by their 
supporters but by political opponents who, as it turns out, actually favor the tax hike. The 
purpose of the opponents’ accusation would not be to voice their displeasure with the 
hypocrite’s new position on taxes but to paint the hypocrite as untrustworthy, 
unprincipled, or politically craven, or to make sure the hypocrite’s supporters are aware 
the hypocrite is now embracing a position they (the hypocrite’s supporters) consider 
wrong and undeserving of support. This can get even more confusing for a neutral 
observer who may wonder why the hypocrite’s opponent is attacking the hypocrite for 
adopting a position the opponent agrees with. A morally ambivalent neutral observer may 
also in all the back-and-forth remain at a loss as to which of the hypocrite’s two positions 
is actually right, knowing with certainty only that the hypocrite switched positions but not 
that the hypocrite’s switch is correct. In this way, the accusation of hypocrisy can sow 
further moral confusion. 
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 If we scale all that back, however, and focus merely on an accusation of hypocrisy 
originating from a supporter and directed at a politician for adopting a position 
inconsistent with a prior position held by the politician and still held by the supporter 
(and that may have led the supporter to support the politician in the first place) we can 
see how the accusation of hypocrisy is an accusation of wrongdoing based on the 
hypocrite’s own subjective moral authority that does not rely on the subjective moral 
authority of a political critic or opponent.* This is a powerful deployment of the 
accusation of hypocrisy. When someone accuses the United States of hypocrisy on 
torture, that accusation of wrongdoing is especially difficult to counter when it appeals 
not only to the outside authority of (for example) the United Nations, or the western 
liberal democratic tradition, or a religious or philosophical doctrine, but to the United 
States’ own standards. One can insist that torture is wrong and that the United States was 
wrong to torture not just because someone else said it is wrong to torture but (most 
potently) because the United States itself said it is wrong to torture. 
 One can convincingly argue, however, that the rightness of moral precepts is not 
determined by nation-states. The United States does not decide if torture is morally 
permissible, and few would consider torture moral if the United States legalized it on its 
own moral authority. Torture has been determined to be morally wrong not because a 
government or any other subjective entity has declared it morally wrong but because it 
violates a number of moral precepts. We may ask again why it matters to call the United 
States a hypocrite on torture if the United States ultimately lacks the objective authority 
 
* This is not to say there isn’t a subjective component to the determination of whether or not an accusation 
of hypocrisy actually is an instance of hypocrisy. Making that determination is a necessary undertaking in 
evaluating hypocrisy, but that level of inquiry is not the main concern at this moment. 
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to make authoritative moral determinations and therefore is in no position to declare 
actions right or wrong. Why not simply say the United States is wrong and leave aside 
the added accusation that the United States is wrong according to its own non-
authoritative standards? 
 The answer is fairly simple: The United States may lack the objective moral 
authority to determine morals but it can certainly claim moral credibility with others by 
declaring its support for and then acting in accordance with a set of moral principles. An 
accusation of hypocrisy—in which someone is accused of failing to act in accordance 
with a moral principle they have declared their support for—is useful then as a way to not 
only criticize someone for doing something wrong but also for questioning someone’s 
credibility as an agent for a moral cause. 
 Moral credibility matters in politics. Many citizens’ politics are motivated by 
moral and philosophical beliefs pertaining to the development of a good society and the 
operation of good government. In determining who to support in politics, many people 
look to a political actor’s moral and philosophical beliefs out of the hope that that 
political actor, once politically empowered, will pursue policies based on those beliefs. A 
political actor who betrays those beliefs by becoming a hypocrite risks losing the support 
of those inclined to support that person on account of their shared beliefs and potentially 
damages their (the actor’s) credibility not only as an agent for those beliefs but as an 
actor primarily motivated by moral beliefs generally.11 
 A political hypocrite who fails to act in accordance with a moral principle they 
had earlier openly supported potentially shatters the trust others had placed in that person 
as a moral agent working for a higher moral purpose. It also raises the possibility that the 
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hypocrite is motivated by something other than a moral cause, unconcerned with the 
well-being of others to whom their morality should ostensibly apply, or using a false 
sense of morality as a weapon to bludgeon their opponents or simply make themselves 
look good. The hope that people would rally around the hypocrite as an agent for a moral 
cause or a moral order is diminished. 
 This desire to avoid hypocrisy in politics in order to build or maintain one’s moral 
credibility was made explicit in President John Kennedy’s June 1963 speech calling for 
the passage of a civil rights act ending segregation in public facilities. Delivered in the 
wake of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference’s Birmingham campaign and as a 
reaction to Alabama Governor George Wallace’s attempt to physically block the 
integration of the University of Alabama, the speech was also set against the backdrop of 
the Cold War, a tense competition for geopolitical influence that pit the United States and 
its liberal democratic allies against a bloc of communist nations led by the Soviet Union. 
Many Americans believed the United States could not rely on military or economic might 
alone to win the Cold War but would have to convince citizens in countries around the 
world that democratic values were better than communist values. Kennedy realized, 
however, that the Jim Crow laws that codified racial segregation in the American south 
undermined the United States’ moral credibility as a champion of democracy. It wasn’t 
just that Americans would find it hard to look themselves in the mirror and claim their 
nation acted in accordance with democratic principles so long as Jim Crow reigned, but 
that it would be hard for Americans to persuade other nations to embrace democratic 
notions of liberty and equality when there was plenty of evidence indicating the United 
States did not follow those principles itself. In his speech, Kennedy used Americans’ 
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desire to win the Cold War along with their moral devotion to democracy as reasons to 
end segregation: 
We preach freedom around the world, and we mean it, and we cherish our 
freedom here at home, but are we to say to the world, and much more importantly, 
to each other that this is the land of the free except for the Negroes; that we have 
no second-class citizens except Negroes; that we have no class or caste system, no 
ghettoes, no master race except with respect to Negroes? Now the time has come 
for this Nation to fulfill its promise.12 
 
It was a moral and strategic argument: If the United States wanted respect and credibility 
as a moral agent and hoped others would follow its moral lead, its actions would need to 
reflect its moral principles. 
 A similar notion motivated President Obama when he declared in his statement on 
the Senate’s CIA torture report that “one of [the United States’] most effective tools in 
fighting terrorism and keeping Americans safe is staying true to our ideals at home and 
abroad.” A major advantage the United States has over many of its rivals on the world 
stage is its embrace of values connected to democracy and human rights. It claims that 
its foreign policy is guided by those values, and that even the ultimate goal of its 
military interventions (in addition to keeping the country safe) is the promotion of those 
values. The United States often contrasts these values with those of its rivals, whose 
beliefs, actions, and conduct often reflect a lack of concern for democracy and human 
rights. The moral values of the United States help the country gain moral credibility, 
admiration, and allies around the world. When it betrays those values—as it did when it 
trampled on the human rights of prisoners by torturing them—citizens everywhere 
begin to wonder if the United States should be considered a credible moral actor or just 
another player on the international stage more interested in pursuing its narrow national 
interests than in supporting and upholding a moral code. People drawn to politics as an 
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expression of moral and political values may finally regard the United States as a 
cynical and craven actor unworthy of rallying around. Engaged this way in hypocrisy, 
the United States appears no better than its oppressive, authoritarian, and inhumane 
rivals. By accounting for its mistakes, the senate’s report and Obama’s statement 
sought to remind Americans that fidelity to its values (and avoiding hypocrisy) was not 
only right but strategically sound.  
 And make no mistake, several of the United States’ rivals (or at least those who 
had been criticized by the U.S. for their own poor human rights records) jumped at the 
opportunity to diminish the United States’ moral credibility by highlighting America’s 
hypocrisy on torture. China’s state news agency Xinhua devoted a page on its website 
to the story and titled it “How Long Can the US Pretend to be a Human Rights 
Champion?” An editorial on that page read, 
[The United States] should clean up its own backyard first and respect the rights 
of other countries to resolve their issues by themselves. 
 
America is neither a suitable role model nor a qualified judge on human rights 
issues in other countries, as it pertains to be. 
 
Yet, despite this, people rarely hear the US talking about its own problems, 
preferring to be vocal on the issues it sees in other countries, including China. … 
What the US appears to be doing is defending its own national interests and 
wielding human rights issues as a political tool.13 
 
A pro-Beijing newspaper in Hong Kong stated, “The report will be powerful evidence 
that will totally unveil the ugly human rights face of the US and will serve a heavy blow 
to its credibility and international image.”14 Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei 
posted two messages on Twitter addressing the subject: 
Any noble man would feel the sweat of shame about #GTMO; then-US.Pres. 




[The United States] claim #humanrights &trample its basics in their prisons, in 
interactions w nations &even w their own ppl.#TortureReport #Ferguson 2/8/10* 
 
The newly installed government of Egypt—which faced international condemnation for 
its crackdown on political dissent following a 2013 coup that deposed President 
Mohamed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood—did not offer comment, but, as reported by 
The Guardian, “Those [Egyptians] who did react said the report highlighted the 
hypocrisy of the US, who have often condemned Egypt’s recent human rights abuses. 
‘America cannot demand human rights reports from other countries when this proves 
they know nothing about human rights,’ said a pro-regime television host, Tamer Amin, 
on his show.”15 
 Let us state the obvious: The governments of China, Iran, and Egypt are in no 
position to stand in judgment of the human rights records of other countries. Even 
accounting for the United States’ flaws, it is difficult to take seriously a critique levied 
against a nation with widespread human rights protections by three nations with abysmal 
human rights records. Any charge of hypocrisy they make against the United States 
ultimately rebounds by degrees of magnitude onto them. It is a classic case of the pot 
calling the kettle black. 
 Yet it is doubtful the leaders of those countries care much about what the rest of 
world thinks about their records on human rights. Even if they did, it is easy to see their 
concern is a façade. They’re probably more interested in taking the United States’ moral 
credibility down a notch and undermining America’s reputation on the global stage. So 
 
* Khamenei’s inclusion of #GTMO is a reference to the United States’ military prison at Guantanamo Bay, 
Cuba, which is often referred to as “Gitmo.” Khamenei’s mention of “#Ferguson” is a reference to 
Ferguson, Missouri, the site of a fatal police shooting of an African American teenager in the summer of 
2014 that resulted in protests, riots, and a forceful intervention by law enforcement officers. 
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maybe it’s not so much a case of the pot calling the kettle black as it is a case of the pot 
making it abundantly clear for all to see that this kettle that thinks it’s so great and that 
criticizes others for not being as great as it claims to be is in fact—just like everyone else 
around here—black and therefore in no position themselves to lecture others on human 
rights or claim the exalted moral high ground on the issue. 
 If people around the world become convinced the actions of the United States are 
not motivated by its moral principles, perhaps they will lose faith in the United States as 
an agent interested in making the moral order it propagates a reality and instead assume 
(and operate in accordance with) a world order based on less-principled concerns. Such a 
world order is likely to favor nations like China, Iran, and Egypt, which are willing to 
ignore human rights concerns in pursuit of their regimes’ interests. And as for the United 
States? While their commitment to human rights is considerably greater than their critics, 
their reputation suffers in light of the torture report, as they appear as willing as any other 
nation to violate moral principles, including those that are widely-accepted by others and 
that they have acknowledged as valid. 
 There is a final political perspective to weigh here. Those who consider 
themselves political realists may argue we are assuming too much in this case of 
hypocrisy and violation of principle. They may in fact argue the worldview of less-
principled political actors is, at the end of the day, the only worldview that matters, as it 
reflects the true nature of international relations. Principles don’t guide politics, they 
would say; what ultimately matters are security and order. Principles are fine to follow 
when the political stakes are low, but we should not bind ourselves to them if doing so 
jeopardizes our well-being. And if it is acceptable to break principles in a world of 
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political expediency, then we definitely should not obsess over something like hypocrisy, 
which is only a sin if moral principles are the ultimate political concern. 
 These views are most often associated with the 16th century’s foremost advocate 
of realpolitik, Niccolò Machiavelli. For Machiavelli, the security of the state was 
supreme, and the state’s security was bound up in the success of a prudent and virtuous 
ruler, one who could defend the state from foreign threats and secure it against internal 
disruption and palace intrigue. This meant the ruler at times would need to resort to “well 
committed” cruelties, or, as Machiavelli wrote, “those (if it is permissible to use the word 
well of evil) which are perpetrated once for the need of securing one’s self, and which 
afterwards are not persisted in, but are exchanged for measures as useful to the subjects 
as possible.”16 Faced with the need to quell a domestic uprising or halt a plot against his 
position, Machiavelli was not opposed to a surgical act of cruelty, one that would 
demonstrate to his subjects and rivals that he would not be constrained by conventional 
morality if his rule or the security of his state (and by extension, his subjects) was 
threatened.17 
 Consequently, Machiavelli is also often considered an apostle of political 
hypocrisy. Despite peoples’ noble aspirations and moral expectations, Machiavelli felt it 
was necessary for rulers to assume the world was a fundamentally “vulgar” place. This 
required a hypocritical duplicity whereby a ruler presented himself to his people as better 
than the means he was willing to adopt if necessary: 
I would even be bold to say that to possess [positive qualities] and always to 
observe them is dangerous, but to appear to possess them is useful. Thus it is well 
to seem merciful, faithful, humane, sincere, religious, and also to be so; but you 
must have the mind so disposed that when it is needful to be otherwise you may 
be able to change to the opposite qualities. And it must be understood that a 
prince, and especially a new prince, cannot observe all those things which are 
58 
 
considered good in men, being often obliged, in order to maintain the state, to act 
against faith, against charity, against humanity, and against religion. And, 
therefore, he must have a mind disposed to adapt itself according to the wind, and 
as the variations of fortune dictate, and, as I said before, not deviate from what is 
good, if possible, but be able to do evil if constrained. 
 A prince must take great care that nothing goes out of his mouth which is 
not full of the above-named five qualities, and, to see and hear him, he should 
seem to be all mercy, faith, integrity, humanity, and religion. And nothing is more 
necessary than to seem to have this last quality, for men in general judge more by 
the eyes than by the hands, for every one can see, but very few have to feel. 
Everybody sees what you appear to be, few feel what you are, and those few will 
not dare to oppose themselves to the many, who have the majesty of the state to 
defend them; and in the actions of men, and especially of princes, from which 
there is no appeal, the end justifies the means.18 
 
Machiavelli certainly believed a ruler should appear to be what he ultimately is not. In 
broad terms, the ruler should appear to others as moral while willing to behave immorally 
if necessary. Machiavelli also believed the people would fall for this charade if it was 
well-executed. That is the mark of a devious political hypocrite, albeit one Machiavelli 
would consider highly effective. 
 There is a certain kind of superhuman thrill we experience when reading 
Machiavelli’s The Prince (similar to what we feel when watching The Godfather, Dirty 
Harry, or Breaking Bad) in which we revel in someone’s triumph via means that go 
beyond conventional morality. We perhaps at times even long to do so ourselves in our 
daily lives (albeit on a less violent scale) by shucking aside tedious procedure or politesse 
to simply do what so obviously needs to be done. With Machiavelli, however, readers are 
too often swept away by his stark prose and sensational examples and forget that he is 
fundamentally an advocate for political prudence. His endorsement of cruelty is always 
accompanied by the caveat of necessity. 
 As a political realist, Machiavelli knew that leaders sometimes need to resort to 
extreme measures that violate their moral principles in order to secure the state. Yet 
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Machiavelli was also well-aware that citizens place great stock in principled leadership 
and could lose faith in a ruler who does not live up to their moral expectations. That loss 
of moral credibility could risk the domestic stability the prince so ardently desires. 
According to Machiavelli, cruelty well committed would spare others the kind of cruelty 
that would accompany invasion or civil war. Cruelty for cruelty’s sake or cruelty poorly 
committed would only alienate the people the ruler has a duty to serve and protect and 
potentially create the conditions that would lead to a time of conflict and cruelty. A 
prudent ruler with a keen appreciation for the way the world really works is also one 
who, absent an existential emergency, acts in accordance with moral principles. Despite 
his focus on cruelty and fear, Machiavelli maintains the ruler should avoid it in normal 
circumstances. A ruler should only indulge political hypocrisy—in which a ruler reveals 
himself to be morally worse than he had led people to believe—as a last resort when the 
security of the state is imperiled.19 
 The overseers of the United States’ torture program insisted the torture program 
met this standard. After 9/11, they argued it was necessary to acquire as much 
information as possible from detainees captured during the War on Terror in order to 
prevent another devastating terrorist attack. National security concerns trumped the 
United States’ fidelity to its principles pertaining to human rights and in turn justified the 
use of “enhanced interrogation techniques” (the George W. Bush administration’s term of 
choice for “methods of torture.”) Given the circumstances, the overseers of the torture 
program would claim their hypocrisy ought to be excused.20 
 It’s not a convincing argument. In the first place, the Senate Intelligence 
Committee’s report indicated no valuable intelligence was gathered through the use of 
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torture. Still, the overseers of the program insisted there was, and, even if there wasn’t, it 
may be a case of Monday-morning-quarterbacking to criticize someone for trying to 
extract information from a detainee through torture since American intelligence officials 
could not know that a torture method would prove unproductive until it was tried. Yet 
even before the program got underway, the United States knew torture was an ineffective 
way to glean accurate and actionable intelligence from a detainee,21 a finding subsequent 
studies have supported.22 (Better methods would include building relationships with 
detainees or offering to help them or those they care about in exchange for their 
cooperation.) Others defended torture on the grounds that no other method had the 
potential to compel detainees to pass along information concerning imminent terrorist 
attacks. Yet the Senate report found no evidence that this “ticking time bomb scenario” 
ever existed in reality.23 In purely utilitarian terms, there is not much to recommend 
torture as a necessary evil. If the emergency of 9/11 in some way justified action that 
violated the core moral principles of the United States, one would be hard-pressed to 
make the case that torturing detainees passed that threshold. 
 With little to show for its efforts except a damaged reputation on the world stage, 
the United States probably did more to hurt than protect itself by initiating a torture 
program. People around the world were probably less inclined to think of the United 
States as a morally conscientious agent in light of the country’s hypocrisy on torture. 
Regardless of whatever truly motivated the United States in foreign affairs, residents of 
other countries could reasonably believe the United States would not be constrained by 
moral principle when acting beyond its borders and perhaps began to wonder if its talk of 
human rights was merely a way to disguise imperialist or self-interested ambitions. If part 
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of the United States’ War on Terror was to win the “hearts and minds” of western 
skeptics who could be persuaded to embrace the worldview and assurances of a terrorist 
group like al Qaeda, then torture did nothing to advance that cause. Unable to excuse it, 
the United States became hypocrites and saw its moral credibility diminished. It’s a 
lesson worth learning. Torture, it turned out, was both a moral and strategic wrong. Even 
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2. SUPREME RATIONALE 
 
 The easiest, most straightforward way to conceptualize a case of hypocrisy 
involving a violation of principle is to imagine a scenario involving an isolated, abstract 
act of wrongdoing. That is, to imagine someone having a principle—i.e., always 
attending church on Sunday—and then not following through on it. 
 But when someone violates a principle and consequently commits hypocrisy, that 
person almost always has an excuse for doing so. In evaluating their hypocrisy, it needs 
to be determined if their reason for violating a principle actually excuses their violation. 
In some instances, a violation of principle might be attributed to events outside the 
violator’s control or to extraordinary circumstances that would make honoring the 
principle either extremely difficult or irresponsible (i.e., missing church due to a flat tire, 
a flooded basement, or illness.) People are usually fairly forgiving when something like 
that happens. Other excuses, however, are less convincing (i.e., skipping church to sleep 
in, to nurse a hangover, or to catch an NFL game) because they involve actions within 
our control and do not establish moral claims that would supersede those animating the 
principle; in fact, the examples listed above seem to be actions the principle is intended to 
check.  
 There is also, of course, a gray area into which potentially excusable actions fall 
(i.e., missing church because your favorite football team was visiting this week, or 
because all your college buddies were in town and Sunday morning was the only time all 
of you could get together, or because your family was celebrating your parents’ fiftieth 
anniversary.) Someone might be a stickler and insist the violator’s hypocrisy remains 
unexcused since the big game, class reunions, and family get-togethers do not trump a 
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principle about remembering the sabbath and keeping it holy. It’s a commandment, after 
all. But even if that principle hadn’t been etched into stone by the finger of God on 
Mount Sinai, the stickler still might add that the violator did consider attending church 
important enough to make it a principle, meaning it shouldn’t be subordinated to another 
action no matter the intention behind the action or its merits. Others might be more 
magnanimous given (among a variety of reasons) the unique and exceptional 
circumstances concerning the events provoking the violation, the moral significance of 
the principle being violated, and the violator’s prior record of adherence to the principle. 
But let’s not get hung up on this. The main point here is that sometimes people violate 
principles by taking actions unmandated by principle.  
 But what if a violation of principle resulted from adherence to another principle? 
What if the principled church-goer also had a principle stating, “I will always attend my 
favorite team’s games when they come to town,” or “I will always attend my class get-
togethers,” or “I will honor my father and mother”? (That last one’s a commandment too, 
of course.) In other words, if we hope to avoid hypocrisy, what should we do when two 
principles come into conflict with one another in such a way that we cannot adhere to one 
without violating the other? 
 If we’re honest about it, most political issues can be framed in one way or another 
as conflicts between competing principles. We’ve already (kind of) confronted this 
dilemma in the previous case study about the United States’ torture program (“The 
Torture Report”) where it was suggested the United States’ principle prohibiting torture 
conflicted with a principle concerning national security. The catch there, however, was 
that no evidence existed to suggest the well-being of the United States was either secured 
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or advanced through the use of torture, meaning the conflict between principles only 
existed in a far-fetched and highly unlikely scenario. Still, many political issues we deal 
with on a day-to-day basis can be viewed as conflicts between held principles. One could 
even argue that one of the main purposes of politics is to manage this sort of dilemma, as 
there is little need to debate what to do when faced with a choice between an action that 
accords with a principle and one that does not. Once it gets more complicated than that, 
though, and people find themselves divided over which proper course of action to follow, 
we often turn to politics as a way to resolve this dilemma. Yet if politics is a realm in 
which its practitioners must inevitably subordinate held principles for the sake of acting 
on other held principles, is anyone who practices politics doomed to be a hypocrite? 
 As the nation’s court of last resort, the United States Supreme Court is confronted 
with cases involving stark conflicts between principles all the time. For example, 
consider Obergefell v. Hodges, the 2015 case that required states to license and recognize 
same-sex marriages.1 The dispute at the heart of the case was fairly straightforward: 
Various states through duly-enacted legislation had defined marriage as a union of one 
man and one woman. A number of same-sex couples in those states sued their state 
governments claiming it was unconstitutional for those states to treat them differently 
than opposite-sex couples by either denying them marriage licenses or refusing to 
recognize their lawful out-of-state marriages. A slim five-judge majority consisting of the 
Court’s four liberal members and Justice Anthony Kennedy (who authored the majority 
opinion) sided with the same-sex couples in the case. The four remaining conservative 
judges (including Chief Justice John Roberts) sided with the states that had enacted bans 
on same-sex marriage. 
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 Obergefell pit two major principles against one another: The principle of equality, 
or the idea that all people ought to be treated the same under the law, and the principle of 
democratic rule, or the idea that the people either directly or through their elected 
representatives have the authority to determine the laws of the land. No matter where 
anyone stands on the issue of same-sex marriage, it is probably fair to say the vast 
majority of Americans hold those two principles dear. Neither principle is regarded by 
Americans as a minor guideline applicable only in rare circumstances. Americans instead 
celebrate and cherish them both as supreme political values. 
 They are also two principles the Supreme Court is committed to upholding. 
Significantly, neither Kennedy nor Roberts dismissed the importance of the principle that 
was on the losing end of their opinions in Obergefell. In fact, Kennedy actually took time 
to recognize the importance of the principle of democratic rule (“Last Term, a plurality of 
this Court reaffirmed the importance of the democratic principle in Schuette v. BAMN [an 
affirmative action case], noting the ‘right of citizens to debate so they can learn and 
decide and then, through the political process, act in concert to try to shape the course of 
their own times.’ Indeed, it is most often through democracy that liberty is preserved and 
protected in our lives”) while Roberts acknowledged the validity of the principle of 
equality (“Petitioners make strong arguments rooted in social policy and considerations 
of fairness. They contend that same-sex couples should be allowed to affirm their love 
and commitment through marriage, just like opposite-sex couples. That position has 
undeniable appeal.”) If anything, there was a tacit assumption that both principles were 
important, must somehow coexist with one another, and could never completely cancel 
the other out. 
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 The Court’s duty in Obergefell then, as in nearly all the cases it hears, was not to 
determine which long-held principle had to be rejected but rather which principle in this 
particular situation took priority over the other. That required the justices to turn to 
another standard or principle for guidance, one that would help them make such a 
determination. In Obergefell, that standard was voiced by Kennedy: “[T]he Constitution 
contemplates that democracy is the appropriate process for change, so long as that 
process does not abridge fundamental rights.” In other words, the principle of democratic 
rule should prevail over the principle of equality unless the principle of democratic rule 
runs afoul of a fundamental right, which, by definition, is a right possessed by all. 
 It was on the issue of what constituted a “fundamental right” that the Court 
ultimately found itself divided. For Kennedy, the concept of a fundamental right included 
liberties related to the “personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy, 
including intimate choices that define personal identity and beliefs.” Kennedy concluded 
that the right to marry was, according to this definition, a fundamental right protected by 
the Constitution, and that the reasons the Court considered marriage a fundamental right 
(that marriage was “inherent in the concept of personal autonomy,” “support[ed] a two-
person union unlike any other in its importance to the committed individuals,” 
“safeguards children and families,” and “is a keystone of our social order”) could be 
“appl[ied] with equal force to same-sex couples” and opposite-sex couples. On the other 
hand, Chief Justice John Roberts used a narrower definition of “fundamental right” and 
arrived at a different conclusion than Kennedy. For Roberts, a fundamental right (citing 
Washington v. Glucksberg, a 1997 case concerning assisted suicide that Kennedy was in 
the majority on) is a right “objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and 
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tradition,” and “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor 
justice would exist if they were sacrificed.” Finding no evidence that same-sex marriage 
met those standards and therefore could not be considered a fundamental right, Roberts 
concluded that democratically-enacted bans on same-sex marriage were constitutionally 
permissible. 
 Some considered the five judges in the majority on Obergefell—particularly 
Kennedy—hypocrites for betraying a commitment to democratic rule. Roberts wrote in 
his dissent, “As a plurality of this Court explained [in an opinion written by Kennedy] 
just last year [in the affirmative action case Schuette v. BAMN], ‘It is demeaning to the 
democratic process to presume that voters are not capable of deciding an issue of this 
sensitivity on decent and rational grounds.’” Travis Weber of the Family Research 
Council echoed this critique: 
Justice Kennedy should have heeded his own advice, from just last term 
in Schuette v. BAMN, that sensitive public policy matters should be left to the 
states. He did refer to Schuette, observing that “this Court reaffirmed the 
importance of the democratic principle in Schuette…noting the ‘right of citizens 
to debate so they can learn and decide and then, through the political process, act 
in concert to try to shape the course of their own times.’… Indeed, it is most often 
through democracy that liberty is preserved and protected in our lives.”  
But he (unfortunately) decided not to follow his own pro-democracy 
precedent. Why did Justice Kennedy decide to not follow his own advice? 
Although he cited constitutional rights language from Schuette (which no one 
would disagree with on its face), in essence, Justice Kennedy appears to feel 
differently about private sexual matters compared to other issues, as evident in his 
consideration of Bowers v. Hardwick and Lawrence v. Texas [cases involving 
sodomy laws] in the Obergefell opinion.2 
 
 Roberts’ accusation of hypocrisy misses its mark, however, because Kennedy 
never dismissed the principle of democratic rule. He instead argued the principle of 
equality superseded the principle of democratic rule when a fundamental right was 
involved. (Kennedy, in Obergefell: “But as Schuette also said, ‘[t]he freedom secured by 
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the Constitution consists, in one of its essential dimensions, of the right of the individual 
not to be injured by the unlawful exercise of governmental power.’… Thus, when the 
rights of persons are violated, ‘the Constitution requires redress by the courts,’ 
notwithstanding the more general value of democratic decisionmaking.”) For Roberts’ 
accusation of hypocrisy to have stuck in a case like this, he would have needed to have 
aimed his accusation at the standard Kennedy used to justify giving priority to one 
principle over the other and then argued Kennedy had used that standard inconsistently. 
What matters as far as hypocrisy is concerned isn’t so much which principles are 
prioritized or deprioritized but rather if those decisions are being made on a consistent 
basis. 
 Weber’s accusation of hypocrisy goes a step further than Roberts’ accusation, 
however, by suggesting Kennedy prioritizes or deprioritizes the principle of democratic 
rule not in accordance with some objective standard but rather the kind of issue he is 
dealing with. Specifically, Weber seems to believe that Kennedy lets his standards slip on 
issues involving “private sexual matters.”3 The narrowmindedness of his critique aside 
(same-sex marriage—let alone any marriage—is more than a “private sexual matter”) 
Weber does not interrogate the possibility that the standards Kennedy uses to mediate 
disputes involving the principle of democratic rule inevitably place laws regulating 
peoples’ private affairs under greater scrutiny. If so, Kennedy would not act 
hypocritically if he allowed the principle of democratic rule to prevail over the principle 
of equality in (for example) a case involving an economics liberty dispute that did not 
involve a “fundamental right” by his definition of the concept. Instead, he could claim to 
have applied his standard consistently in both cases. 
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 If Kennedy could be implicated in an act of hypocrisy, it is perhaps in reference to 
the 2013 case U.S. v. Windsor, which overturned a key section in the Defense of 
Marriage Act (DOMA) that required the federal government to only recognize marriage 
as a union of one man and one woman, thus compelling the federal government to 
recognize same-sex marriages licensed by states. In his dissent to Obergefell, Justice 
Antonin Scalia wrote, 
It would be surprising to find a prescription regarding marriage in the Federal 
Constitution since, as [Kennedy] reminded us only two years ago (in an opinion 
joined by the same Justices who join him today): 
 
“[R]egulation of domestic relations is an area that has long been regarded 
as a virtually exclusive province of the States.” 
 
“[T]he Federal Government, through our history, has deferred to state-law 
policy decisions with respect to domestic relations.” 
 
To paraphrase, Scalia accused Kennedy of a logical inconsistency since Kennedy had 
overturned DOMA just two years earlier in Windsor by arguing the federal government 
had no business regulating domestic relations like marriage, which he said had 
historically been the province of the states. In Obergefell, however, Kennedy appeared to 
trample all over the state’s right to regulate marriage. Weber also noted this 
inconsistency, calling it “hypocrisy” and a “blatant contradiction.” Kennedy does not 
confront this critique head-on, but seems content instead to fall back on his claim that 
marriage is a fundamental right of supreme importance to American society that ought to 
be enjoyed by both opposite- and same-sex couples: 
There is no difference between same- and opposite-sex couples with respect to 
this principle. Yet by virtue of their exclusion from that institution, same-sex 





Kennedy recognized that it is the states that establish marriage laws; it was his 
contention, however, that they cannot regulate marriage in such a way that they abridge 
the fundamental rights of some of their citizens and in turn treat them unequally. 
 There is certainly room to disagree with the reasoning of the justices in this case. 
One may believe that Kennedy’s standard is too subjective and open to judicial abuse, or 
that Roberts’ standard does not take a full reading of the historical record concerning the 
treatment of same-sex individuals in the United States into account. Those critiques, 
however, are jurisprudential disagreements, not matters of hypocrisy. Even an accusation 
of intellectual hypocrisy concerning a logical inconsistency in either Kennedy or Roberts’ 
arguments would need to allow for the possibility that the inconsistency is really nothing 
more than a matter of personal interpretation of complex ideas and legal concepts (see 
“The Consistent Life Ethic”). 
 Obergefell demonstrates that principles do not exist in vacuums; they are instead 
almost always in the company of other principles that together form the moral 
architecture that shapes and defines our broader understanding of a Good Life or a Good 
Society. These principles, despite our best intentions, will inevitably come into conflict 
with one another, often in ways we do not anticipate. It is also inevitable that we will turn 
to politics as a way to resolve these conflicts. Yet we should not rush to label those who 
wrestle with dilemmas of this nature hypocrites. These dilemmas are not resolved easily 
and often require accommodations or compromises most would prefer to avoid. Still, 
decisions over which principle to prioritize when principles are in conflict with one 
another must be made, and the best we can hope for is that those decisions themselves are 
made along principled lines. In cases like this, hypocrisy won’t be found in the decision 
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but in the decision-making, and any accusation of hypocrisy should only be made after a 




1 For any reference to Obergefell v. Hodges in this case study, see Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 
___ (2015) https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/14pdf/14-556_3204.pdf. 
 







3. THE CONSISTENT LIFE ETHIC 
 
 Is it possible for someone who believes the death penalty should be banned yet 
thinks abortion should be legal, or alternately, who opposes abortion yet supports the 
death penalty, to escape the charge of hypocrisy? 
 It’s a case study right out of Ethics 101. The assumption behind the question is 
that those who oppose the death penalty on the grounds that it terminates a human life 
should also, in accordance with sound reasoning, also oppose abortion, which terminates 
the life of a human embryo or fetus. By the same logic, those who cite pro-life arguments 
to defend their opposition to abortion should also therefore oppose the death penalty, 
which takes the life of a convict. 
 It’s called the “consistent life ethic,” an idea developed in the early 1980s by the 
Archbishop of Chicago Cardinal Joseph Bernardin. The phrase itself can be traced back 
to a 1971 speech by Archbishop Humberto Medeiros of Boston and is considered 
synonymous with the idea of the “seamless garment” as articulated by Roman Catholic 
activist Eileen Egan in the early 1970s. The consistent life ethic is a fairly straightforward 
concept: Human life is sacred and should therefore be protected without condition at all 
times. In Bernardin’s view, this meant opposing abortion, the death penalty, euthanasia, 
unjust war, and nuclear proliferation while supporting efforts to alleviate economic 
injustice and poverty.1 
 Reorienting American politics around the consistent life ethic would entail a 
significant shift in American public opinion, since few Americans are consistently “pro-
life” on these issues. The divide on capital punishment and abortion illustrates this well. 
According to an August 2019 Pew Research Center study, 61% of Americans believe 
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abortion should be legal in all or most cases while 38% believe it should be illegal in all 
or most cases. This divide is particularly sharp when it comes to party affiliation, with 
82% of Democrats and Democratic leaners believing abortion should be legal in all or 
most cases compared to 36% of Republicans and Republican leaners.2 When it comes to 
capital punishment, a June 2018 Pew study found that 54% of Americans supported the 
death penalty for those convicted of murder while 39% remained opposed. Significantly, 
however, 77% of Republicans supported the death penalty compared to only 35% of 
Democrats.3 In other words, Republicans for the most part believe abortion should be 
illegal but support the use of capital punishment for capital crimes while Democrats for 
the most part believe abortion should be legal but oppose the use of capital punishment. 
This means the beliefs of many Americans are not aligned with Cardinal Bernardin’s 
consistent life ethic. 
 Many Americans likely developed their views on abortion in isolation from their 
views on capital punishment, and vice versa. Many may have never even considered how 
the reasoning that shaped their views on one of those issues could be just as applicable to 
the formation of their views on the other. Still, CNN commentator Carol Costello found it 
perplexing that Americans over time had not adopted a consistent life ethic on these 
matters. In a 2014 article in which she tested the “logic” of the anti-abortion/pro-capital 
punishment position, she wrote that the apparent contradiction “smacks of hypocrisy” and 
left her “confused.” (She also acknowledged the inconsistency of the pro-abortion/anti-
capital punishment position.) Citing a 2010 study showing that only 8% of Americans 
supported the consistent life ethic, Costello remarked, “Apparently, consistency is not 
America’s strong suit.”4 
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 It’s pretty clear Costello believes the failure of so many Americans to adopt a 
consistent life ethic regarding abortion and capital punishment is a glaring moral 
shortcoming. Yet Costello also seemed to suggest bad morals are not at the root of the 
hypocrisy but rather bad thinking. It is not their beliefs but their “logic” that has left her 
not outraged but “confused.” It’s an intellectual dilemma, one that could be solved not 
with a change of heart but a change of mind. 
 So far in this work, political hypocrisy has been framed as a moral failing. In the 
first case study (“The Torture Report”) the United States was shown to have committed 
an act of moral wrongdoing when it violated a principle it had adopted prohibiting the use 
of torture. The fact that the United States had engaged in torture was a serious moral 
violation in its own right; what made it that much more damning was that the United 
States had earlier acknowledged via a number of international agreements and in its own 
legal code that torture was wrong but did it anyway, implicating itself in an act of 
hypocrisy. 
 Nearly every political issue has some sort of moral dimension to it. This is readily 
apparent when it comes to issues that fall under the purview of the consistent life ethic 
such as capital punishment and abortion, issues that inevitably deal with how the state 
defines life, when it is legitimate for someone or the state to take a life, and the 
assumptions we ought to adopt when weighing matters of life and death. When people 
argue over these issues, they often argue in explicitly moral terms and accuse their 
opponents of propagating beliefs that are profoundly immoral. 
 When hypocrisy comes into play on moral issues like these, the presumed 
hypocrite is typically characterized as someone who does not practice what they preach; 
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for example, a pro-life politician caught seeking an abortion for an acquaintance, or a 
pro-choice politician who admits to being personally pro-life. Again, in these instances, 
the presumed hypocrite is accused in some way of committing a moral wrong by their 
own standards. But some accusations of hypocrisy, such as Costello’s above, trade 
accusations of moral inconsistency for accusations of logical inconsistency. In these 
situations, the accuser implies the hypocrisy at hand is not the result of a deliberately 
immoral decision (even if it produces a result the accuser would consider immoral) but of 
faulty reasoning. If the accused hypocrite had only been more consistent in their thinking, 
they could have avoided becoming a hypocrite. 
 It has already been established that the idea of consistency is central to a study of 
hypocrisy. Hypocrisy can be avoided if individuals act consistently with their beliefs. 
Someone who states they believe people (including themselves) ought to act a certain 
way and then acts in a way inconsistent with those beliefs runs a serious risk of becoming 
a hypocrite by doing something they would consider wrong by their own standards. 
Consistency is also central to the field of logic. According to the rules of logic, a set of 
claims are said to be consistent with one another when every claim in the set is true at the 
same time. For example, if someone stated that they always act in accordance with their 
beliefs, that they have always believed abortion is wrong, and that they got an abortion 
last week, people would say that these claims lack logical consistency since that set of 
statements contains a contradiction. The person who made those statements would also 
be regarded as a hypocrite for the same reason, namely that there is a contradiction 
between their beliefs and actions, which is only reinforced by the claim that they do not 
allow themselves such a contradiction. 
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 While most accusations of hypocrisy imply some sort of moral failing, 
occasionally they are presented as the result of an intellectual error or oversight. Certain 
words and phrases related to thought processes tend to pop up in accusations of this type, 
such as “it doesn’t make much sense”5 or “I don’t understand,”6 references to “logic”7 
and “reasoning”8 and one’s “rationale,”9 phrases describing someone as suffering from “a 
lack of self-awareness”10 or “cognitive dissonance,”11 descriptions of situations as 
“ironic” or suffused with “irony,”12 and words associated with muddled thinking such as 
“absurdity”13 and “ridiculous.”14 One example even went so far as to offer people a 
“hypocrisy test” they could use to diagnose someone’s willingness to “take their 
philosophy to its logical conclusions.”15 All these signals suggest the accuser believes the 
hypocrite’s problem is essentially more mental than moral.  
 Framing an instance of hypocrisy as a logical inconsistency is appealing for a 
number of reasons. It appears that at least one function of this sort of accusation is to 
suggest the accused is not smart enough or is too confused to be regarded as a trusted 
voice on political matters. The idea is that the hypocrite’s logical inconsistency—that is, 
their inability to think straight without contradicting their own thoughts and beliefs—
undermines their credibility as a political authority. Perhaps the accusation is merely 
meant to imply the accused has made a mental error that damages their argument. Less 
generous readings of these accusations seem to suggest, however, that the accuser has 
concluded the accused is guilty of a serious mental lapse and shouldn’t be trusted on a 
particular issue. In some cases, it’s not hard to believe the accuser considers the apparent 
hypocrisy proof that the accused simply isn’t intelligent enough to be trusted as a source 
of reason in the public sphere or with political power period. Either way, the accusation 
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has the potential to cut to the core of the accused’s credibility as a thoughtful political 
participant. 
 The accusation can work the other way, as well. Rather than suggesting the 
accused is too dumb to notice their hypocrisy, an accusation might instead suggest the 
accused is too clever by half, someone dressing their arguments up in high-minded 
rationale that sound thoughtful but are actually intellectually shallow. In such cases, an 
accusation of hypocrisy can cast the accused as a duplicitous and condescending political 
type trying to pull one over on us on the assumption that we’re too stupid to notice. 
Calling that person a hypocrite is one way to let the world know someone’s onto their 
game.16 
 Accusations of hypocrisy based on mental rather than moral errors are also used 
by political interlocutors to make end runs around intractable moral debates. Debates 
about abortion involving the consistent life ethic are good examples of this. Moral 
arguments over abortion in the United States have proved difficult to resolve: Neither 
side seems willing to budge on the issue, moral pleas alone have been unable to win the 
debate, and no apparent stratagem has emerged that could resolve the dilemma once and 
for all. Consequently, rather than continue to assault their opposition’s moral position, 
advocates on both sides may opt instead to cast their opponents’ beliefs as logically 
inconsistent and nonsensical and therefore undeserving of a thoughtful person’s 
consideration and devotion. This, for example, is the strategy used by those who criticize 
pro-life advocates for failing to follow through on their defense of “life” by also 
renouncing their support for capital punishment. By suggesting pro-life advocates don’t 
have a good intellectual grasp on the concept of life and what the defense of life therefore 
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requires of them, critics hope to show people that pro-life arguments are built on grounds 
that are logically unsustainable and therefore deserving of serious skepticism. Or to put 
the argument another way, however morally appealing the pro-life position is on the face 
of it, greater scrutiny of the intellectual arguments supporting it suggests it actually 
doesn’t make much sense as a basis for one’s beliefs. 
 A couple notes are in order, however. First, the discovery of a logical 
inconsistency in a set of claims does not automatically mean each of the claims in the set 
is untrue, just that those claims together cannot be true at the same time. In terms of the 
preceding example, someone who is pro-life on abortion and pro-capital punishment may 
be accused of holding an inconsistent life ethic, but that does not automatically render the 
person’s views on both issues invalid. It may only mean they need to adjust their views 
on one or the other issue, perhaps by changing their mind to oppose the death penalty 
while retaining their opposition to abortion. 
 Secondly, while criticizing another person’s moral position as logically 
inconsistent may have a certain strategic appeal, it is also usually very personally 
satisfying for the critic to do so, as they may now feel they have prevailed in a political 
conflict by reconfiguring it from a moral debate to a war of wits. Few accusations of 
hypocrisy deliver as fulfilling a sense of schadenfreude as accusations of logical 
inconsistency, but few are also as likely to leave the critic looking so smug, which, in 
arguments about people’s heartfelt beliefs, may not win the critic much sympathy from 
others. Such a consideration is irrelevant to the validity of an argument, but it certainly 
has the potential to affect its reception. 
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 Returning now to the main argument, the final and perhaps most powerful reason 
for framing hypocrisy as a logical inconsistency is related to concerns about civic virtue 
and public-spiritedness. As explained in this work’s introduction, the norm of public-
spiritedness is the idea that political action ought to be motivated by an unselfish concern 
for the public good, the well-being of society at large, and the widely-shared and broadly-
defined values that shape and maintain the participatory public sphere. The norm 
encourages citizens and leaders to think beyond narrow concerns related to self-, group-, 
and partisan-interest and instead advocate for policies that advance the well-being of 
others and the nation as a whole. Yet public-spirited policy arguments are not 
automatically accepted at face value, as citizens may wonder if an advocate for a policy is 
merely using public-spirited rhetoric to advance a policy that actually serves a narrower 
interest. To alleviate this concern, policy advocates will often strive to introduce a greater 
sense of objectivity into their arguments, one that can be said via its basis in truth and 
sound reasoning to compel belief and action. By demonstrating that one’s political 
opinions are not merely reflective of one’s personal political preferences but shaped 
instead by a factual, logical, and rational assessment of the public interest that has an 
authority independent of any personal perspective on matters at hand, citizens can more 
convincingly claim that their political positions are motivated by a dispassionate and 
disinterested concern for the public good. Conversely, exposing someone’s argument as 
logically inconsistent can also potentially expose that presumably public-spirited person 
as a hypocrite whose beliefs and actions are not consistent with what a rational, objective 
assessment of the public good should lead them to believe. 
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 This vision of a rational republic has strong appeal, but, as history often reminds 
us, it is one more likely to find expression on the big screen in a portrayal of the science-
fictional world of Vulcan than in democratic societies here on Earth. The problem isn’t 
simply a matter of historical reality or the compelling claim that democracy itself is an 
incubator of irrational tendencies.17 It’s that politics cannot be reduced to a “calculative 
ideal” based upon “the mathematicization of reason,”18 one in which the cold dictates of 
logic lead inexorably to a definitive conclusion. Political considerations are more 
complicated and nuanced than that. Additionally, such a view narrows the field of politics 
to bureaucratic management and administration while diminishing the subjective 
normative concerns that give politics its purpose. As Thomas A. Spragens, Jr., writes, 
(while quoting Max Weber,) “Rationality is a meaningful concept vis à vis politics only 
in the context of determining the means ‘adequate to the realization of an absolutely 
unambiguously given end.’ Concerning the ends themselves, reason has nothing whatever 
to say.”19 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it fails to recognize that the logic of 
politics may lead people in different directions to different conclusions and draw from 
sources some would be inclined to dismiss as irrational and incompatible with their own 
beliefs and rational understanding of the world. Some would even argue the whole point 
of democratic politics is to mitigate conflicts between rational and irrational perspectives 
that might otherwise remain irreconcilable.20 
 It would be easy at this point to resign oneself to the conclusion that it is 
impossible to establish an objective rational motivational basis for democratic politics. 
This admission would in turn render attempts to link political hypocrisy to logical 
inconsistencies mostly pointless, as people could always dismiss accusations of hypocrisy 
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leveled against them as resulting from their accuser’s inability to appreciate the 
logical/rational terms of their own arguments. But even if an objectively rational 
pluralistic democracy seems implausible, a reasonable pluralistic democracy does not. As 
John Rawls explains, 
Persons are reasonable in one basic aspect when, among equals say, they are 
ready to propose principles and standards as fair terms of cooperation and to abide 
by them willingly, given the assurance that others will likewise do so. Those 
norms they view as reasonable for everyone to accept and therefore as justifiable 
to them; and they are ready to discuss the fair terms that others propose.21 
 
Alternately, “The rational is…a distinct idea from the reasonable and applies to a single, 
unified agent…with the powers of judgment and deliberation in seeking ends and 
interests peculiarly its own.”22 It is upon this idea of the reasonable that citizens in a 
liberal democratic society, despite their differing (and perhaps irreconcilable) moral, 
philosophical, and religious views, can debate and justify policy amongst themselves. 
 Reasonable agreement forms the basis of public reason, which is premised on 
values and a conception of justice all those in a diverse society can independently affirm 
as acceptable and legitimate. Public reason establishes the terms of political cooperation, 
a shared notion of the common good, and the range of reasons (as derived from the 
common good) that all involved can respect as acceptable justifications for state action.23 
When there is disagreement over policy, citizens and politicians can turn to public reason 
to justify their arguments and demonstrate how their position is aligned with what their 
fellow citizens would recognize as the public good. Public officials can also seek to 
legitimize the exercise of state power and respond to critics who claim they (the public 
officials) are actually motivated by arbitrary, authoritarian, personal, or partisan reasons 
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by citing public reason to show how a desire to pursue the public good informed their 
actions. 
 Consequently, reason-giving emerges as an important democratic norm. In 
healthy democracies, politicians will not last long if they rely on their statutory authority 
alone to justify their actions (i.e., “I did it because the law says I can”); instead, they are 
expected to offer reasons for acting. These reasons must show that their actions are 
undertaken with the public good in mind, and they must be offered in public where those 
reasons can be challenged and tested. The reasonableness of these arguments should also 
be discernable to other citizens: Facts ought to be drawn from widely-credible sources, 
arguments should be logical and well-reasoned, and reasons used to justify action in one 
case should generally retain their motivational force in similar cases under similar 
conditions. These are all qualities of good argumentation that hold within and outside the 
political construct of public reason. Ultimately, arguments based on public reason allow 
their advocates to potentially persuade others on terms they can accept and respect as 
legitimate; they also allow others to critique arguments on terms their advocates can 
comprehend. Because of the role public reason has traditionally played in American 
politics, Cass Sunstein has characterized the United States’ constitutional democracy as a 
deliberative “republic of reasons.”24 
 Accusations of hypocrisy may begin to materialize in a republic of reasons if a 
political argument is found to be poorly reasoned or logically inconsistent. If logic and 
reason have a compelling authority in their own right, people ought to abide by them 
even when it is politically inconvenient to do so. In fact, one can build a reputation for 
impartiality and civic virtue in politics by relying upon reason rather than partisanship or 
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self-interest to guide one’s decision-making process. Accusations of hypocrisy based 
upon the discovery of a logical inconsistency can suggest the accused hypocrite is 
following a personal or partisan agenda rather than the impartial dictates of logic and 
reasoning. 
 We have seen this sort of accusation already at work in the case study about the 
Supreme Court’s decision regarding same-sex marriage (see “Supreme Rationale”—you 
thought that was just a Wu-Tang pun, didn’t you?) Justice Kennedy was charged with 
hypocrisy for not applying the same reasons concerning the primacy of states’ rights he 
had used in previous court cases to Obergefell v. Hodges. Had he done so, his critics 
claimed, he would have allowed states to determine the legality of same-sex marriage; 
instead, he seemed motivated less by the impartial logic of his reasoning on constitutional 
law than by a personal desire to legalize same-sex marriage throughout the United States. 
The criticism of Kennedy’s decision (and the charge of hypocrisy) hinged on the 
rationale Kennedy used to decide the case, namely that he was applying that rationale 
inconsistently across cases. (Kennedy, in an elaboration on his own reasoning, begged to 
differ.) 
 While accusations of hypocrisy are sometimes framed as logical inconsistencies, 
there is good reason to be careful about conflating the concepts. This work noted in its 
introduction that it did not intend to get too picky about what technically counted or 
didn’t count as hypocrisy and would instead allow the parameters of its analysis to be 
determined by the ways in which the term is commonly used in politics. Yet there does 
seem to be a big difference between an act of “hypocrisy” and a “logical inconsistency,” 
namely that the former is a moral error while the latter, if taken at face value, is best 
86 
 
understood as a mental error. Now it is certainly possible that a logical inconsistency 
could result in an outcome some might consider immoral and that such an outcome might 
be enough to convince someone that the inconsistent actor should not be trusted with 
public power. Note, however, that in such a situation, the cause of the immoral act is not 
an immoral desire but a mental shortcoming. The problem is not that the official knew 
better and did something wrong regardless, but that the (presumably) well-intentioned 
official wasn’t wise enough to reach the correct conclusion and ended up doing 
something that produced a morally bad result. 
 The same is true in logical inconsistencies resulting in hypocrisies. If the cause of 
a hypocrisy is a mental error rather than a moral error, it seems there would be an easy 
way for the accused to escape the charge of hypocrisy: Admit the mental error and then 
correct the mistake. Their wounded pride aside, someone committed to logical 
consistency and sound reasoning would have few objections to doing so. Furthermore, 
their accusers (if gracious) would quickly see their inconsistency was not the result of 
partisan or personal motives but simply a mistake and withdraw the moral condemnation 
of hypocrisy. 
 If the accused insisted their logic and reasoning was sound, it may be more 
accurate to say the person is “mistaken” rather than a “hypocrite,” with judgment 
centering on their mental acuity instead of their moral fiber. But it would also be worth 
considering in such a situation why someone persists in their logical inconsistency. 
Maybe they aren’t smart enough to see the problem, or are operating according to reasons 
we find unconvincing but that somehow make sense to them (a very tricky impasse to 
resolve.) Or it could be the case that the accused is actually aware his or her reasoning 
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and logic doesn’t add up yet carries on regardless with no concern for their mistake. It 
would not be surprising for observers to wonder why this logically inconsistent person 
maintains their error, which increasingly comes to look less like a mental mistake than a 
deliberate act. Their preference to cling to a logical inconsistency that leads them to a 
certain policy outcome (rather than an unintentional entanglement in an inconsistency 
they could easily correct) would certainly go a long way toward earning them the label of 
hypocrite, but the accuser would also need to ascribe a motive beyond the mental error 
(say, a preference for a particular policy outcome) to the accused’s hypocrisy. The main 
semantic point, though, is that the problem here as it is diagnosed would actually not be a 
mental one but rather the product of a conscious moral choice, which makes calling 
hypocrisy of this nature a “logical” inconsistency inaccurate. 
 This, of course, does not mean logic and reason have no role to play in evaluating 
accusations of political hypocrisy. Establishing logical support between the premises and 
conclusions of moral arguments is of significant importance to sound moral reasoning. 
Accusations and defenses against hypocrisy often rely on appeals to logic, specifically 
claims of argumentative consistency and inconsistency. This is most evident when testing 
someone’s argument against the established logic of that argument. 
 Yet moral reasoning is not a cold calculus with clearly defined premises leading 
to inarguably true conclusions. People of good faith will disagree about what moral 
obligations and public reason require of them, what terms condition their moral 
obligations, and which moral obligations take priority over others. As a result, even when 
operating according to a mutual understanding of public reason, different people’s 
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reasoning on an issue will often lead them to different conclusions, including whether or 
not a particular action qualifies as hypocrisy. 
 This is likely the case when it comes to issues involving the consistent life ethic. 
As mentioned earlier, the logic of the consistent life ethic is rather straightforward: 
Human life is sacred and should therefore be protected at all times without condition. 
Additionally, in cases that raise questions concerning life—abortion and capital 
punishment, for instance—those who adhere to the consistent life ethic are advised to err 
in the direction of life’s preservation. It’s a clear-cut, compelling argument that makes a 
lot of logical sense, particularly for someone who believes the preservation of life is a 
supreme value. 
 But there are alternatives to the consistent life ethic, and one should not assume 
the logic and reasoning underlying the consistent life ethic control arguments about issues 
typically associated with it. For example, someone may qualify the defense of life by 
granting greater protections to innocent human life than guilty human life. This 
distinction could lead them to argue that an unborn child deserves legal protection while 
allowing for the possibility that someone convicted of taking another person’s life should 
forfeit their own in the name of justice.25 Alternately, one could argue the issue of 
abortion is best understood not as a matter of “life” at all but as an issue pertaining to 
women’s health and autonomy, which makes abortion irrelevant to the consistent life 
ethic.26 Both of these arguments have a logical consistency of their own that adherents of 
the consistent life ethic cannot disqualify as hypocritical via appeals to the logical terms 
of the consistent life ethic itself. If someone hoped to disqualify a pro-life/pro-capital 
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punishment or pro-choice/anti-capital punishment position as hypocritical, those 
positions would need to be disqualified on their own terms. 
 It is certainly fair to wonder how many people holding beliefs on abortion and the 
death penalty that adherents of the consistent life ethic would consider inconsistent 
arrived at those beliefs in a way that could plausibly be considered logically consistent. 
Perhaps most people who hold such beliefs are simply towing the party line or adopted 
their beliefs without considering how the premises of those beliefs are logically relevant 
to other beliefs they hold. As mentioned earlier, however, it is probably most accurate to 
describe someone who holds such logically inconsistent beliefs—i.e., someone who 
believes “all life” should be protected but still supports the death penalty, or someone 
who opposes the death penalty because it takes a life yet still remains pro-choice despite 
conceptualizing the issue of abortion as a matter of “life”—as guilty of poor reasoning 
rather than hypocrisy. Their mistake seems more like a cognitive oversight rather than a 
deliberate moral choice to ignore a conclusion generated by their moral reasoning. It is 
exceedingly hard to know, however, when a sincere mental error turns into a moral 
misdeed amounting to hypocrisy, when someone transitions from not knowing their 
reasoning is flawed to knowing but carrying on as though they still remain convinced 
their logic is sound. 
 Situations like this are tough to work through. Ideally, everyone in a political 
community would argue from the same logical and rational basis. This would allow 
members of the community to correct those who make mistakes, who in turn would 
appreciate being shown the error of their ways. In democracies, however—even those 
operating under the auspices of public reason—citizens are expected to be fairly tolerant 
90 
 
of where their fellow citizens’ reasoning leads them, even when that reasoning appears 
erroneous or is covertly done in bad faith. This is not to say democratic arguments need 
not appeal to reason and logic; on the contrary, citizens should expect that they do. It’s 
just that democracies require citizens to have a high tolerance for what they would 
personally consider to be poor arguments. 
 This does not mean we need to be convinced by the reasoning behind such 
arguments, however. We may somehow find them flawed, even logically inconsistent. 
We may point out what we believe to be their shortcomings, attempt to show their 
advocates the errors of their way, and explain why the positions we have arrived at are on 
firmer footing and more compatible with public reason than theirs. We may ultimately 
conclude via our own rational analysis that their arguments are hopelessly irrational. 
Misguided. Even wrong on their merits. But hypocritical? It turns out that’s hard to tell. 
But then again, maybe it really doesn’t matter much in the long run. Maybe calling 
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This meme contrasts some conservatives’ support for Cliven Bundy with their support for the construction 
of the Keystone XL Pipeline. Bundy is a Nevada rancher who initiated an armed standoff with the federal 
government in 2014 over his refusal to pay over $1 million dollars in grazing fees accumulated over 
twenty-one years for his use of federal land. Bundy argued he did not owe the government money and had 
the right to graze his cattle on that land because the federal government lacked the power to own state land. 
This made Bundy a hero in the eyes of many who believed a heavy-handed government encroached too 
often on individual rights.  The Keystone XL Pipeline is a pipeline that, once constructed, would transport 
Canadian oil across Montana, South Dakota, and Nebraska. It is generally opposed by Democrats (typically 
on environmental grounds) and supported by Republicans (who see it as a good investment in the nation’s 
economy.) The TransCanada Corporation (now TC Energy), who would build and own the pipeline, needed 
to gain permission from the federal government to exercise eminent domain in order to seize privately-
owned land from people unwilling to either sell their property or grant the corporation an easement for 
construction of Keystone XL. The meme contrasts conservative support for Bundy, who believes the 
federal government is not allowed to own land and acts oppressively when it charges fees for use of public 
land, with their support for the Keystone XL Pipeline, which can only be constructed if the federal 
government approves the seizure of land from private land owners. 
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one’s behavior with excuses or additional information, or ignoring or denying some element contributing to 
the dissonance.) In popular parlance, however, distress sometimes has nothing to do with it. Instead, the 




contradictory feelings or beliefs. According to this usage, people suffer from cognitive dissonance in 
politics because they have not carefully reviewed their beliefs for intellectual consistency, which leads 
them to effectively function as hypocrites. 
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4. THE LATTE SALUTE 
 
 In September 2014, just as the United States began military strikes against ISIL 
(the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) in Syria, President Obama was caught on 
camera saluting two American servicemen with a cup of coffee in his raised hand as he 
disembarked the presidential helicopter Marine One in New York City. Many 
conservatives interpreted the gesture as evidence of the president’s disrespect for the 
nation’s military and took to lambasting Obama over what began trending on social 
media as the #LatteSalute.1 The most high-profile criticism originated on FOX News 
during a segment featuring host Sean Hannity and former White House adviser and 
George W. Bush campaign manager Karl Rove.2 Over on The Daily Show, however, Jon 
Stewart—whose creative team had an uncanny ability to unearth political hypocrisy—
was having none of Hannity and Rove’s indignation: 
Stewart: When [President George W.] Bush took us to war [in Iraq in 2003], any 
criticism was shouted down as treasonous, but when a president you don’t like 
has the country poised on the same precipice, no transgression—no matter 
how immaterial and ridiculous—is too small to cite as evidence that this 
president isn’t as American as you are. You want a hot cup of cognitive 
dissonance? Watch this: 
 
CLIP from FOX News’ Hannity 
Hannity: Would President Bush ever [salute a Marine while holding a 
beverage]? 
Rove: Yeah, are we surprised? I mean, after all, we’ve got a chai-swilling, 
golf-playing, basketball trash-talking, leading-from-behind, I-got-no-
strategy, Osama-bin-Laden-is-dead, GM-is-alive, community-
organizing commander-in-chief. How disrespectful was that? 
 
Stewart [After mocking Rove for “feeding us a steaming bowl of liberal 
epithets”]: But in their haste, they forgot to answer the question: Would 
President Bush ever salute the troops with a cup of coffee in his hand? And 
the answer is no, because his hands were too filled with dog, a Scottie, out of 
respect. [Picture from 2001 of President Bush saluting while holding a dog 
appears on screen.] So here we’ve got two presidents, both sending the United 
States to war citing the same legal authorities, both without any seeming exit 
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strategy, and both holding shit in their hands while saluting our troops, but in 
[the minds of those on FOX News] only one did it because he loved America. 
The other did it because he hated it.3 
 
 There you have it: Two presidents of different parties caught saluting members of 
the United States military while holding something in their arms or hands (see Figures 6 
& 7) yet their respective supporters will only criticize the president who is a member of 
the opposite party for his offense. We have here the inconsistent application of criticism 
stemming from a principle concerning how presidents ought to properly show respect to 
the men and women serving in America’s armed forces. That’s a double standard. 
 







 Double standards occur when public actors excuse themselves or their political 
allies from following a principle or standard they expect other similarly situated people to 
follow. Double standards have much in common with violations of principle. In both 
 
 Granted, Stewart’s ire is directed at Republicans but it is probably safe to assume that if there was any 
criticism directed at Bush for saluting with dog-in-hand it probably originated with Democrats who likely 
did not leap to condemn Obama for his salute, which would implicate Democrats in hypocrisy as well. 
Also, some might argue Stewart did not prove that Hannity and Rove did not criticize Bush for his salute, 
but it’s reasonable to assume they didn’t. 
Figure 4 
“Latte Salute” 
White House via Instagram, screenshot 
September 23, 2014 
Figure 5 
“Scottie Salute” 
AP Photo/Susan Walsh 
June 25, 2001 
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cases, the public actor fails to adhere to a principle they believe should be followed. 
Double standards, however, come with an extra twist, which is that the public actor who 
has violated the principle still expects or has expected others—typically their political 
opponents—to follow the same principle. Hence the “double” standard: One standard 
everyone is expected to follow, and another, laxer standard for one’s self and allies. 
 The sight of someone violating or ignoring a principle they believe others like 
them ought to follow probably strikes many people as profoundly wrong and unjust. 
More than any other form of hypocrisy, double standards reveal how people’s aversion to 
hypocrisy is intertwined with their aversion to unfairness. In this case, it seems very 
unfair for Republicans like Rove to chastise a Democratic president for disrespecting 
members of the United States Armed Forces when those Republicans did not direct the 
same level of vitriol toward a Republican president for doing basically the same thing. 
The fair thing to do would have been for Republicans to either criticize both presidents 
for their mistake or withhold criticism in both cases. 
 Evolutionary psychologist Robert Kurzban, in his book Why Everyone (Else) is a 
Hypocrite, links our visceral dislike of hypocrisy to a nearly instinctive desire for fairness 
rooted in self-interest. Kurzban’s hypothesis owes much to Hobbes and the elemental 
logic of the social contract. Without rules, an individual is free to pursue their self-
interest and desires without restraint, but so are others, who may harm the individual in 
their own pursuit of the same. Rules place constraints on how people pursue their 
ambitions, but people are only inclined to accept rules that also constrain the behavior of 
others and that are administered and enforced impartially. This prevents rules from 
becoming tools would-be rulebreakers can use to oppress or disadvantage the obedient.4 
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 The problem with double standards is that they replace impartiality with 
favoritism. As Kurzban writes, “[W]hen a moral principle is applied in one case but not 
another to which it is relevant, people are, in essence, trying to get those and only those 
moral rules good for them (or bad for others) while excluding rules that harm them (but 
help others). … At its core, then, hypocrisy really amounts to favoritism.”5 The hypocrite 
benefits by excusing themselves from a rule they expect others to follow; in turn, the 
offended party discovers their interests have not been served by the hypocrite’s selective 
application of the rule. This leads them to demonize the hypocrite, the subtext of which is 
that the hypocrite cannot be trusted to uphold the social compact that fairly regulates our 
pursuit of self-interest. As a matter of self-interest, humans seem conditioned to spot 
hypocrites and call them out for their hypocrisy.6 This also helps explain why we have 
such a visceral reaction to the discovery of hypocrisy in politics. 
 Kurzban arrives at this insightful conclusion despite his less-than-convincing 
attempt to graft his ideas concerning hypocrisy onto a psychological conception of the 
mind as divided into a seemingly infinite number of specialized “modules” that handle 
different cognitive functions.7 A simpler explanation would just assume self-interested 
individuals faced with a conflict about how best to pursue their self-interest: Through 
either impartiality (which requires the sacrifice of self-interest in the short term in order 
to preserve the social contract that will serve their self-interest in the long term) or 
favoritism (which pursues self-interest in the short term but potentially damages the 
social contract that serves their self-interest in the long term.) Resolving the outcome of 
that conflict often entails some sort of cost-benefit analysis—what is gained or lost by 
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favoring impartiality over favoritism, and vice versa—and some strategic consideration 
concerning how the decision is likely to play itself out. 
 According to this theory of hypocrisy, the demand for fairness along with 
people’s antipathy to double standards is rooted in the pursuit of self-interest. People take 
umbrage with double standards that disadvantage them but tend to ignore or dismiss 
double standards that work to their benefit. As alluded to in the title of Kurzban’s book, 
this belief that everyone (else) is a hypocrite seems to suggest self-interest plays a much 
greater role in forming people’s notion of fairness than many may like to admit. This 
does not mean there aren’t people who believe fairness is a good in-and-of itself. These 
individuals will look beyond self-interest as a reason to treat others fairly and simply 
accept fairness as a social good owed to all equally. Such fair-minded people would be 
more likely to object to any double standard, whether employed by an opponent or an 
ally. It’s just difficult to ascertain how many of these fair-minded people are out there, or 
if they outnumber those who like to think they’re one of those fair-minded souls who 
prioritize fairness as a good in-and-of itself but actually only accept fairness as a 
component of their greater concern with self-interest. 
 Given this corrupted motive, how seriously should people take charges of a 
double standard? If we seek to remedy a double standard for someone who, as a matter of 
self-interest, has said they have been treated unfairly when they are themselves blind to 
their own hypocritical actions, aren’t we simply acting to help an individual fulfill their 
own self-interest rather than serving the needs of fairness? One might be inclined to 
answer yes, particularly if the offended individual is later allowed to slide on their own 
double standards. (It would also mean the enforcer held a double standard concerning 
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their denunciation of double standards.) But maybe the bigger question is why anyone 
should get upset over double standards in the first place if it is assumed most everyone—
which includes the person committing the double standard and the person disadvantaged 
by the double standard—is simply pursuing their self-interest and likely to adopt the 
opposite position if the tables were turned? In other words, why should impartiality be 
granted a position of esteem over favoritism (or partisanship) when impartiality is also 
often motivated by self-interest, favoritism, and partisanship? Why should anyone 
intervene on the side of fairness when those calling for it only do so when fairness 
happens to coincide with their partisan ambitions? 
 The answer is kind of obvious. When people align themselves with fairness, 
they’re aligning themselves with the principle of fairness and outcomes consistent with 
that principle. It doesn’t matter who those outcomes are said to “favor,” and, if the judges 
of fairness are genuinely fair-minded, their identities didn’t factor into their decision 
anyway. Yes, people are bound to benefit from actions that make unfair situations fair, 
but given that those who gain the benefit were being disadvantaged by an unfair situation, 
it’s fine that the previously disadvantaged now derive the benefits they (like all involved) 
deserve of and from fair conditions. Furthermore, this does not mean the side that drew 
advantage from the double standard is now unfairly disadvantaged, just that they are now 
deprived of the advantages that came at the expense of the unfair treatment of others. 
Overall, it can be said there is greater fairness and equity among all in a situation where 
fairness and equity are due. 
 This may seem obvious, but perhaps this point gets obscured in the daily give-
and-take of politics. In an era of highly contentious politics, it is easy for citizens—
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especially those who fashion themselves as non-partisans—to regard complaints about 
double standards as just another attempt by partisans to gain benefits at the expense of 
their adversaries when it is far from clear they deserve the spoils of political victory. One 
could conclude that since neither side is consistently fair, neither side deserves sympathy 
or support; a pox on both houses then. Yet such a disposition would require citizens to 
abdicate the role they should play as arbitrators of fairness in a society committed to the 
principles of justice and equality. Yes, that is a high-minded aspiration, and one many 
partisans would struggle to fulfill, but it is also an honorable, public-spirited way to fulfill 
one’s role as citizen. Citizens, committed as they ought to be to the public good and the 
preservation of public principles like the fair and equitable treatment of all citizens, have 
an obligation to sort through these issues of fairness and insist on fair outcomes, which in 
turn requires them to work through the complexities of double standards. 
 When it comes to evaluating double standards in relation to hypocrisy and 
politics, the first question that ought to be asked is what expectation for fairness 
accompanies the double standard under scrutiny, with the general rule being the greater 
the expectation for fairness, the greater the demand to avoid the improper inconsistency 
attendant to hypocrisy. Oddly enough, the greater the expectation for fairness (along with 
the greater stakes involved in keeping a situation fair) the more likely the improper 
inconsistency won’t be described as an instance of hypocrisy at all. For example, 
applying the law differently to two similarly situated people may be characterized in 
some quarters as hypocritical, but because treating people unequally under the law is 
considered such a serious wrong, people tend to refer to such an instance not as an 
example of “hypocrisy” but with the much more serious condemnation of “injustice.” 
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Similarly, treating two people differently on account of their race is more often described 
as an act of “discrimination” or “prejudice” or “bias,” terms that seem to capture the 
significance of the transgression better than the word “hypocrisy.” This is not to say the 
word “hypocrisy” is never used in such circumstances, just that there are stronger words 
that better convey the seriousness of the offense. 
 The accusation of hypocrisy seems more fitting for cases like the Latte Salute that 
are embedded in more conventionally political settings that allow more room for the 
expression of favoritism. The case of the Latte Salute involves partisans treating figures 
from the United States’ two major political parties differently. This isn’t necessarily 
objectionable; far from it, in fact. Parties are central to the United States’ competitive 
democratic political system, and citizens are frequently allowed—even expected—to 
favor one party over the other, especially when it comes to matters of policy. 
Consequently, partisanship and favoritism are allowed in partisan politics to a certain 
degree. At the same time, however, many would argue there are circumstances in which 
the parties should be treated the same and held accountable to the same set of rules and 
standards, and that partisans themselves should follow the same set of public-spirited 
standards they expect members of the opposite party to follow, particularly when those 
standards are not matters of political contention. This is where accusations of hypocrisy 
are often deployed. Accusations of hypocrisy can be used to regulate partisan competition 
and rein in excessive partisanship by suggesting that political players who may ordinarily 
favor one side in a political dispute over another have gone too far in their favoritism by 




 In the case of the Latte Salute, Republicans were caught holding the leader of the 
Democratic Party to a higher standard than they held the leader of their own party, all in 
the pursuit of partisan political gain. This behavior was more self-serving than fair: 
Rather than honorably and equitably condemning anyone—including a fellow partisan—
who violated an accepted political norm, Republicans chose instead to support their 
friends and hurt their enemies, principles of right action be damned. That seems to be a 
pretty clear-cut case of political hypocrisy. 
 Furthermore, the principle/norm being violated here isn’t even a point of partisan 
contention. No one is arguing over whether or not presidents should salute members of 
the military while holding something; it’s just assumed that if they are going to salute, 
they should do so properly and respectfully. That has nothing to do with a difference 
between the parties that would allow for the expression of favoritism. Calling out one 
president but not the other just seems like a way to smear a member of the opposite party 
while making one’s own party appear better by comparison. Again, a fairly clear-cut case 
of political hypocrisy. 
 On the face of it, there appears little room for hypocrisy in a case like the Latte 
Salute. Yet indulging in this sort of hypocrisy may actually serve a useful political 
purpose. One of the most important functions parties perform in multi-party democracies 
is to hold each other accountable for their behavior. Parties—particularly those in 
power—cannot be trusted to check themselves. Democrats, after all, did not make an 
effort to criticize Obama for his disrespectful salute; even if Democrats concluded the 
Latte Salute was nothing more than a minor and uncharacteristic faux pas, they still 
probably preferred that no one draw attention to it. Therein lies the problem. Without an 
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opposition, too much bad behavior would slide by unnoticed. Despite people’s dislike of 
partisan sniping and political bickering, the oversight function parties play is a major 
benefit of a competitive political system. The parties keep each other in check. It is good, 
too, that this partisan criticism involves issues lacking a partisan dimension, since if the 
parties only engaged on issues they disagreed about they would never deal with issues 
that have a general public interest and that demand accountability, such as rooting out 
corruption, ensuring good management of government services, or holding politicians to 
high ethical standards and standards of conduct. 
 If the price of good governance—a non-partisan, public-spirited aspiration—is an 
occasional engagement in hypocrisy, then we need some tolerance for political hypocrisy. 
While bad political behavior should not go unchecked, neither party can inoculate itself 
from bad political actors. Bad apples will pop up in both parties. That insight should 
foster in politicians a sense of humility, particularly when it comes to criticizing members 
of the opposing party, who are just as liable as members of the accuser’s own party to 
engage in bad political behavior. Partisans need to realize they will likely hold their 
opponents to a higher standard than members of their own party, meaning the criticism 
they aim at their rivals can easily rebound with the same amount of force back onto their 
own party and fellow partisans. 
 Partisanship can easily distort our political judgment. People have a tendency to 
see the worst in their opponents while overlooking the obvious faults of their allies. In 
2017, Dan M. Kahan, Ellen Peters, Erica Cantrell Dawson, and Paul Slovic published a 
study that asked respondents to analyze the findings of an empirical experiment. One 
group in the study was asked to assess the results of a study on a skin rash treatment; the 
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other was asked to assess the results of a study on gun control measures. Both cases 
required respondents to look at some data and then perform a few mathematical 
calculations akin to what might be found on a high school standardized test or a college 
entrance exam (in other words, something the average American wouldn’t run into on a 
daily basis but that can be solved using fairly basic computational skills.) Kahan, et al., 
discovered something very interesting: Those respondents who had earlier demonstrated 
that they were good at math were most likely to analyze the findings of the skin rash 
treatment study correctly, but when presented with the gun control study, mathematical 
aptitude no longer mattered. Instead, respondents tended to analyze the results of the gun 
control study in light of their political beliefs. Remarkably, those respondents who were 
good at math were the most susceptible to the effects of partisanship, as they became 
more likely than the average respondent to analyze the data correctly if the data affirmed 
their political preferences and more likely than the average respondent to analyze the data 
incorrectly if the data countered their political preferences.8 As Ezra Klein of Vox wrote 
in reaction to this conclusion, “The smarter the person is, the dumber politics can make 
them. … People weren’t reasoning to get the right answer; they were reasoning to get the 
answer that they wanted to be right.”9 
 Kahan, et al., ascribe people’s tendency to interpret facts in light of their partisan 
inclinations to what they call “identity-protection cognition,” a form of “motivated 
reasoning” that serves as a “psychic self-defense mechanism” intended to keep them in 
good standing with others who share their moral beliefs. When something—whether at 
the level of an issue or a symbol—acquires a political charge, people quit evaluating it on 
whatever terms they would normally use to evaluate it and begin interpreting it through a 
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partisan lens, which keeps them in good company with their fellow partisans.10 What is 
lost is the hope for a dispassionate analysis of the circumstances. 
 The study conducted by Kahan, et al., contrasted scientific/mathematical 
cognition with identity-protection cognition, but it is reasonable to think their findings 
could extend to a situation like the Latte Salute. There was no more prominent symbol of 
liberalism in the 2010s than Barack Obama. Just as any mistake he made would be red 
meat for conservatives to feast upon, liberals would be just as likely to forgive him. 
Ominously, people’s reasoning on this issue won’t help them figure out an appropriate 
response as their very reasoning is corrupted by their partisanship. It sets partisans up to 
become hypocrites once the political circumstances are turned. 
 The way out for partisans—consciously acknowledging that their reasoning is 
likely clouded by their partisan opinions and then taking multiple mental steps to counter 
and check those impulses—requires a pretty heavy cognitive lift. Once they do that, 
however, they’ll probably reach a few key conclusions in the case of the Latte Salute. 
First, while one could certainly admonish Obama for his careless salute, it’s ultimately a 
minor presidential offense and wholly out of character for a president who typically goes 
out of his way to respect the nation’s servicemembers. Secondly, because Obama’s lapse 
did not involve a point of partisan contention and is something any politician of any 
political stripe could have done on accident, it would probably be best for people to 
temper their criticism in the absence of a larger pattern of misbehavior. 
 Additionally, it would be wise for all involved but particularly Obama’s 
Republican opponents to remember that politics is usually played in glass houses 
furnished with stones. A bombastic reaction to the Latte Salute may land a politician on a 
109 
 
cable news segment or build a huge Twitter following—and that may no doubt be what a 
certain style of politician aspires to—but a more prudent course of action would involve a 
dose of humility in order to ward off an accusation of hypocrisy. After all, anyone can 
screw up a salute; there’s nothing right or left, Republican or Democratic about it. If a 
member of your side hasn’t already made a mistake like that, fate has a funny way of 
making what goes around, come around. While drive-by attacks like the #LatteSalute 
give partisans a tempting opportunity to claim the high ground with voters by arguing 
their side does a better job adhering to the non-partisan principles that unite us all (while 
implying the opposition comes up short in that regard) they also set up the attacker for a 
fall. Our own experience tells us that when we point our finger at others, there are always 
three fingers pointing back at us. A politician with a sense of shame and honor and an 
aversion to hypocrisy may want to tread lightly when dealing with cases like this. 
 Yet this is not to say political figures should completely refrain from calling out 
bad behavior in cases like the Latte Salute out of fear they will eventually be branded a 
hypocrite. Let’s face it: If people always refrained from criticizing others given the 
potential for that claim to rebound back onto them and turn them into hypocrites, people 
would get away with a lot of bad behavior. Critics can chastise Hannity and Rove for 
whipping their conservative viewers into a frenzy over the Latte Salute, but if they 
offered no criticism at all, it is doubtful Democrats would have stepped up on their own 
to hold Obama accountable instead (including those who may have criticized President 
Bush back in 2001.) 
 In criticizing the opposition, it is always possible for a partisan to make a 
mountain out of a molehill or focus more on a telegenic faux pas than a policy blunder. 
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It’s also hard to get press coverage of an event like the Latte Salute right: Any 
coverage—even of the measured kind—will inevitably magnify it, but not covering it 
runs the risk of appearing biased. The media’s best options would be to either sit on the 
story and only report it in the context of an emerging pattern of disrespectful behavior or 
frame it as human error while defusing the partisan hysteria and reminding viewers that 
anyone from any party is prone to making a similar error. So credit where credit is due: 
During a contemporaneous appearance on the Fox and Friends morning show, FOX 
News host Bill O’Reilly said of Obama’s gaffe, “I know a lot of people don’t like 
President Obama, but once in a while…you got to cut him a little slack, you know? He 
didn’t mean anything malevolent about it.” Pressed by host Elisabeth Hasselbeck about if 
he understood why the Latte Salute was “bothering people,” O’Reilly replied, “Yes, I 
understand a lot of people are very sensitive about it, but, you know, in life, you don’t 
sweat the small stuff.”11 
 No one would ever mistake Bill O’Reilly for a humble man, but there you have it. 
One of the most important lessons that can be learned from this study of hypocrisy is how 
vital the virtue of humility is in politics, not only in dealing with our opponents but in 
preserving our own moral reputation as well. You can have your passions and convictions 
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5. CONFIRMATION BIAS 
 
 Since the early 1990s, a corps of five judges has formed a conservative majority 
on the United States Supreme Court. That majority, however, was imperiled in February 
2016 following the sudden death of Justice Antonin Scalia, a Ronald Reagan appointee 
often regarded as the ideological soul of the Supreme Court’s conservative wing. With 
Scalia’s passing, the Court was now evenly divided between four Republican and four 
Democratic appointees. The responsibility to nominate Scalia’s successor fell to 
Democratic President Barack Obama, who at the time was less than a month into his final 
year in office. Any person Obama selected was not only likely to flip a seat from 
conservative to liberal but also tilt the Court’s overall ideological balance in favor of 
liberalism for the first time in over a generation. 
 Every student of American politics knows, however, that the president does not 
get the final say regarding membership on the Supreme Court. Judicial nominees must 
also be confirmed by the Senate, which, as a result of the 2014 midterms, was now 
controlled by Republicans uninterested in filling the federal bench with Obama 
appointees. Additionally, 2016 was a presidential election year. Republicans realized that 
if they could stall the confirmation process, retain control of the Senate, and elect one of 
their own to succeed the term-limited Obama, the new Republican president could select 
a different nominee and preserve the Court’s conservative majority. Alert to this 
possibility, Democrats preferred to confirm a new justice during the waning months of 
Obama’s term.  
 It did not take long for the politics involving this latest Supreme Court vacancy to 
kick into high gear. About an hour after news of Scalia’s death broke, Senate Majority 
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Leader Mitch McConnell (R-KY) issued a statement of condolence that ended by 
declaring (in bold print, nonetheless,) “The American people should have a voice in the 
selection of their next Supreme Court Justice. Therefore, this vacancy should not be filled 
until we have a new president.”1 When asked about the vacancy at a Republican 
presidential primary debate later that very night, then-candidate Donald Trump affirmed 
McConnell’s strategy in blunt language: “Delay, delay, delay.”2 
 Democrats, taken aback by how quickly McConnell had turned to politics, heard 
nothing but hypocrisy in the majority leader’s words. In the past, McConnell had insisted 
Democrats allow votes on the judicial nominees of Republican presidents. For example, 
in a 2007 radio interview, McConnell—then serving as the Senate Minority Leader at a 
time when Democrats were refusing to consider President George W. Bush’s judicial 
nominees—asserted, “All of these judges are entitled to an up-or-down vote.”3 To 
highlight McConnell’s hypocrisy, Senate Minority Leader Harry Reid (D-NV) patched 
together a letter both addressed to and signed by McConnell composed entirely of 
McConnell’s past statements calling upon the Senate to set aside partisan politics and 
hold hearings on judicial nominees.4 
 Most Republican Senators followed McConnell’s lead on this, but they soon 
found themselves accused of hypocrisy as well. The website Right Wing Watch 
uncovered a 2005 interview with Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Chuck Grassley 
(R-IA) in which he urged senators (again quarreling over a batch of stalled Bush-era 
judicial nominees) to “do our jobs” while likening Democrats to “being a bully on the 
schoolyard playground” for delaying the confirmation process.5 After Senator John 
McCain (R-AZ) endorsed McConnell’s plan, McCain’s general election opponent, Rep. 
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Ann Kirkpatrick (D), posted a list on her campaign website of occasions in which 
McCain had taken a hard stance against the politicized obstruction of judicial nominees.6 
In early March, Obama authored a Facebook message reading, “Senators leading the 
obstruction on a Supreme Court nominee have demanded up-or-down votes many times 
in the past,” along with a link to a Medium article featuring ninety examples of Senators 
Grassley, John Cornyn (R-TX), Orrin Hatch (R-UT), and Jeff Sessions (R-AL) doing just 
that.7  
 Yet Democrats were hardly immune to charges of hypocrisy, either. In defending 
himself from Kirkpatrick’s attacks, McCain cited a 2007 speech by Vice Chair of the 
Senate Democratic Caucus (and Reid’s heir apparent) Chuck Schumer (NY) in which 
Schumer called upon his fellow Democrats to embrace a new precedent for handling late-
term court appointments and reject President Bush’s latest judicial nominees.8 Cornyn 
followed suit, telling a Dallas radio station, “We’re embracing this precedent that Sen. 
Chuck Schumer advocated for back in 2007. … If it’s good enough for them when 
they’re in the majority, then it’s good enough for us when we are. … This is a 
hypocritical argument on the part of Senator Schumer.” (Schumer claimed the two 
situations were different: “One’s apples, one’s oranges.”)9 Republicans also cited what 
they called “The Biden Rules,” which were based on a speech delivered by Vice 
President Joe Biden in June 1992 while serving as Chairman of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee. In the speech, Biden vowed not to hold hearings on judicial nominations 
made by Republican President George H.W. Bush during the run-up to the 1992 
election.10 (Washington Post columnist George Will, who described, “The Republican 
Party’s incoherent response to the 2016 Supreme Court vacancy” as “a partisan reflex in 
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search of a justifying principle,” wondered why Republicans would cite a Democratic 
politician as precedent in this case.11 And of course, one might also wonder why 
Democrats would point to Republican demands to hold up-or-down votes on nominees 
from a time when Democrats’ own behavior seemed to condone the obstructionism they 
now deplored.) 
 There were other prominent examples of Democratic hypocrisy as well. Obama’s 
vote to support a failed filibuster of nominee Samuel Alito in 2006 while Obama was 
serving in the Senate came back to haunt him. (White House Press Secretary Josh Earnest 
described the vote as “symbolic” in that it allowed some Democratic senators to voice 
their displeasure with Alito without upending the confirmation.)12 In an op-ed in the 
Washington Post, McConnell and Grassley pushed back against Reid’s assertion that the 
Senate has an obligation to give a hearing and a vote to a Supreme Court nominee by 
drawing attention to a floor speech Reid delivered during the George W. Bush presidency 
in which Reid said, “Nowhere in [the Constitution] does it say the Senate has a duty to 
give presidential nominees a vote.”13 After Democratic presidential candidate Hillary 
Clinton called on Republican senators to quit stalling, commentator Cal Thomas, in an 
article titled “Hypocrisy, Thy Name is Hillary Clinton,” directed his readers to remarks 
Clinton made in 2005 in which she stated the Senate has the power to “deny advice and 
consent” for judicial nominees.14 As commentator Carl Cannon wrote regarding the 
leaders of the Democratic Party, “When it comes to the Supreme Court…they are two-
faced. Perhaps a better way of putting it is that these Democrats have demonstrated that 
they have two standards when it comes to judicial appointments: one for themselves, 
another for Republicans.”15 
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 The hypocrisy of both sides was on full display during a March 2016 episode of 
NBC’s Meet the Press. In separate interviews with Reid and McConnell, host Chuck 
Todd played clips of what the party leaders had said in the past concerning the 
nomination process, juxtaposed them with more recent statements in which they argued 
something close to the opposite, and then asked them to explain the contradiction. 
McConnell briefly revealed a partisan motive before tacking back to his non-partisan 
standard, stating, “I don’t think it’s a good idea to move the Court to the left. But that’s 
not really the issue here. It’s not the person. It’s the principle.” Todd summarized the 
spectacle well, observing, “There feels like there’s hypocrisy on both sides. Democrats 
essentially don’t want to confirm a Supreme Court justice if a Republican’s doing it, and 
Republicans don’t want to confirm a Supreme Court justice if a Democrat is doing it. 
Isn’t that what we’re staring at here?” McConnell’s reply was curt but accurate: 
“Nobody’s been entirely consistent.”16 
  “The dirty little not-so-secret fact about the Senate,” wrote Carl Hulse of the New 
York Times just four days after Scalia had died, “is that both sides have engaged in 
ruthless tactics to deny presidents not of their party the chance to make lifetime 
appointments to courts where they could influence public policy long after that president 
is gone. Veteran senators develop remarkable dexterity, capable of seamlessly flipping 
their stance on filibusters and obstructionism depending on whether they are in the 
majority or the minority or who is in the White House.”17 
 This case about the 2016 Supreme Court vacancy is a classic case of political 
hypocrisy and a prime example of a political double standard. Interestingly, while there 
are matters of policy at stake here (the appointment of a liberal justice rather than a 
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conservative justice, and vice versa, could have significant implications for issues 
involving health care, environmental regulation, religious freedom, LGBT rights, etc.,) 
there is no direct material policy in dispute here. At issue are the rules and procedures 
concerning how the Senate is to handle Supreme Court vacancies, an issue that, prior to 
Scalia’s death, did not appear to divide the parties. While the parties will likely have 
differences of opinion over what kind of people ought to fill Supreme Court vacancies, 
there is nothing about being liberal or conservative that informs anyone’s opinion about 
the procedures and customs that ought to be followed when filling an open Court seat. 
It’s not even a point of contention on either party’s radar.18 There is just a process that, in 
isolation, both parties appeared to accept. 
 Such non-partisan processes are useful when it comes to mediating and resolving 
partisan squabbles. These enduring rules and procedures guide political disputes to a 
point of conclusion and lend the process a credible sense of fairness. Without them, the 
losers of a political dispute might claim their opponents did not play fair and deprived 
them of any chance to win. 
 Sometimes, however, the side that cannot achieve a political victory playing by 
the rules will attempt to bend or change the rules to their advantage, which is likely to 
draw a strong rebuke from the side that assumed they were going to win so long as 
everybody followed the agreed-upon rules. The ensuing argument over a set of rules and 
procedures that had previously drawn bipartisan support is in reality a proxy argument 
over policy. This brings the issue of fairness to the forefront again, as a fair person plays 
by the rules. Questions of how to handle unfair rules set aside, the concern now is that 
one party, hoping to snatch political victory from the jaws of defeat, might cheat to win.  
118 
 
 Polemarchus would have no problem with that. You may recall Polemarchus as 
one of Socrates’ early interlocutors in Plato’s Republic. He is not often cited as a model 
for fairness (although it is reasonable to fear he is often a model in practice.) When 
Socrates asks him, “What does the craft we call justice give, and to whom or what does it 
give it?” Polemarchus replies, “[Justice] gives benefits to friends and does harm to 
enemies.”19 Hopefully your instincts tell you that is wrong. Polemarchus’s mistake is 
confusing partisanship with justice. It’s fine to be a partisan, to want your team to 
triumph over another. But prioritizing your side’s victory over respect and adherence to 
the rules is not just or fair or right in nearly all cases. 
 Many instances of double standards in politics—including the previous case study 
(“The Latte Salute”)—could be described as a kind of “polemarchian hypocrisy,” or as a 
kind of hypocrisy undertaken by someone to hurt their enemies while helping themselves 
and their allies. This is especially true when it comes to cases of hypocrisy involving 
rules and procedures, like the current case concerning Supreme Court vacancies. 
Impartial rules regulate partisan disputes. That’s not a problem if your side wins playing 
by the rules. If it looks as though your side is going to come out on the losing end of a 
contest played by the rules, however, you may be tempted to skirt or change the rules. 
Hence the polemarchian hypocrisy: Insist upon the rules when following them benefits 
your side in a partisan dispute, and try to find a way around them when they don’t. 
 A politician’s primary motivation may be winning, but another obligation 
attendant to their office—upholding the rule of law to preserve justice and fairness—
supersedes that. On the face of it, then, that should make passing judgment in this 
particular case fairly easy: All parties should follow the accepted rules, procedures, and 
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conventions pertaining to the nomination and confirmation of individuals to the Supreme 
Court, meaning that any hypocrisy resulting in the inconsistent application of the rules 
between the parties should be considered unacceptable. 
 But what if the “accepted rules” were never officially “rules” to begin with. The 
truth is that there are very few official written rules governing the way the president and 
the Senate are to handle judicial nominations. Most of the rules discussed so far in this 
case study only concern a series of norms, customs, and conventions of the Senate—what 
could be called “unwritten rules”—that are not legally binding on the parties. Can 
someone be accused of hypocrisy for violating a rule they have no legal obligation to 
obey? Perhaps someone can only be accused of hypocrisy for violating official rules 
(which come with the expectation of obedience) but not unwritten rules (which, because 
we have chosen not to officially codify them, allow for the possibility of violation.) 
 This political drama over judicial nominations has been going on for decades. The 
history of this will be explored shortly, but for now one just needs to know that what 
probably began with an attempt by Democrats to block a handful of Republican nominees 
to the federal bench in the 1980s and 1990s (including one to the Supreme Court) has 
escalated to the more recent standoff over Scalia’s vacant seat. In all that time, however, 
it needs to be acknowledged that no one in either party during any of these political 
showdowns over judicial nominations has ever violated any written rule, law, or 
procedure pertaining to the confirmation process. Everything they did—whether that was 
holding up nominations in committee, voting down nominees on the Senate floor, 
filibustering nominees, eliminating the filibuster for judicial nominees, refusing to even 
consider judicial nominees for confirmation—was done by the books. Even when the 
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parties changed the rules to their advantage, not once did they violate the Constitution, a 
federal statute, or the written rules of the Senate. 
 The politicians involved in this case have instead been accused of violating the 
unwritten rules concerning judicial appointments. This is where the charge of hypocrisy 
comes into play: The politicians accused of hypocrisy in this case have indicated they 
believe the unwritten rules governing judicial appointments ought to be respected yet 
have violated them when it was to their advantage or their opponent’s disadvantage to do 
so. It’s a classic double standard. 
 And what exactly are these unwritten rules? They boil down to this: That the 
Senate should confirm the president’s nominees for judicial office so long as the 
nominees are of good character, possess the professional qualifications necessary to carry 
out the job, and have demonstrated the aptitude necessary to serve as a judge. Judicial 
nominees should be vetted carefully but efficiently and are not to be judged through a 
partisan political lens. 
 It goes without saying that politicians have so eroded these unwritten rules and 
their related conventions over the past thirty years that few senators likely assume they 
remain in effect or trust their opponents to respect them. It is worth asking, then, why 
these unwritten rules were developed to begin with. There are likely many reasons. 
 In the first place, the Constitution does not offer a lot of guidance when it comes 
to matters concerning the judicial branch. Article III, which deals with the judiciary, is 
very brief and almost seems like an afterthought; it does not even specify how many 
judges are to sit on the Supreme Court. As far as the nomination process goes, it merely 
states that the president “shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the 
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Senate, shall appoint…Judges of the supreme Court.” The Senate’s role—“Advice and 
Consent”—is vague and wide open to interpretation. For the Senate to carry out its 
constitutional duties, it became necessary for the Senate to augment the Constitution with 
its own informal institutional rules concerning the confirmation process. 
 Those same rules also helped stave off political crises concerning the size and 
composition of the Court and reduced the likelihood that American politics would 
devolve into a potentially crippling game of hardball. The strict letter of constitutional 
law does not prevent the Senate from blocking or ramming through presidential nominees 
or even altering the size of the Court. Perhaps there isn’t necessarily anything wrong with 
that; maybe that would simply be a matter of politics playing itself out within the 
parameters of the Constitution. As a practical matter, however, it would probably imperil 
the Court’s authority as well as the nation’s political stability, as fights would constantly 
erupt between the parties over the use and legitimacy of judicial power. 
 Yet while the Senate’s unwritten rules supplement the vague language of the 
Constitution while alleviating the potential for political hardball, they do not completely 
eliminate the possibility of raw constitutional conflict between the parties. The unwritten 
rules still allow for senators to resort to strictly legal constitutional means to stop a 
nomination, but it is generally accepted this should happen rarely and only if senators 
seriously objected to a nominee. The unwritten rules do not turn the Senate into a rubber 
stamp when it comes to appointments; because the unwritten rules do not have the force 
of official Senate procedure or the Constitution, senators can still turn to those legal 
mechanisms as a tactic of last resort. 
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 That means it would also be wise for presidents to avoid nominating individuals 
whom senators would consider too political, partisan, or controversial. Even though the 
Constitution grants the president the first move in this process, and despite the unwritten 
rules basically turning the power to make judicial nominations into a prize awarded to the 
winner of the presidency, the unwritten rules do not write the concerns of senators 
(including, quite often, on account of the filibuster, senators who are members of the 
party opposite the president) out of the process. The unwritten rules encourage 
collaboration among all players while granting the president some extra leverage. This 
has benefits for the Court as well: The Supreme Court’s credibility as a mediator of 
contentious political disputes is reinforced when a bipartisan coalition of politicians 
stretching across two branches of government legitimizes its members. 
 The ideological diversity of both parties throughout most of the twentieth century 
(with the presence of southern conservatives in the Democratic Party and northern 
progressives in the Republican Party) made it easier for senators to follow these 
unwritten rules. Presidents could expect to find support from across the aisle if a judge 
had a noticeable ideological bent and probably had the leverage to cut deals with 
skeptical members of his own party to win over their votes. The current era, however, is 
characterized by high political polarization and ideologically homogeneous parties, which 
helps explain the strain placed on the Senate’s unwritten rules. Presidents perhaps feel 
emboldened to nominate more ideological judges who engender more ideological support 
from likeminded senators who in turn expect to be rewarded by their base for their 
partisan behavior. Given the ideological purity of the parties today and the ideological 
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distance separating them as well, a nominee’s prospects for bipartisan support are also 
diminished. 
 In highly polarized times, the unwritten rules governing judicial appointments can 
seem more like obstacles to partisans than tools that can be used to regulate political 
conflict. Unwritten rules, however, play a vital role in democracies and should not be 
dismissed for partisan gain. In their book How Democracies Die, Steven Levitsky and 
Daniel Ziblatt argue the health of a democracy is secured not only by constitutional rules 
but also by “informal rules that, though not found in the constitution or any laws, are 
widely known and respected.” Levitsky and Ziblatt characterize these rules and norms as 
the “guardrails of democracy,” essentially setting the bounds for acceptable political 
gameplay while “preventing day-to-day political competition from devolving into a no-
holds-barred conflict.”20 The two most important norms in democracies are mutual 
toleration (or “the idea that as long as our rivals play by constitutional rules, we accept 
that they have an equal right to exist, compete for power, and govern,”21) and institutional 
forbearance (which entails “avoiding actions that, while respecting the letter of the law, 
obviously violate its spirit,” or refusing to push “institutional prerogatives to the hilt, 
even if it is technically legal to do so[.]”22) 
 The norm most-relevant to the current case study is institutional forbearance. 
Forbearance assumes political conflict can never be eliminated from society, that the best 
way to manage this political conflict is via democracy, and that democratic politics is a 
game both sides would like to play indefinitely. Consequently, conscientious politicians 
and citizens will not press their political advantages to the point of total victory so that 
their opponents do not feel the need to resort to destabilizing tactics to reassert 
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themselves in the political game. Concerned less with total political domination than with 
preserving democracy as a way to resolve political disputes, good democratic politicians 
will find ways to accommodate their opponents. Crushing political victories are sacrificed 
for the long-term viability of democracy.23 (And of course, this can’t be realized unless 
those involved express a sense of mutual toleration toward each other and essentially 
agree to disagree without treating the other as an existential political threat.) 
 The norm of forbearance calls on senators to honor the unwritten rules of the 
Senate governing judicial nominations. Political reality reveals why it is so important to 
respect this norm. Since 1975, when the Senate lowered the number of Senators needed 
to end a filibuster to sixty, a party has only been able to assemble a 60+ majority for a 
total of twenty-eight months, meaning it is virtually impossible for the Senate to legislate 
without bipartisan cooperation. Furthermore, of those twenty-eight months, only four of 
them coincided with a president from the same party as the majority. It is also worth 
noting that since 1975, control of the Senate changed hands nine times, Democrats 
occupied the White House for twenty years while Republicans will have occupied it for at 
least twenty-four, and fourteen vacancies appeared on the Supreme Court. While most of 
those vacancies occurred during times when the president’s party controlled the Senate, 
the need for bipartisan cooperation—particularly when vacancies throughout the federal 
court system are taken into account—should be obvious. Political power trades hands 
with relative frequency. Divided government is as likely if not more likely than unified 
rule. Without cooperation and the unwritten rules that foster it, the functional capacity 
and credibility of the judicial branch would be jeopardized. The current trend of 
obstructionism along with the countervailing trend of expeditiously confirming nominees 
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run counter to the important norm of forbearance and undermine the goodwill necessary 
to preserve the institutional well-being of the Senate. 
 Yet some will insist the only rules being violated in the Senate during these 
battles over judicial nominees are unofficial rules senators have no obligation to obey and 
all the leeway to break. So long as senators follow the official letter of the law and act 
within its bounds, anything they do is legitimate. Some may counter by arguing it harms 
democracy to violate these unwritten rules, but the official democratically-adopted rules 
of democracy permit it. And one can hardly be called a hypocrite for violating a rule that 
does not require people to follow it. 
 This is all technically true. No senator would ever be held legally accountable for 
breaking an unwritten rule while acting in accordance with the letter of the law. But 
everyone has been party to informal agreements based on trust and goodwill that all 
involved, despite the absence of a legal requirement, are still expected to respect and 
obey. When people break them, they disappoint others who were expecting them to 
deliver a particular result while diminishing their reputation for trustworthiness. It is 
often inadequate for someone to say the law or written rules gave them permission to act 
a certain way when an informal or unwritten agreement between the parties created the 
expectation that all involved would honor a different standard. Unwritten rules cannot be 
written off so easily. 
 Some may wonder why, if unwritten rules are so important, society doesn’t give 
them added force and authority by actually codifying them so that everyone will have to 
follow them. In some cases, that might not be a bad idea. Yet as Levitsky and Ziblatt 
point out, every set of rules contains gaps and ambiguities that will inevitably need to be 
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worked out in their implementation. Unwritten rules can help guide people through that 
problem so that those who would exploit a legal loophole or a doctrinaire reading of a 
law’s text do not undermine the spirit of the law and wield it as a bludgeon against their 
opponents.24 Unwritten rules also help dull the edge of a rule-bound society so that 
people are not constantly calling one another out for just the slightest of deviations from 
codified rules. This is extremely important in democracies, where the people are 
sovereign and the law is regarded as an extension of their will; without unwritten rules 
complementing and softening the enforcement of written rules, people may feel the law is 
a tool of oppression rather than a mirror reflecting their vision of a just and good society. 
 Finally, unwritten rules are often not written down because of a need for them to 
remain somewhat nebulous, perhaps because the letter of the law itself is vague and its 
implementation needs to accommodate that ambiguity, or because the letter of the law is 
strict and needs some leeway built into it, or because society needs to allow for some 
give-and-take in the application of the law when so many people are living under the law, 
or because of a desire to preserve the opportunity for deviation and dissent in the sort of 
situations the rules typically apply to. Unwritten rules acknowledge this gray area 
between the letter and implementation of the law. Although those who honor unwritten 
rules often insist that people follow such rules, they will also admit occasions may arise 
when it is acceptable to bend, violate, or even eliminate them and that determining when 
this is permissible is often a matter of subjective judgment. Adherents cannot utilize this 
judgment if they are forbidden from doing so by the dictate of codified law. While 
unwritten rules are not meant to be broken under ordinary circumstances, they reserve for 
their adherents the right to do so (and resort to legalistic, hardball tactics) if necessary. 
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Unwritten rules introduce flexibility into what could otherwise be a very rigid legal 
system. 
 Ultimately, people cannot escape the charge of hypocrisy simply by claiming the 
rule they violated is unwritten and therefore carries no obligation for its adherents to 
abide by it. Even if an unwritten rule is not officially on the books and holds open the 
possibility for violation, there still remains a strong expectation that, under most 
circumstances, that rule will be obeyed. 
 In fact, it actually seems more fitting to accuse someone of hypocrisy in politics 
when it involves an unwritten rule than it does a written rule. Some legal, moral, and 
ethical requirements are so strong people are virtually obligated to obey them. If someone 
does violate them, that person may be accused of hypocrisy (that is, of an improper 
inconsistency) for failing to uphold a legal, moral, or ethical obligation that it was 
incumbent on them to uphold. But the word “hypocrisy” does not seem to adequately 
characterize an offense of this nature. Compared to other words that could have been 
used in those cases (“injustice,” “discrimination,” “prejudice,” “bias”) the word 
“hypocrisy” feels too weak. When faced with a nigh-inviolable legal, moral, or ethical 
claim that people are virtually obligated to obey, calling someone who violates such 
claims a “hypocrite” underplays the severity of the offense. Improper inconsistencies of 
this type demand stronger words. 
 But “hypocrisy” seems to capture the sort of improper inconsistency that results 
when someone violates an unwritten rule they were presumed to have been following. It 
is easy to imagine the excuse: “Yes, I said I would follow the unwritten rule, but 
technically I didn’t have to.” And while it has already been argued that such an excuse is 
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automatically exculpatory (far from that, in fact) it may be, in certain circumstances, a 
justifiable excuse nonetheless, as well as a plausibly legitimate excuse for many. This 
sort of improper inconsistency—one based on a less-than-obligatory/conceivably violable 
commitment that those to whom the commitment applies are still, on their honor, strongly 
expected to honor—seems to be the kind of hypocrisy so frequently discovered in 
politics. 
 Say what may be said of the adage “rules are meant to be broken,” but unwritten 
rules—despite the strong expectation that people ought to obey them—are certainly 
designed to allow people to violate them. People should hope that when someone violates 
an unwritten rule like the one concerning Supreme Court vacancies that the violator is not 
a Polemarchus, or someone willing to embrace a double standard when it comes to an 
unwritten rule in order to disadvantage his enemies and advantage himself or his allies, 
but rather someone attempting to preserve a principle that takes precedence over the 
principles that would be preserved by obeying the unwritten rules. After all, rules can be 
used negligently or for ill purposes, as when politicians hide behind rules to conceal 
corruption, obstruct majorities, or ignore crises. Again, in such cases, it may be 
acceptable to sidestep the rules in order to expose bad behavior or to restore the 
functionality of government. Rules might also be used to advance unjust policy. A law 
passed via a proper legal process is not necessarily a just law, particularly if its enactment 
results in an injustice. While children are taught that “it doesn’t matter if you win or lose, 
it’s how you play the game” (a maxim that typically, among other things, precludes 
cheating) the stakes involved in political games are considerably higher than those found 
on a field of play. Consequently, it may be acceptable at times to take the rare and 
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extraordinary step of violating a rule in order to ensure a just outcome. In such cases, 
people may be willing to forgive the hypocrisy attendant to violating a rule that had 
previously been honored if doing so corrects a serious wrong or means they are not 
hypocritical when it comes to their support of justice. 
 These extreme scenarios are always possible but occur rarely, meaning citizens 
should not be quick to resort to extra-legal tactics to achieve policy goals. In fact, doing 
so may only heighten the chance that others will begin following that example and 
damage the ordinarily cherished principle of due process. In most cases, it is probably 
better off to play within the rules. Furthermore, it is important to remember that the issues 
one side considers extremely important are usually equally significant to their opposition, 
who probably feel as certain about their causes as their opponents.* Thanks to rules, 
political passions can be channeled into socially acceptable arenas of contention; absent 
them, political disputes could easily turn violent. This is not to say extra-legal tactics are 
always forbidden. In some circumstances, they may be the only option available. If that is 
the case, however, anyone using extra-legal tactics should openly justify their actions in a 
statement explaining with specificity the severity of the problem they are confronting and 
why these particular means are necessary to achieve the supremely important ends they 
desire. 
 It would be difficult to justify hypocrisy in the current case involving the Supreme 
Court vacancy using the argument that standard rules and procedures needed to be 
violated to guard against an injustice or serious wrong. Preventing one’s opposition from 
 
* It is at this point that the elephant in the room—abortion—should be mentioned. For many activists and 
voters in the United States today, the politics of Supreme Court nominations boil down to this issue, which 
involves fundamental matters of life and liberty some may consider serious enough to justify violating rules 
concerning judicial appointments. 
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seating judges that would likely advance their preferred policy objectives does not meet 
any of the necessary criteria for taking such an extreme step; in fact, nominating and 
confirming judges is a fairly routine and necessary political practice undertaken by the 
president and Senate and should follow fairly routine procedures no matter who holds 
political power. This of course is not a rubber stamp for judicial appointments—a review 
of a judge’s qualifications may reveal information that disqualifies them from office—but 
it does mean that actions deviating from the normal confirmation process should rarely 
occur. 
 There is one final matter in this case to consider. Some will argue it is acceptable 
to become a hypocrite on a matter concerning obedience to rules if your opponent breaks 
the rules first. If one party suddenly changed the unwritten rules concerning judicial 
appointments, it would seem acceptable for the other party to take maximum advantage 
of the new rules even if they had earlier denounced the change, since not doing so could 
leave them at a significant political disadvantage. It makes little sense for a party to bind 
themselves to the old rules and inhibit their ability to shape the political direction of the 
judiciary when their opponents unilaterally freed themselves of those rules to their 
advantage. Of course, a party may choose to continue to play by the old rules concerning 
judicial appointments if they believe there is some political advantage to be found in 
standing up for the old rules, and they may be morally obligated to play by the old rules if 
they believed the new rules were fundamentally undemocratic. 
 Barring that, however, it seems acceptable for a party to follow the new rules 
concerning judicial appointments even if they are critical of the new rules and denounced 
their opponents for changing them. In fact, if one party ruled out the possibility of 
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retaliating in the event of a rule violation, the other party may never feel dissuaded from 
violating rules and permanently adopt the identity of a Polemarchus. 
 There is one important caveat to this principle, however: If the situation allows, 
the rules should only be violated on a tit-for-tat basis. If the retaliatory party believes the 
old rules have value—and nearly all parties to the current dispute over judicial 
appointments have indicated rhetorically at one point or another that they believe they 
do—then the retaliatory party should do whatever they can to preserve those rules even as 
they rectify a rule violation with a violation of their own. A tit-for-tat strategy has the 
potential to achieve this. In responding to a rule violation with a tit-for-tat approach, the 
retaliatory party needs to make clear to their opponents and the public what specific rule 
violation they are responding to and that their response is genuinely proportional to the 
original violation in amount and degree. Once completed, everyone will know all sides 
have benefitted equally from the violation, that the score should now be considered 
settled, and that the old rules—which earlier had appeared to have been suspended—have 
been restored. 
 Some may object to this “eye for an eye” approach on the grounds that it lowers 
the moral standing of the retaliatory party to the level of the offending party. In some 
circumstances, that may be the case, meaning a rule violation is better left as evidence of 
the offending party’s poor moral standing. If there is a need, however, to correct a wrong 
wrought by a rule violation, a tit-for-tat strategy is an effective way to clearly and fairly 




 A tit-for-tat strategy sounds like a nice way to resolve this problem, but it’s not 
always easy to implement given how difficult it is for both sides to agree that a response 
is proportional rather than an escalation. This is true even in the current case, where we 
might assume violations and responses would be easy to quantify simply by counting the 
number of judges either blocked or rammed through the nomination process. The 
problem is some may argue the retaliation needs to be more than just quantitative but 
qualitative. This may explain why Republican justifications for hardball tactics 
concerning judicial nominations always come back to the Democrats’ successful effort to 
block the confirmation of Robert Bork to the Supreme Court in 1987. For Republicans, 
the “borking” of Robert Bork was the Democrats’ original (and enormous) sin. Bork—
widely regarded as an arch-conservative—would have replaced Justice Lewis Powell, Jr., 
a conservative judge who nonetheless was part of the majority in Roe v. Wade (1973). 
After Bork was voted down by the Senate, President Ronald Reagan nominated Anthony 
Kennedy, who was part of the narrow 5-4 majority in Planned Parenthood v. Casey 
(1992) that upheld the central holding in Roe. Republicans could have borked any of 
President Clinton’s or President Obama’s nominees to the Court and called it 
quantitatively even, but qualitatively many Republicans might argue the score from 
Bork’s nomination can’t be settled until they have a conservative majority in place on the 
Court that will overturn Roe. 
 In the three decades since Bork’s nomination, both sides have traded retaliatory 
blows with each other over judicial nominations. At this point, it’s hard for a tit-for-tat 
strategy to work effectively as both sides blame the other for either starting or sharply 
escalating the conflict. In the 1980s, Republicans were driven to counter the activist 
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liberal legacy of Supreme Court justices like Earl Warren, William Brennan, and Harry 
Blackmun (all nominated by Republican presidents) by appointing ideologically 
conservative judges like Bork, while Democrats worked to prevent what they felt was an 
overt effort by Republicans to politicize the nation’s courts. This is perhaps what led 
Democrats to block around ten judges during the George H.W. Bush presidency. 
Republicans countered by obstructing about double that number during Bill Clinton’s two 
terms in office. During George W. Bush’s presidency, Democrats actually began 
filibustering judicial nominees, marking a significant escalation in the conflict. 
Republicans did the same to Obama but to a much greater degree, leading Harry Reid to 
implement the so-called “nuclear option,” an unprecedented move that eliminated the 
filibuster for all federal judicial appointments except to the Supreme Court. And, of 
course, once Republicans regained control of the Senate in 2014, Mitch McConnell took 
the unprecedented step in 2016 of not even considering a nominee for an open Supreme 
Court seat. 
 After all this back-and-forth, it’s hard to hear either side take a stand in defense of 
the unwritten rules governing judicial nominations without regarding them as hypocrites. 
Perhaps that means the unwritten rules simply don’t apply anymore. If that’s the case, it’s 
probably time for both parties to drop the moral pretense and just accept that future 
federal judicial vacancies will be filled through a process of political hardball. Without 
unwritten rules to guide them through the process, however, it’s easy to imagine a series 
of crises engulfing the Senate and eventually crippling the Supreme Court. Rather than 
abandon the old unwritten rules for political hardball, it may be better instead to develop 
a new set of rules to take their place (i.e., term-limiting Supreme Court justices to allow 
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for more regular/lower-stake appointments, or setting up an independent commission that 
can identify qualified nominees using non-political criteria, etc.)26 These rules may not be 
airtight, meaning politicians may still try to find ways to work around them, but if both 
parties agreed they needed to restore the stability the earlier rules had provided, the new 
rules could serve as a new baseline for cooperation. 
 There is no doubt that spirit of cooperation is sorely needed, especially after the 
way the Senate handled the vacancy created by Scalia’s death. In March 2016, President 
Obama nominated Merrick Garland, Chief Judge of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, 
for the open seat. Garland had supervised federal prosecutors in the Oklahoma City 
bombing case in the 1990s before being appointed to the D.C. Circuit by President 
Clinton. Despite his age (sixty-three, which meant his tenure on the Court would be 
relatively brief) and his reputation as a moderately liberal judge (at the time of another 
vacancy in 2010, Republican Senator Orrin Hatch called Garland “a consensus nominee” 
of whom there would be “no question” concerning his confirmation) Garland never 
received a vote let alone a hearing in the Republican-controlled Senate.27 
 After upsetting Hillary Clinton in the 2016 presidential election, President Trump 
nominated Neil Gorsuch, a Circuit Court of Appeals judge with a solid conservative 
record, to take Scalia’s spot. In touting Gorsuch for the Court, Republicans stressed his 
professional resume as a judge even though, as E.J. Dionne, Jr., of the Washington Post 
pointed out in an op-ed titled “It’s Time to Make Republicans Pay for Their Extreme 
Hypocrisy,” they did not see that as a reason to elevate Garland.28 Democrats, who 
remained in the minority in the Senate, moved to filibuster Gorsuch’s confirmation even 
though, as David Rutz of the Washington Free Beacon made clear in an article titled 
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“Take Two-and-a-Half Minutes to See How Hypocritical Democrats Are on Filibustering 
Supreme Court Nominees,” many of them had denounced Republican use of the filibuster 
for judicial nominees when Democrats were in the majority just a few years back.29 
Republicans, who could not initially overcome the Democratic filibuster against Gorsuch, 
then moved to take the unprecedented step of eliminating the filibuster for Supreme 
Court nominees even though they had condemned Democrats for eliminating the 
filibuster for all other judicial nominees just four years earlier.30 John McCain, who at 
one time argued it would be “sheer hypocrisy” for Republicans to retain the Democrats’ 
51-vote threshold for judicial nominees once Republicans were in the majority,31 then 
asserted that anyone who believed it was good for the Senate to eliminate the filibuster 
for Supreme Court nominees was a “stupid idiot;”32 he then voted to eliminate the 
filibuster.33 Finally, in April 2017, the Senate confirmed Neil Gorsuch’s appointment to 
the Supreme Court, effectively restoring the Court’s 5-4 conservative majority. 
 
Postscript 
 From a May 29, 2019, CNN article by Ted Barrett: “Speaking at a Paducah 
Chamber of Commerce luncheon in Kentucky, McConnell was asked by an attendee, 
‘Should a Supreme Court justice die next year, what will your position be on filling that 
spot?’ The leader took a long sip of what appeared to be iced tea before announcing with 
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6. SETTLING THE SCORE 
 
 With jobless rates rising at the onset of the Great Recession in 2008, Congress 
passed a bill offering federally-funded unemployment benefits to individuals who had 
used up their allotment of state-funded unemployment aid. Following a couple 
reauthorizations, the program expired at the end of 2013 as Republicans and Democrats 
in Washington failed to agree on how to pay for another extension. A bipartisan effort in 
the Senate, however, did produce a compromise in March 2014, but its prospects for 
passage were scuttled by Republican Speaker of the House John Boehner when he 
announced such a bill had no chance at seeing a vote in his chamber. In a statement 
posted to his website, Boehner declared, 
We have always said that we’re willing to look at extending emergency 
unemployment benefits again, if Washington Democrats can come up with a plan 
that is fiscally-responsible, and gets to the root of the problem by helping to create 
more private-sector jobs. There is no evidence that the bill being rammed through 
the Senate by [Senate Majority Leader Harry] Reid meets that test, and according 
to [state administrators who wrote a letter opposing the bill], the bill is also 
simply unworkable. Frankly, a better use of the Senate’s time would be taking up 
and passing the dozens of House-passed jobs bills still awaiting action.1 
 
 Some observers, such as Danny Vinik at The New Republic, objected to 
Boehner’s assertion that there was “no evidence” the Senate bill would create private-
sector jobs. He noted the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), a nonpartisan agency 
created by and for Congress to “[produce] independent analyses of budgetary and 
economic issues to support the Congressional budget process,”2 found that extending 
emergency unemployment benefits actually created jobs.3 (This happens because the 
unemployed tend to spend their benefits immediately, which leads businesses to boost 
production and hire workers to meet demand.)4 
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 Huffington Post’s Arthur Delaney took his criticism of Boehner one step further 
by accusing him of not simply ignoring the facts but of hypocrisy. Wrote Delaney: 
While Boehner is just not that into what the budget office says about 
unemployment extensions, he loves their take on raising the federal minimum 
wage to $10.10 per hour, which the CBO figures could reduce employment by 
half a million jobs. 
 
“What I’ve long said is that raising the minimum wage destroys jobs — and that 
was confirmed last week by the Congressional Budget Office — at least 500,000 
jobs would be lost, maybe as many as a million,” Boehner said last month.5 
 
Delaney’s implication here was that Boehner was guilty of a double standard when it 
came to the CBO in that Boehner considered the agency authoritative when its findings 
supported Republican positions but was quick to dismiss it when its reports debunked 
Republican arguments. 
 Congress founded the CBO in the 1970s in order to free itself from a reliance on 
executive branch accounting during budget negotiations between the president and the 
legislature. Since its creation, the CBO has developed a reputation for political 
independence, methodological transparency, and credible analysis, with politicians of 
both parties often inconvenienced by its findings. It established itself as a nonpartisan 
institution during the Carter administration when the office—led at the time by 
Democratic appointee Alice Rivlin—questioned the overly-optimistic estimates offered 
by the White House for the cost of its proposed energy legislation. Since then it has 
drawn the ire of Ronald Reagan, Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich, and Bill Clinton, 
whose administration and allies tried unsuccessfully to pressure the CBO into issuing a 
positive score of its doomed health care plan. At the same time, politicians who can 
defend their arguments about policy by citing the findings of the CBO gain an extra 
measure of credibility in the public arena. For this reason, Democrats working on health 
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care reform in 2009-10 chose to accept the CBO’s findings and modify their legislation 
accordingly to ensure the Affordable Care Act was at least projected to do what they and 
the president had promised.6 
 More recently, the CBO has been in the news for a set of projections concerning 
Republican legislative proposals. After the CBO issued a report in September 2017 
finding that a Republican proposal to repeal and replace the Affordable Care Act would 
leave millions of Americans uninsured, Senator Susan Collins (R-ME) announced her 
opposition to the bill, effectively ending its legislative prospects.7 The CBO played a 
more direct role in the passage of Republican tax cuts in the Senate, where Senate rules 
stipulate that bills affecting the budget can use the reconciliation process to avoid the 
possibility of a filibuster so long as the CBO determines the bill reduces deficits after ten 
years. In order to pass the CBO’s analysis, Republican lawmakers made the tax cuts for 
individuals temporary so that they would expire at the end of the ten-year window.8 
 The Trump administration and its Republican allies became vocal critics of the 
CBO during the recent debates over health care and taxes. Anticipating a less-than-
flattering score on their health care proposals, Republicans began questioning the 
credibility of the CBO almost as soon as they began their efforts to repeal Obamacare in 
the early months of 2017.9 In May 2017, White House budget director Mick Mulvaney, 
frustrated with what he described as the “absurd” scoring of a Republican health care bill, 
wondered if “the day of the CBO had come and gone.”10 Health and Human Services 
Secretary Tom Price, who was tasked with passing Trump’s health care overhaul through 
Congress, stated in June 2017 that “the numbers the CBO had before with the 
[Affordable Care Act], and the numbers they have now, are not accurate.”11 There was 
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also some talk in Republican circles of circumventing the CBO altogether by replacing 
their projections with estimates from executive agencies or conservative think tanks.12 
 This Republican rhetoric did not sit well with the Washington Post’s editorial 
board, who penned an op-ed on March 11, 2017, titled “The GOP’s Mind-Blowing 
Hypocrisy on the CBO.” They wrote: 
Over the past two decades, CBO is perhaps best known for analyses that put a 
stamp of budgetary responsibility on Obamacare, but also papers that enabled 
Republicans to cut taxes during the George W. Bush years and, later, to slam 
President Obama on the long-term debt picture. Time after time, Republicans had 
nothing but praise for the office’s “nonpartisan” work. They were quick to cite the 
CBO when it concluded that some people would willingly work less under 
Obamacare. 
 
The board also noted that Keith Hall, the director of the CBO, had been appointed to his 
post in April 2015 by congressional Republican leadership after then-congressman Tom 
Price had demanded the removal of the previous director. (The director of the CBO is 
selected jointly by the leadership of both the House and Senate.) The new director was 
even a proponent of “dynamic scoring,” a method of budget analysis that has the effect of 
lessening the cost of tax cuts, a policy objective prized by Republicans.13 Price’s 
statement at the time of Hall’s appointment declared, “Keith Hall will bring an 
impressive level of economic expertise and experience to the Congressional Budget 
Office. His vast understanding of economic and labor market policy will be invaluable to 
the work of CBO and the important role it will continue to play as Congress seeks to 
enact policies that support a healthy and growing economy.”14 
 This case is again about a double standard, but it is not the institution in 
question—the CBO—that is accused of a double standard; instead, that charge has been 
leveled against certain Republicans who have recently dismissed the CBO’s findings 
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despite having accepted the institution as a trustworthy source of information in the past. 
Significantly, the Republicans in this case have been accused of dismissing the CBO not 
because they believe the nonpartisan institution is acting with a partisan bias but because 
they are presumed to believe the nonpartisan institution’s findings would prove 
disadvantageous to certain aspects of their partisan agenda. 
 As explained in an earlier case study (“The Latte Salute”) one reason people 
dislike double standards is because they offend people’s sense of fairness. It is generally 
accepted that it is wrong to favor some people over others when all involved are entitled 
to equal treatment. In some situations, however, favoritism and preference are acceptable. 
This is often the case in politics, an undertaking defined by its competitive nature. 
Politicians and parties representing competing ideologies, agendas, and policies work 
hard to win the support of citizens, who are encouraged to take sides in political debates 
and support their preferred candidates and parties. Once in power, parties and politicians 
plot to enact their policy objectives and retain their hold on power while their opponents 
maneuver to stop and usurp them. Supporters are often rewarded with the enactment of 
preferable policies. Regular elections ensure this competitive spirit is an ever-present 
consideration in politics. 
 Yet politics is not a free-for-all. While it is fine to settle political disputes 
competitively, there is a legitimate concern that the ambitious quest for victory and power 
will tempt some into seeking an unfair edge over their opponents or manipulating the 
system to their advantage. In so doing, policy outcomes may be geared more toward 
narrow partisan or personal concerns than the broader public good. Consequently, 
citizens and politicians are expected to obey rules regulating political contests, justify 
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their policy proposals with public-spirited reasons that explain how their policies will 
benefit society as a whole, and accept that their opponents have as much of a right to 
compete within the terms of the competition as their preferred side does even if they 
don’t want their opponents to win. (See “Confirmation Bias.”) 
 Partisans and political ideologues often struggle with finding the right balance 
between pushing their own partisan agenda and respecting the rules and norms that 
regulate political competition. Many partisans rally behind a partisan political agenda 
because they believe that agenda embodies the public good, which, by extension, would 
not be realized if their opponents were to gain power. Of course, their opponents might 
feel the same way about their own partisan political agenda and the damage to the public 
good that could result if their opponents were to gain power. In some cases, it may be 
true that one partisan side actually does have a superior appreciation for the public good 
while their opponents, if empowered, would do serious harm to it. In these cases, acts of 
civil disobedience or drastic political action may be called for. Daily political 
circumstances rarely necessitate such actions, however, as change can be pursued through 
regular political channels. Partisans need to be careful that the overzealous pursuit of 
power or a policy agenda does not take priority over their more important civic 
responsibilities as stewards of the rules and norms that govern a competitive democratic 
political society. As much as they want to win—and as much as they believe it is 
essential for the good of the country that their side win—partisans must in nearly all 
circumstances accord greater respect to the rules of the democratic game and accept that 
they are just as entitled to win by those rules as their opponents. Consequently, citizens 
should prioritize the maintenance of democratic norms, rules, standards, and principles 
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over partisan and ideological principles. Prioritizing partisan principles over such civic-
minded principles leaves citizens vulnerable to legitimate accusations of hypocrisy.  
 One way governments have sought to prevent partisanship’s hyper-competitive 
impulses is by establishing rules and agencies to oversee political competitions. The 
Federal Elections Commission, which enforces campaign finance laws, was designed for 
this purpose. Another example would be the various state-level non-partisan redistricting 
committees tasked with drawing congressional districts following every census so that 
the districts are not gerrymandered by a party for partisan advantage.15 Neutral 
competence is the aspiration of any government bureaucratic agency (and one, given 
every person’s unique subjective perspective, impossible to guarantee) but it is of 
particular importance to any agency tasked with overseeing political competitions, since 
without a sense of obligation to it, a partisan regulator could rig the competition in such a 
way to render any hope of an open and fair competition obsolete. 
 This is where the CBO comes into play. Although the CBO is the product of 
political rivalry (as you’ll recall, it was created so the legislative branch could counter the 
executive branch’s budget numbers) over the years it has established a reputation as a 
neutral, impartial institution that can help mediate disputes within the partisan halls of 
Congress. “Mediate” does not mean the CBO actually negotiates disputes between the 
parties concerning the budget. Instead, it aims to provide the House and Senate with 
accurate, nonpartisan assessments of budgetary proposals, a useful service in a highly 
competitive institution like Congress, whose members are often inclined to sell the public 
on the merits (or demerits) of proposed legislation with numbers that do not accurately 
capture a bill’s estimated costs and benefits. The CBO can rise above this partisan 
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conflict by providing the public and members of Congress with accurate, authoritative 
assessments of budgetary proposals. The CBO’s efforts also help ground debates about 
the proposals in estimates all sides can trust and accept. Sometimes a CBO report will 
affirm a partisan’s arguments; at other times, a report may refute them. Regardless, the 
CBO can credibly maintain that their conclusions do not reflect a preferred partisan 
outcome but are instead the product of a nonpartisan model that they believe generates 
the most accurate forecast of the proposed legislation’s effects. Discussion and debate on 
the proposed legislation can then proceed from the facts certified by the CBO. 
 When the CBO is asked to analyze a legislative proposal, it is often said they are 
being asked to “score” the bill. The report they produce is often described as a “score.” 
The CBO is even sometimes referred to as Congress’s “scorekeeper.” This is an 
instructive way of thinking about the role the CBO plays in American government. Just 
consider any athletic competition. None of the participants in the competition would want 
a scorekeeper prone to fixing scores. Of course, a part of us may long for a scorekeeper 
who fixed the score on our behalf, but absent that (and the accompanying likelihood that 
our competitors would retaliate by employing their own crooked scorekeepers to counter 
our own) we would all prefer a scorekeeper who kept the most accurate score possible so 
that the efforts of the competitors on the field of play ultimately determine the outcome 
of the competition and to prevent the competition from devolving into debates over the 
validity of a score or which final score to accept. Ideally, this scorekeeper would be a 
neutral observer exhibiting neutral competence—someone whose only interest was not 
who won the game but rather getting the final score correct—and all competitors would 
agree to accept the scorekeeper’s tally as the authoritative final score. In this way, the 
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CBO is like a scorekeeper, someone who, without partiality, sets the objective reality of 
an objectively definable aspect of a competition in order to provide an objective basis 
upon which the competition can be waged and evaluated. 
 Within the halls of government, a CBO score establishes the budgetary reality of a 
bill. Both sides agree its calculations ought to be treated as authoritative and the basis 
upon which debate about the bill ought to proceed. Both sides agree to this regardless of 
whether or not the CBO’s findings support or undermine their claims about the bill 
because the CBO’s findings are derived not from partisan preferences but from respected 
economic models utilizing the best available information about the way the American 
economy works. The CBO’s methods are also transparent so that anyone can check their 
methods and review their work. 
 Consequently, accepting a CBO score is a matter of fairness and fair play. It’s 
easy for one side to accept a CBO score when it buttresses their side’s argument. It’s 
harder when the math doesn’t work out the way they’d like it, but there’s nothing about 
the CBO’s methods that indicates it is biased against one side or the other. In fact, 
tomorrow, on another bill, their side’s case for that different piece of legislation may be 
strengthened by a CBO report. The key idea, however, is that once the parties to a debate 
accept the CBO as a de facto congressional scorekeeper—as someone whose rulings are 
considered authoritative in regulating the contentious legislative process and binding on 
all sides—then its rulings should be accepted. Support for the CBO and its reports should 
not be contingent on the CBO producing scores that support a particular political agenda. 
That wouldn’t be fair to those who are willing to accept the CBO’s reports even when 
they prove disadvantageous to their agenda. Accepting (and expecting an opponent to 
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accept) the rulings of an impartial official when those rulings favor you but rejecting 
them when they don’t would be unfair and hypocritical. 
 Of course, it is always possible the accountants at the CBO could act with bias. 
That would certainly be a problem if that was the case (and it’s something we can never 
put entirely out of mind) but as a 2017 survey of economists conducted by the University 
of Chicago’s Initiative on Global Markets reveals, the CBO has a sterling nonpartisan 
reputation.16 Its transparent methods also allow anyone to review its work for evidence of 
bias and to source its methodological assumptions. Furthermore, any recent Republican 
accusation of bias has a high bar to clear given that, as mentioned earlier, the CBO’s 
director was appointed by Republicans and has demonstrated a willingness to adopt 
accounting methods preferred by Republicans. 
 One might be inclined to dismiss a CBO score if they believed the CBO’s work 
was faulty, but there’s not much evidence to support that argument either. It is true the 
CBO vastly overestimated the number of Americans who would sign up for health 
insurance through the Affordable Care Act’s marketplace, but because many of those 
expected signees instead got health care through the law’s Medicaid expansion, the 
number of Americans without health insurance dropped by about the amount the CBO 
projected. Like any economic forecaster, the CBO is not perfect, but its projections have 
proven well-informed and reasonably reliable. Don Lee at the Los Angeles Times put it 
best in a May 2017 article: 
Although there’s no comprehensive measure on the hundreds of cost estimates on 
bills it does every year, the CBO’s analyses and forecasting are regarded as good 
or better than others doing similar work. 
 
It’s true that on economic forecasting, the CBO in recent years has been overly 
optimistic about growth while underestimating the rate of job creation, but so was 
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almost every other private forecaster. And economists say that the CBO’s 
economic projections generally compare favorably against other outfits, and its 
long-term budget estimates have been fairly accurate. 
 
“While no individual or organization can perfectly predict the future, the CBO has 
a long history of providing credible and impartial estimates based on the center of 
a range of likely outcomes,” said Maya MacGuineas, president of the nonpartisan 
Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget. “CBO is our nation’s fiscal referee 
and should be respected even if you do not like the call.”17 
 
That last statement by MacGuineas is well-put. There is room to quarrel with the CBO 
and even openly disagree with its conclusions. Yet members of Congress have a strong 
obligation to accept the CBO’s findings as the authoritative ruling regardless. A baseball 
analogy is useful here: We may disagree with what an umpire calls a ball or a strike, but 
as long as we’re playing the game and the umpire is using the same strike zone for both 
teams, the ump gets the final say over the matter. It’s certainly better than letting the 
batter or catcher make the call. The only significant difference is that an umpire can 
throw a player out of the game for arguing balls and strikes. The CBO can only offer a 
report, leaving it much more vulnerable to seeing one of the teams take the ball and go 
home if they don’t like a particular call. It really does depend on the parties to honor their 
commitment to their mutually-agreed-upon scorekeeper to make this work. 
 So are certain members of the GOP hypocritical when it comes to their 
acceptance of the CBO as Congress’s scorekeeper? They come pretty close to crossing 
that line. One might give Boehner a pass; it’s not entirely clear from the article that’s 
cited that he’s aware of the CBO’s finding that unemployment benefits help create jobs, 
although one might expect the Speaker of the House to have read that report. Price seems 
more intent on undermining the credibility of the CBO, which itself is problematic, 
especially since he personally vouched for the qualifications of the agency’s director. He 
150 
 
doesn’t quite throw it under the bus, although he seems to be setting himself up to do just 
that. As for Mulvaney, perhaps the only way he could escape the charge is if he never 
accepted the CBO’s role as a neutral scorekeeper to begin with, even from his days as a 
congressman. More plausibly, Price and Mulvaney could claim they don’t need to accept 
the CBO’s numbers in their new roles as members of the executive branch. It would 
seem, though, that the CBO’s status as a nonpartisan independent agency would make it 
difficult for them to dismiss its role in the legislative process. 
 There is one final point to note. While the CBO provides Congress and the public 
with useful budgetary information, that information does not then necessitate one’s 
support of or opposition to the budgetary issue in question. Remember Hume’s Law: Is ≠ 
Ought. For instance, a legislator who wants to create jobs or increase people’s access to 
healthcare does not need to automatically support a bill that is forecasted by the CBO to 
create jobs or increase people’s access to healthcare. It may be that the legislator believes 
the current bill does not go far enough to increase those numbers, is too costly or 
inefficient, or violates important normative concerns to generate its results. Other 
concerns matter. Boehner, for example, might have replied to the accusation of hypocrisy 
leveled against him by accepting the CBO’s findings as a matter of fact but then asserting 
he did not believe it was right for the government to create jobs through the mechanism 
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 7. THE KISSING CONGRESSMAN 
 
 The state of Louisiana has a reputation for rather colorful (and at times randy) 
politics. Its most famous son, Governor Huey Long (1928-1932), raged against the state’s 
wealthy political elites for their corruption and cronyism but was hardly a paragon of 
good governance. Long’s brother Earl, who served three stints as governor himself 
(1939-1940, 1948-1952, 1956-1960), carried on an affair with a New Orleans stripper 
while in office. The whiff of scandal dogged Edwin Edwards, but that did not stop 
Louisiana voters from sending him to the governor’s mansion a record four times (1972-
1980, 1984-1988, 1992-1996); it also finally sent him to jail in 2001. More recently, 
Congressman William Jefferson was convicted of bribery in 2009, while Senator David 
Vitter was outed as a client of a Washington, D.C., prostitution service in 2007. At the 
same time, Louisiana is in the heart of the Bible Belt, so it is not unusual to hear 
politicians touting their Christian faith and strong family values on the campaign trail. 
This blend of religious righteousness and salacious politics makes Louisiana a breeding 
ground for some of the nation’s more sordid tales of political hypocrisy. 
 Louisiana’s 5th congressional district is located in the reliably conservative 
northeastern region of the state and includes the cities of Monroe and Alexandria. When 
Representative Rodney Alexander resigned to take a job with the state government in 
2013, the state scheduled a special election for later that year to select his replacement, 
with a jungle primary in October and a general election in November. Republican 
businessman and political neophyte Vance McAllister emerged as the winner of that 
contest, a victory some in the state attributed to endorsements he’d received from 
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members of the Monroe-area Robertson family, hunting-product entrepreneurs who had 
acquired national fame as stars of the reality television series Duck Dynasty.1 
 The political clout of reality TV stars aside, McAllister used his business 
experience and status as a newcomer to politics as selling points with voters. He also 
emphasized his Christian faith and family values, as seen in a commercial he aired during 
the campaign titled “Dishes.” The commercial featured his wife and kids gathered 
alongside him in their kitchen as they prepared a routine Sunday morning breakfast prior 
to church. During the ad, McAllister stated, “It’s here in this house that [my wife] and I 
work to instill the values of faith, family, and country in our five children. If you will 
trust me with your vote, you can count on me to take those values to Washington, defend 
our Christian way of life, protect the unborn, and be right back here every Sunday to do 
the dishes.”2 
 In April 2014 (less than six months after McAllister had taken office) the 
Ouachita Citizen, a weekly Louisiana newspaper, posted a story to their website 
upending the family values narrative McAllister had pushed during his campaign. The 
article featured surveillance camera footage of McAllister sharing a passionate kiss with a 
female staff member in one of his district offices. After the story’s release, McAllister 
offered an apology and asked for forgiveness “from God, my wife, my kids, my staff, and 
my constituents who elected me to serve,” adding, “Trust is something I know has to be 
earned whether you’re a husband, a father, or a congressman. I promise to do everything I 
can to earn back the trust of everyone I’ve disappointed.”3 
 One person who was not quick to grant forgiveness was the husband of the staffer 
McAllister was having an affair with. He and McAllister had been classmates and co-
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workers in the past, and their families were on friendly terms.4 During an interview on 
CNN, the jilted husband described himself as “devastated” before casting doubt on 
McAllister’s religious devotion, stating, “I know his beliefs. When he ran one of his 
commercials, he said, ‘I need your prayers,’ and I asked, ‘When did you get religious?’ 
He said, ‘When I needed votes.’ He broke out the religious card and he’s about the most 
non-religious person I know.”5 
 While some constituents were forgiving or willing to take McAllister’s behavior 
in stride as just another example of Louisiana’s debauched politics, others expressed 
deeper disappointment. New York Times reporter Trip Gabriel surveyed the mood of local 
voters. “Our community is known for Christian values. We were so proud to be sending 
to Washington someone representing us in that way. He let us down,” said one 
constituent. Another remarked, “It feels like he took my vote and wasted it.” Added 
another, “I think he should man up and step down.”6 
 The leaders of Louisiana’s Republican Party also called for McAllister to give up 
his seat. Louisiana GOP party chairman Roger Villere issued a statement deploring 
McAllister’s “extreme hypocrisy,” declaring that “a breach of trust of this magnitude can 
only be rectified by an immediate resignation.”7 Republican Governor Bobby Jindal also 
urged the congressman to step aside, but some voters found Jindal employing a double 
standard since he had not also demanded the resignation of Senator Vitter despite Vitter’s 
own sex scandal.8 McAllister did not resign but announced at the end of April he would 
not seek reelection; two months later, however, he changed his mind and indicated he 
would again be a candidate for his seat in Congress that November. 
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 If someone asked a group of people for hypothetical examples of political 
hypocrisy, there’s a strong likelihood many would come up with a scenario similar to 
McAllister’s: A politician whose moral veneer masks an immoral personal life, whose 
private behavior does not reflect their political positions and values. This case study 
offers a variation on the kind of double standards that have been examined so far. Unlike 
the double standards in the previous case studies, which were strictly confined to matters 
of public actions, the double standard in this case study implicates the private behavior of 
a politician. In cases like this, a public figure’s public political positions appear to be at 
odds with their private behavior or personal experience. In other words, these politicians 
are accused of not practicing privately what they preach publicly. 
  “Preach” is a fitting word here. A classic example of hypocrisy in general is that 
of the adulterous pastor, and cases like McAllister’s seem related to those. What people 
find so shocking about these examples is that they involve people who have gone to great 
lengths to emphasize the importance of private virtues (either by praising those virtues 
directly or condemning those who violate them) and have positioned themselves as 
custodians of those virtues, but still fail to conduct their own private lives in accordance 
with those standards. They tell others how to live but do not follow their own advice. 
They praise a set of values they apparently do not personally value. They bask in the 
glow of a goodness they have not earned. They emphasize soulcraft but cannot take care 
of their own soul. 
 It is dispiriting to learn a person is not as good as people assumed, especially 
when that person was admired as a role model for advocating positive values and 
exhibiting good behavior. People’s disappointment can morph into anger if they conclude 
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they’ve been duped, that the hypocrite fooled them into believing he or she was a good 
person and took advantage of their trust for his or her own personal gain. The hypocrite’s 
betrayal may even lead people to lose faith in the values the hypocrite promulgated, their 
failure either undercutting the strength of their message or leaving others to suspect their 
own beliefs are foolish sentiments that made them easy marks for con men. 
 These are all understandable reactions to the discovery of a personal failing, but in 
such cases it is important to figure out what exactly is damaged when it is revealed a 
politician is not living their private life in accordance with the values they have embraced 
in public, values that are presumably attached to a vision of the public good and the good 
society. It is fair to wonder how a politician can be a spokesperson for those values when 
they cannot model those values in their personal behavior. One may even question the 
validity of those values if one of their most prominent public advocates cannot adhere to 
them. Yet unlike the double standards in the previous case studies, the public political 
implications of the double standards here are not always clear. A private indiscretion does 
not necessarily actively disadvantage an opponent or alter policy outcomes within the 
competitive political arena. A personal failing may simply reflect poorly on the character 
and reputation of the hypocrite. Consequently, it becomes important to determine when a 
double standard involving a discrepancy between a politician’s private and public life 
becomes politically significant. The current case involving Vance McAllister offers an 
opportunity to begin a more in-depth study of these issues. 
 To begin with, McAllister’s personal failings do not prove that the values he 
claimed to adhere to are wrong, only that he hasn’t lived up to them. The tenets and 
ethics of Christianity are either valid or invalid on their own terms and do not depend on 
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Vance McAllister’s personal behavior for legitimacy. Granted, it is dejecting to see a 
leader endorse these values and then fail to live up to them. People may wonder about the 
practicality of such values if even a champion of those values cannot abide by them, or 
worry that such a high-profile betrayal may hurt the reputation of those values in the eyes 
of others. Yet ethical precepts are ultimately justified through ethical reasoning, not via 
prominent endorsements or the sheer number of people who support them (and even if 
ethical precepts gained legitimacy as a result of popular acceptance, then the Louisiana 
voters who were let down by McAllister can find affirmation of their values in the large 
number of people who shared their disappointment.) 
 As for the damage done to the law, McAllister might be vulnerable to charges 
related to workplace romances between managers and subordinates and unlawful 
termination. Those remain difficult issues to assess in this case, however, since the full 
history of McAllister’s relationship with the woman he was having an affair with and the 
circumstances that led to her hiring in the first place remain unknown. Having an 
extramarital affair, though, is not illegal, so on the main issue at hand it’s hard to argue 
McAllister is a hypocrite for breaking the law while acting as a lawmaker (as if calling a 
“lawbreaker” a “hypocrite” adds much necessary insult to injury anyway.) 
 Turning to the political fallout, one might wonder if McAllister’s hypocrisy would 
lead his fellow lawmakers to trust him less as a legislator and negotiator. While his affair 
may raise some red flags, it is likely that so long as McAllister honors his word when it 
comes to political matters, many would still likely regard him as a faithful colleague even 
if he is not a faithful husband. 
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 What is left, then, is the damage done to a politician’s relationship with their 
constituents when it is discovered the politician is not living their private life in 
accordance with their public values. To begin with, one can make a strong argument that 
a politician’s private conduct ought to have little bearing on citizens’ assessment of the 
politician’s public record. This isn’t simply a matter of saying a politician is entitled to a 
private life outside the public eye. It is instead to argue that what matters in peoples’ 
evaluations of politicians is purely a function of their public conduct in their role as 
public figures. Do they exhibit good judgment in their management of public affairs? 
What positions and values did they say they would uphold in their role as a public actor? 
How did they ultimately vote? What decisions did they ultimately make? Were their 
public pronouncements concerning their anticipated public behavior consistent with their 
public actions? 
 This focus on public action over private conduct could significantly diminish the 
severity of McAllister’s hypocrisy. It simply wouldn’t matter much if McAllister failed 
privately to live up to the Christian and family values he espoused on the campaign trail 
so long as his votes in Congress reflected those values. One could argue McAllister’s 
constituents did not send him to Washington so he could be a shining example of a 
Christian family man on the banks of the Potomac; they sent him there instead to do a 
job, which amounts to casting votes in the House of Representatives in accordance with 
the Christian family values he articulated during his campaign. If he does that, he would 
be fulfilling his duty as an elected representative regardless of his personal shortcomings. 
Furthermore, his actions in that public role will have a far greater consequence for his 
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constituents and the nation than anything he would do in his private life. Being a bad 
person would not necessarily make Vance McAllister a bad representative. 
 Ironically, the political inexperience McAllister touted as a virtue during his 
campaign for Congress could make it difficult for him to rely on the distinction between 
public and private concerns as a defense from scandal. As a political outsider, McAllister 
lacked the baggage that comes with being an incumbent politician, but that also meant he 
lacked a voting record that could establish his bona fides as a politician whose votes are 
consistent with Christian and family values. This would require McAllister to ask his 
constituents for their trust and patience so he could prove himself worthy of their support. 
With a scandal churning, however, trust and patience would probably be in short supply, 
meaning his private behavior may be the only thing his constituents could use in forming 
an opinion of the congressman. 
 Or his constituents could decide that the details of McAllister’s private life are 
immaterial to their assessment of his public service and therefore accept nothing but 
evidence drawn from the public record before passing judgment on him. Pending that, 
McAllister’s grade probably remains incomplete: While he may have been unfaithful to 
his wife and his personal values, there was virtually nothing to suggest at the time the 
scandal broke that he had been unfaithful to his constituents and the values they expected 
him to uphold as their representative. American politics is littered with disreputable 
people serving their constituents well in public office. It’s long been argued the genius of 
the American political system is that it encourages devils to behave as angels by 
prompting the selfish to cooperate, cheaters to honor their word, and the power-hungry to 
mind their constituents.9 So long as politicians can demonstrate to their supporters that 
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they have their constituents’ backs, voters may exhibit a willingness to overlook their 
representatives’ personal indiscretions. 
 It is appealing to draw a strict distinction between public and private affairs in 
politics, but few people would go so far as to say a person’s private behavior ought to 
have no bearing whatsoever on evaluations of a person’s suitability to serve in 
government. For example, many people probably know someone whose private life is in 
such disarray that it’s hard to imagine entrusting that individual with the responsibilities 
of public office, particularly if people believe the disarray is related to the individual’s 
character and likely to permeate the conduct of their public affairs. People may therefore 
conclude that an individual who is so unable to manage their private affairs is not 
qualified to manage their collective public affairs. Additionally, some personal 
indiscretions may be so severe, deviant, or disreputable that voters could not countenance 
someone who has committed such acts as a representative of the people. 
 Disqualifying someone from public office on these grounds, however, would not 
depend upon an accusation of hypocrisy. If, for example, voters were to believe someone 
who committed adultery was not fit to serve in public office, then they would have to 
deny anyone who committed adultery their support, meaning both someone who took a 
public stand against it as well as the person who remained silent on the matter or even 
indicated they did not believe adultery was wrong. It might sting a bit more to learn an 
anti-adultery politician had an extramarital affair, especially if their anti-adultery position 
had convinced voters of their personal virtue, but in the end, it’s the adultery—not the 
hypocrisy—that would weigh more in peoples’ assessment of them and compel voters to 
withdraw support. In fact, in drawing the line against adultery, avoiding hypocrisy would 
161 
 
become the citizen’s burden to bear: It would fall on them regardless of their support for 
the politician’s policies to sanction the politician for his or her marital infidelity. 
 Setting aside concerns for some kinds of personal behavior that would disqualify 
any person from serving in public office regardless of their prior comments on that 
behavior, it has been argued thus far that constituents in most cases ought to generally 
treat hypocrisies resulting from inconsistencies between an individual’s publicly-
endorsed principles and that individual’s private behavior as relatively insignificant so 
long as the individual’s public behavior remains consistent with their publicly-endorsed 
principles. But constituents may have other legitimate concerns arising from hypocrisies 
related to discrepancies between a politician’s publicized beliefs and their private 
conduct. One concern that would be of great relevance to McAllister’s case involves the 
premises upon which citizens grant a politician the authority to lead, specifically whether 
a politician is selected to advance a specific policy agenda or entrusted to serve in public 
office on account of the quality of their character. 
 So far, this case study has reviewed scenarios in which politicians are elected to 
pursue a specific policy agenda. But what about politicians whose primary appeal is the 
quality of their private character? These politicians don’t base their leadership on their 
advocacy for certain policies but on personal characteristics that they contend make them 
well-suited to serving their fellow citizens in public office. Perhaps they are known for 
their wisdom, common sense, integrity, resolve, courage, self-discipline, responsibility, 
reliability, or sense of duty and honor, virtues that serve people well in both the private 
and public realm. Or maybe they are regarded as role models for how they live their lives 
in accordance with a certain set of highly-respected communal values that suggests they 
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have a strong sense of right and wrong. For many voters, these types of candidates are 
appealing not because of the positions they take on a range of issues but because of the 
character of the candidates themselves, as voters trust that someone who embodies those 
values will naturally channel those values into their service to the public. Such political 
figures could be said to have their souls in order, which makes them well-suited to 
ordering the affairs of the polis.  
 A personal failing could shake the public’s confidence in a politician like this. 
When a politician’s record matters less than the character that generated that record, the 
discovery of a character flaw could prompt the public to reassess that politician’s 
suitability for public office. It may not even matter if the politician in question has a long 
and respectable record that satisfies voters; once their prestige and high-mindedness is 
undermined by a personal failing, citizens may come to see them as a flawed moral vessel 
or (even worse, perhaps) a run-of-the-mill politician using the façade of virtue to trick the 
public into trusting them. That is likely to lead the public to wonder if they’ve been sold a 
bill of false goods or if the decisions of the politician were made in good faith. 
 Perhaps it is unwise to ever place so much confidence in the character of a 
politician. Like anyone else, politicians are flawed individuals, and they almost always 
run for office in pursuit of a partisan agenda; believing otherwise only leaves voters 
vulnerable to those who would deceive them. Yet it also makes sense for voters to long 
for candidates with personal characteristics and virtues they consider well-suited to 
public service. Those who believe institutional safeguards are not enough to ensure a 
well-functioning and durable democracy certainly believe that. It seems necessary for 
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democratic citizens to hold both of these conflicting ideas—that politicians are morally 
flawed but are expected to act virtuously—in their heads at the same time. 
 As far as Vance McAllister is concerned, the key question seems to be what sort 
of leader he told people he intended to be: One who promised to pursue a specific policy 
agenda if elected that was said to reflect his moral values, or one who promoted himself 
as uniquely qualified to serve the public given his personal character and values. If it is 
the latter, his hypocrisy may be less forgivable. McAllister did suggest in his television 
commercials that the Christian and family values that guide his personal life would also 
guide his public service. The setting of the commercial—his kitchen, surrounded by his 
wife and kids—also personalized the appeal, making his campaign less about the issues 
than himself as a candidate. Additionally, there is evidence in the New York Times article 
by Trip Gabriel that his constituents supported him on account of his character and 
values. McAllister’s hypocrisy could suggest to voters that he does not have a firm grasp 
on what those values require of him, potentially making him a poor steward of those 
principles. If voters sent McAllister to Washington based on his reputation as a Christian 
family man whose personal virtue would guide his public service, then his hypocrisy 
could be said to undermine the premises upon which his claim to leadership is based and 
his constituents could be justified in withdrawing their support from him. 
 Of course, McAllister did not only run as a Christian and family values candidate. 
Part of his appeal also rested on his business experience and his status as a political 
outsider, and some voters likely based their votes on those credentials. Others probably 
weighed his positions on policy. It would be useful to know just how much emphasis 
McAllister placed on his character and values during the campaign versus these other 
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considerations, and if his message about character was only emphasized in commercials. 
After all, many politicians run ads featuring themselves in their homes with their 
families, as it makes them more relatable and conventional in the eyes of voters. Perhaps 
that was all McAllister aimed to accomplish with his TV spots as well. 
 It is also worth considering what exactly McAllister meant when he talked about 
“family values” and “Christian values.” Were these actually abstract principles related to 
character and personal conduct? Or were they a kind of political shorthand signaling a 
specific conservative policy agenda calling for policies aimed at (for example) restricting 
abortion, supporting families that home school, halting the expansion of gay rights, or 
allowing individuals the freedom to conscientiously object to government mandates that 
offend their religious beliefs? Again, if citizens believed McAllister’s values talk was 
actually more representative of a policy agenda than a personal affirmation of his 
character, then perhaps it is easy to forgive him for his hypocrisy. (Maybe it would have 
just been wiser for McAllister to have avoided personalizing his politics to begin with. 
Rather than asking voters to trust him on account of his holding the right values and 
possessing the right kind of character, McAllister could have emphasized how his values 
led him to support specific policies he intended to fight for once he got to Washington. It 
would have required a dose of humility on his part—he would have had to downplay his 
personality in favor of his platform—but it would have helped insulate him from his 
personal failings.)  
 There is also one other issue worth thinking about in McAllister’s case, which is 
that Vance McAllister, like all Christians, is a sinner. He made a mistake as any person of 
faith is liable to do, so maybe people just need to cut the guy some slack. Granted, 
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adultery is a very serious mistake (and it’s worth noting the full details of the affair as 
well as the state of his marriage are unknown) and perhaps it does disqualify him from 
office. But maybe his affair was also the result of a moment of weakness. Despite the 
comments made by his mistress’s husband/long-time friend concerning the sincerity of 
his Christian faith, maybe McAllister has otherwise led a rather upstanding life. Perhaps 
his Christian constituents might find it in their Christian hearts to forgive him or at least 
not rush to judgment. (What did Jesus say about the adulterer? “Let anyone among you 
who is without sin be the first to throw a stone[.]”)10 It makes sense to be disappointed in 
McAllister, but knowing human nature and peoples’ tendency to sin and become 
hypocrites, maybe it also makes sense to give the congressman a second chance to prove 
himself to his constituents. 
 McAllister’s constituents were not in much of a mood to do that, however. 
McAllister’s indiscretions set off a scramble for his seat and cost him the support of the 
Duck Dynasty clan. Robertson family patriarch Phil Robertson, speaking at a rally for his 
nephew Zach Dasher (one of a handful of Republicans who challenged McAllister) said 
of the congressman, “I asked him [during his initial campaign] if he was a Godly man 
and he said, ‘Yeah.’ I asked him if he walked by faith in the Lord Jesus, and he said, 
‘Yeah.’ I asked him if he was a strong family man and he said, ‘Yeah.’ Two months in, it 
proved otherwise.”11 McAllister responded, “I am disappointed that Phil is speaking 
against the words that he writes about, like forgiveness, when we’re all sinners. What 
Phil and I have in common is we believe in the same Lord, and that’s the God of second 
chances.” In an attempt to flip the charge of hypocrisy back on Robertson, McAllister 
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cited Robertson’s wife as a model of forgiveness, as she once took Phil back in after a 
period of substance abuse and infidelity.12 
 McAllister’s wife stood by him as well, appearing alongside him in a campaign 
commercial titled “Blessed.” The TV spot began with McAllister stating, “Life is filled 
with ups and downs,” before his wife added, “But a man’s character is based on how 
many times he gets back up and stands again.” Both then claimed to be “blessed”: 
McAllister by his family and “wonderful Christian wife” (as a shot of her reaching out to 
touch her husband’s hand plays, her wedding band in place) she for having “a husband 
who owns up to his mistakes, never gives up, always fighting for the good people of 
Louisiana.”13 
 Those people went to the polls in November 2014. McAllister finished fourth in 
the jungle primary with 11% of the vote and a little less than half of what Robertson 
family member Zach Dasher (who came in third) won. A year later, McAllister attempted 
to win a seat in the state senate but was trounced in the primary by the Republican 
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13 Vance McAllister, “Vance McAllister ‘Blessed’,” Vance McAllister, YouTube, September 22, 
2014, campaign commercial, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Escc5zCjP2Q.  
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8. UNCOMMON CORE 
 
 Compared to their peers in other nations, American primary and secondary school 
students are pretty average. On international standardized reading, math, and science 
tests, the United States is usually somewhere in the middle of the rankings. These scores 
always generate much consternation in the U.S., as they suggest American students are 
not as well educated (particularly when it comes to math) as students in high-scoring 
nations like Singapore, South Korea, Estonia, Canada, and China. Yet American scores 
are also statistically similar to other “average” nations, which means focusing on 
rankings alone can be somewhat deceiving. What can be said is that when it comes to 
education (or at least the academic skills tested at certain grade levels on these tests) the 
United States doesn’t crack the top ten globally, gets results similar to many other 
comparable nations while finishing well ahead of other countries, has not seen a marked 
improvement in its scores over the past twenty years, and still struggles to improve the 
scores of low-income and minority students.1 
 The obsession with international test scores isn’t just a matter of national pride for 
American leaders. There is a concern that American workers will need to be highly 
educated in order to compete and thrive in a post-industrial global economy that places a 
premium on information processing and innovation. American workers and the American 
economy risk being outpaced by foreign competitors if they are not learning in school the 
skills a 21st century economy will demand of them. 
 With these concerns in mind, the National Governors Association, the Council of 
Chief State School Officers, and the education reform group Achieve, Inc., in 2010 
created the Common Core State Standards, which was quickly backed by the Obama 
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administration. Common Core aimed to standardize what was taught at every grade level 
from kindergarten through twelfth grade so that school curricula and instruction 
throughout the nation reflected internationally benchmarked standards and practices in 
language arts and math. Common Core also sought to raise academic standards across 
states. Nearly a decade earlier, President George W. Bush’s signature education program, 
the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB), had required states to set educational standards 
and administer standardized tests measuring student progress; states, however, could set 
their own statewide standards, leading some to establish easier goals in order to avoid the 
law’s penalties for low achieving schools. Common Core looked to end this practice with 
the help of Obama’s Department of Education, which granted states waivers on NCLB’s 
enforcement mechanisms if they adopted and tested in accordance with Common Core’s 
standards. States were not required to adopt Common Core, but Texas, Virginia, and 
Minnesota still received waivers by proving their own standards effectively prepared 
students for college and careers.2   
 Common Core initially had broad bipartisan support, with 63-65% of both 
Republicans and Democrats supporting the initiative. By the end of Obama’s presidency, 
however, support among both parties had slipped under 50%, with only 35% of 
Republicans approving it.3 Reasons for opposition were varied. Some Democrats felt 
Common Core did not do enough to undo the heavy-handed legacy of No Child Left 
Behind. Teachers bristled at the program’s prescriptive design or felt they were not given 
enough preparatory material to implement it. Public school advocates argued Common 
Core advanced the interests of charter school and voucher advocates. Republicans—
many of whom had earlier championed NCLB as a long overdue reform that could fix 
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underachieving local schools—now feared the loss of state and local control over 
education policy; that a Democratic president had thrown his weight behind the plan only 
added to their unease. Parents voiced displeasure with the new and unfamiliar way math 
was being taught to their children and complained that subjects such as science and social 
studies were being shortchanged. And as nearly everyone complained of fatigue over 
high-stakes standardized testing, Common Core only seemed to double down on the 
practice.4 
 The GOP’s loss of faith in Common Core proved something of a problem for 
Republican governors running for president in the 2016 electoral cycle. The federal 
government pushed Common Core, but it mainly fell upon state governments and their 
governors to adopt and implement it. Most states did so as a way to escape the NCLB’s 
requirements while staying onboard the education reform movement. Yet by 2015, a 
governor’s association with Common Core often proved to be a liability. 
 Consider, for instance, Louisiana Governor Bobby Jindal. With Jindal’s support, 
Louisiana adopted Common Core in 2010. Two years later, he named a Common Core 
supporter state superintendent of education and praised the program as an initiative that 
“will raise expectations for every child.”5 By the fall of 2013, however, he began to 
waffle. At a rally for school vouchers, without mentioning Common Core, he insisted the 
state was “not going to move one inch off more rigorous and higher standards for our 
kids” but also expressed concern about Washington’s role in state education policy.6 Less 
than a year later, citing the federal government’s increased involvement in curricular 
matters and parental opposition, Jindal backed further away from Common Core, writing 
in a USA Today editorial, “I have news for Washington: We can have rigorous standards 
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without giving control to the federal government. Parents deserve a voice in this debate.”7 
Finally, in May 2014, the governor solidified his newfound opposition to Common Core 
by relating it to the failure of “centralized planning…in Russia.”8 Reacting on Twitter, 
conservative firebrand Michelle Malkin wrote, “Jindal was for [Common Core] before he 
was against it,” a gibe, as will be seen shortly, that would have resonated with those 
familiar with the history of political vacillations.9 PolitiFact rated Jindal’s change of 
mind a “Full Flop” on their Flip-O-Meter.10* 
 New Jersey Governor Chris Christie was also an early proponent of Common 
Core. In 2011, he described the program as “a building block in our state’s education 
system meant to ensure that teachers and districts can innovate within a framework of 
high expectations and accountability.”11 Two years later, with Republican opposition to 
Common Core growing, Christie reaffirmed his support at the KIPP School Summit in 
Las Vegas: 
We are doing Common Core in New Jersey and we’re going to continue. And this 
is one of those areas where I have agreed more with the President than not. And 
with Secretary [of Education Arne] Duncan. They haven’t been perfect on this, 
but they’ve been better than a lot of folks have been in terms of the reform 
movement. I think part of the Republican opposition you see in some corners in 
Congress is a reaction, that kneejerk reaction that is happening in Washington 
right now, that if the President likes something the Republicans in Congress don’t. 
If the Republicans in Congress like something, the President doesn’t. It is this 
mindset in D.C. right now that says we have to be at war constantly. Because to 
not be at war is to show weakness and to show weakness leads to failure. And, I 
just don’t buy that.12 
 
 
* According to PolitiFact’s website, PolitiFact’s Flip-O-Meter feature is only intended to measure a 
politician’s consistency on an issue as a matter of fact. It is not intended to make a normative judgment 
about the politician or the acceptability of the flip-flop. See Bill Adair, “Principles of PolitiFact and the 




In July 2014, however, Christie initiated a review of Common Core in New Jersey. By 
the end of that year, he began to express “real concerns” with the program.13 At CPAC in 
2015, during an interview with FOX News host Laura Ingraham (who asked him why he 
didn’t follow Virginia’s example and establish standards independent of Common Core 
in New Jersey) Christie expressed “regrets” over the program’s implementation and 
lamented the “heavy foot of the federal government” and the loss of “local control” over 
setting the educational standards.14 While campaigning in Iowa a few months later, the 
governor decried “the way the Obama administration has tried to implement it through 
tying federal funding to these things.”15 A few months later at Burlington County College 
in New Jersey, Christie said, 
It’s now been five years since Common Core was adopted and the truth is that it’s 
simply not working. It has brought only confusion and frustration to our parents, 
and has brought distance between our teachers and the communities where they 
work. Instead of solving problems in our classrooms, it is creating new ones, and 
when we aren’t getting the job done for our children, we need to do something 
different.16 
 
Christie did confirm New Jersey would continue to use standardized tests calibrated to 
Common Core in New Jersey schools. Writing on NJ.com in response to Christie’s flip, 
op-ed contributor Tom Moran observed, “[Christie] was for [Common Core] before he 
was against it.”17 PolitiFact rated Christie’s change of mind a “Full Flop” on their Flip-
O-Meter.18 
 Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker also flip-flopped on Common Core, but his 
switch was a little more ambiguous. Walker was never a loud supporter of Common 
Core, but his administration embraced it as a matter of policy. His first state budget as 
governor in 2011 directed Wisconsin’s Department of Public Instruction to develop a test 
to “measure mastery” of Common Core standards. A year later, a task force Walker 
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formed and chaired boasted of Wisconsin’s early adoption of Common Core and 
recommended developing learning standards in accordance with the program. Common 
Core was an apparent point of agreement between himself and Wisconsin’s Democratic 
state superintendent of public instruction. But in 2013, Walker’s second state budget 
forbid the Department of Public Instruction from “requiring” Wisconsin schools to 
continue enactment of Common Core while leaving previously adopted Common Core 
standards in place. Early in the following year, after stating Common Core standards 
weren’t tough enough and had not originated in Wisconsin, the governor announced a 
plan to create a commission to review Common Core. This was followed in July 2014 
with a terse, one sentence statement reading, “Today, I call on the members of the state 
Legislature to pass a bill in early January (2015) to repeal Common Core and replace it 
with standards set by people in Wisconsin.” Yet on the date of his re-inauguration in 
2015, Walker’s press secretary called for a repeal of Common Core while remaining open 
to allowing school districts to opt-out of the program on their own. PolitiFact rated 
Walker’s change of mind a “Half Flip” on their Flip-O-Meter.19 
 Each of these governors stand accused of flip-flopping, one of politics’ most 
reviled forms of hypocrisy. A flip-flop is an instance in which someone changes their 
position on an issue or principle, typically to a position nearly opposite their original 
position. The term is popularly used as a pejorative, as a person accused of flip-flopping 
is charged with adopting a position improperly inconsistent with past views. 
 Some of the most notorious cases of hypocrisy in politics are considered flip-
flops. One of the most prominent examples involves President George H.W. Bush, who 
agreed to a tax increase with congressional Democrats as part of the 1990 budget 
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agreement despite having declared, “Read my lips: No new taxes,” during his acceptance 
speech at the 1988 Republican National Convention. That broken promise—described by 
Republican campaign consultant Ed Rollins at the time as “the most serious violation of 
any political pledge anybody has ever made”20—contributed to Bush’s defeat in 1992 by 
disenchanting conservatives and other voters who would have otherwise been inclined to 
turn out for him at the polls.21 But perhaps the most famous example—and the one most 
often cited as a cautionary tale—is Democratic Senator John Kerry’s shift from voting to 
authorize military action in Iraq in 2002 to opposing the war there while running for 
president in 2004. President George W. Bush’s re-election campaign weaponized Kerry’s 
switch to raise questions about Kerry’s sense of conviction, most memorably in a 
television ad featuring footage of Kerry windsailing as a narrator wondered, 
In which direction would John Kerry lead? Kerry voted for the Iraq War, opposed 
it, supported it, and now opposes it again. He bragged about voting for the $87 
billion to support our troops before he voted against it. He voted for education 
reform and now opposes it. He claims he’s against increasing Medicare 
premiums, but voted five times to do so. John Kerry: Whichever way the wind 
blows.22 
 
Kerry didn’t help counter his reputation as a flip-flopper when, after being asked about 
his vote against the $87 billion appropriation bill for military operations in the Middle 
East, he replied, “I actually did vote for the $87 billion before I voted against it.”23 
 It is generally assumed citizens dislike flip-floppers. As posited by Anthony 
Downs in 1957, rational voters would certainly prefer candidates they judged “reliable” 
(defined as someone whose “policy statements at the beginning of an election 
period…can be used to make accurate predictions of [their] behavior”) and “responsible” 
(defined as someone whose “policies in one period are consistent with [their] actions…in 
the preceding period”) as such characteristics suggest to voters that a politician will 
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reward their voters’ support and the effort their voters put into voting by delivering on 
their voters’ political preferences.24 Alternately, voters would likely regard a politician 
who changed their positions on policies as an unpredictable representative who couldn’t 
be trusted to deliver or build upon campaign pledges and policy legacies. Without a 
greater degree of certainty concerning how their vote would translate into actual policy, 
voters would be inclined to withdraw their support for the flip-flopper. 
 Social science research also indicates flip-flopping can disadvantage politicians. 
A series of studies by Michael Tomz and Robert P. Van Houweling have shown that flip-
flopping damages the reputation of politicians even when the politicians adopt positions 
more closely aligned with their supporters.25 This is probably because the shift in 
positions suggests to voters the politician is open to changing their mind, leaving voters 
to wonder what other positions the politician might be willing to abandon as a matter of 
political expediency. Indeed, as modeled by Patrick Hummel, candidates are constrained 
by the costs of flip-flopping as they contemplate moderating their positions for a general 
election following primary campaigns in which they hewed closely to the positions of 
ideological partisans.26 Additionally, Navin Kartik and R. Preston McAfee have shown it 
can be more advantageous for a politician to stand by an unpopular position (rather than 
switch positions) in order to exhibit character, integrity, and conviction.27 As President 
Bill Clinton said while analyzing the Democrats’ defeat during the 2002 midterm 
elections (which occurred just over a year after the 9/11 attacks and in the midst of a 
national debate over military intervention in Iraq) “When people are feeling insecure, 




 Yet other studies suggest the evidence against flip-flopping is more mixed. David 
Doherty, Conor M. Dowling, and Michael G. Miller have found that while switching 
positions can be costly for a candidate, voters also prefer candidates who switch to 
positions closer to their own than maintaining fidelity to a position they dislike. Voters 
are also more likely to tolerate a flip-flop depending on the issue, how much time has 
passed between adoption of the original position and the flip-flop, and if overwhelming 
majorities support the new position.29 Research by Sarah Croco indicated the sanction on 
flip-flopping is overstated, as most citizens will tend to disregard a policy switch so long 
as the flip-flopper adopts a policy they support; this suggests the strategic advantage of 
flip-flopping should not be discounted.30 The perceived competence of a politician can 
also lessen the backlash over a flip-flop, as Ayala Yarkoney Sorek, Kathryn Haglin, and 
Nehemia Geva found.31 These studies suggest flip-flopping is not viewed in isolation by 
citizens, but is accounted for alongside other political considerations. 
 Real world examples also show voters do not reflexively punish flip-floppers. Just 
consider the career of New York Democratic Senator Kirsten Gillibrand, who was 
appointed to fill the vacated Senate seat of Hillary Clinton in 2009 after Clinton resigned 
to become Secretary of State. Gillibrand had been elected to the House in 2007, 
representing a large district in northern New York that trended conservative. Her voting 
record on gun issues in the House reflected her constituency: She defended the rights of 
hunters and signed an amicus brief asserting the rights of individuals to own handguns. 
Gillibrand received an “A” rating from the National Rifle Association (NRA) in her 2008 
re-election bid and touted the group’s endorsement on her House website.32 Once she 
became a senator representing one of the most liberal states in the union, however, 
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Gillibrand became an ardent supporter of gun control legislation. One of her first votes as 
a senator was in opposition to gun rights legislation that was similar to a bill she had 
supported in the House just five months earlier.33 When she ran for re-election to the 
Senate in 2010, the NRA gave her an “F” rating.34 
 Owing to her record on gun issues as well as immigration and gay rights, many 
liberals initially expressed unease about Gillibrand’s appointment to the House. New 
York Representatives Carolyn Maloney, Steve Israel, and Carolyn McCarthy (whose 
husband was a victim of gun violence) contemplated primary campaigns against her.35 
Those challenges did not materialize, however, as Gillibrand morphed from a centrist 
Democrat into a reliable liberal. She easily dispatched her lone primary contender in 2010 
by winning 76% of the vote and cruised to re-election with 63% support. Two years later, 
after facing no primary competition, 72% of New York voters delivered Gillibrand a full 
six-year term. She has since said she “didn’t do the right thing” concerning her votes in 
favor of gun rights in the House.36 
 Despite people’s apparent disdain for flip-flopping, it does seem citizens have a 
certain amount of tolerance for it. It may even be that when it comes to flip-flopping, 
citizens are the best judges of its acceptability, as those affected by a flip-flop—whether 
that flip-flop is a betrayal of a politician’s supporters (i.e., George H.W. Bush’s flip-flop 
on taxes) or an attempt to more closely align a politician’s views with their base (i.e., 
Kirsten Gillibrand’s flip-flop on guns)—are almost always in a position to effectively 
punish or reward a flip-flopper (or a flip-flopper’s party) for their maneuver. If they feel 
they’ve been betrayed or that the flip-flop indicates the politician is untrustworthy, 
unprincipled, or unwise, citizens can rescind their support; on the other hand, if citizens 
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for whatever reason find the flip-flop acceptable, they can back the politician in the 
voting booth. 
 This suggests an important difference between the way most flip-flops and most 
double standards work: Whereas a politician’s supporters are often not inclined to punish 
a politician for using a double standard since double standards usually disadvantage 
shared political opponents, a politician’s supporters are more likely to punish a flip-
flopper since flip-flops typically trade on the trust and backing of a politician’s 
supporters, who themselves may feel disadvantaged or vulnerable as the result of a flip-
flop. By extension, while disciplining a double standard often requires a partisan to set 
aside partisanship in the name of civic virtue, fairness, and equal justice under the rules 
and law, partisanship alone can often effectively police flip-flops. 
 It should be said, however, that politicians will not automatically get away with 
flip-flopping whenever they switch to a position more popular with fellow partisans. As 
Tomz and Van Houweling found, flip-flopping can damage a politician’s reputation 
among supporters even when flipping to their supporters’ preferred position by 
suggesting the politician is willing to put their own political survival ahead of principle 
and their established (and in this case, shared) beliefs concerning the public good. Kartik 
and McAfee even demonstrated it may be more advantageous for a politician to stand-by 
an unpopular position to avoid the reputational damage of flip-flopping. And of course, 
non-partisans who judge politicians on their character will likely be turned off by a 
politician who appears to be chasing votes rather than acting in accordance with their 
beliefs and judgment concerning what is best for the political community. As these 
arguments suggest, flip-flopping is not always evaluated according to a purely political 
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calculus; for many citizens (as well as this study) what matters is what the flip-flop says 
about the judgment of someone entrusted with the stewardship of the public good. 
 In a democratic republic like the United States, politicians speak the language of 
public reason. Their political beliefs are derived from a vision of the public good all 
citizens can identify with. The policies they support are justified with references to those 
beliefs. It can be assumed politicians endorse those policies as the best way to realize the 
public good. Even when a politician appears to endorse a policy narrowly tailored to the 
interests of a specific group or constituency, they can often defend their position by 
referencing reasons attached to the public good. 
 Citizens assume politicians should be motivated by and act in accordance with the 
public good. Consequently, they frown upon flip-flopping. A politician’s political beliefs, 
attached as they are to the public good, should not be easy to discard. It is assumed such 
beliefs are born of deep conviction and serious thought. Granted, some policy decisions 
are tough calls and politicians could easily break one way or the other on them. Yet 
politicians are still expected to make those hard decisions and take ownership for them. If 
they do swap positions, they would need to do so in light of the public good; that is, they 
would need to explain why, in their judgment, their new belief or position is a better 
reflection of their understanding of the public good. What would not be acceptable would 
be for a politician to flip-flop and essentially disavow their understanding of the public 
good solely to improve their electoral odds. 
 It is permissible for politicians to change their minds under certain conditions. 
Perhaps the most legitimate reason for flip-flopping involves changed circumstances—
i.e., the acquisition of new information, exposure to new perspectives, or revelations 
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about the consequences of political action—that are significant enough to prompt a 
politician to alter a position or belief as it relates to the public good. It is reasonable for 
people to change their minds after learning something new or being exposed to new 
ideas. It’s happened to everyone, and it can happen to politicians too. Few people would 
probably want a politician so inflexible or afraid of becoming a hypocrite that they would 
never alter their positions even in the face of information or perspectives that render their 
positions untenable or unwise, especially in light of the public good. 
 Additionally, real world developments sometimes reshape people’s views 
concerning political matters. It is easy to imagine how new events—for example, an 
economic downturn, a national security crisis, or a policy failure—might prompt a 
politician to jettison an old position and adopt a different one. Some citizens—
particularly those most devoted to an ideological agenda—may object to flip-flopping 
even under this scenario on the assumption that preferred ideological solutions to 
problems are more optimal in the long term even if they result in short term pain. Yet 
many would also understand why a politician changed their mind on an issue or principle 
upon realizing their old views and policy prescriptions no longer adequately addressed 
current circumstances. This is what perhaps redeems George H.W. Bush’s flip-flop on 
tax hikes in the early 1990s: Faced with a ballooning deficit and a shortage of revenue 
that imperiled numerous government programs, Bush sought to address that pressing 
problem by forging a compromise with Democrats that entailed a violation of his “no 
new taxes” pledge.37 While that flip-flop alienated Bush’s Republican base, according to 
the Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget, it played a significant role in shoring 
up government spending and generating the budget surpluses that would emerge by the 
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close of the decade.38 By 1990, it had become clear to Bush at least that his blanket 
opposition to tax hikes was no longer consonant with the public good. 
 Republican Rep. Steve LaTourette (OH) also cited new developments to explain 
why he in 2011 no longer considered himself bound to a “Taxpayer Protection Pledge” he 
signed in the mid-1990s. That pledge, sponsored by conservative activist Grover 
Norquist’s Americans for Tax Reform, was created to bind politicians to a promise not to 
raise taxes of any kind while in office. Signing the pledge became an important litmus 
test for Republican candidates. Concerned about the federal budget deficit, however, and 
holding out hope that a bipartisan grand bargain could be struck that might balance the 
budget through a compromise package of spending cuts and tax increases, LaTourette 
renounced the pledge he had signed eighteen years earlier, saying it had expired “like 
milk in a refrigerator.” Said LaTourette, 
Although my instinct is not to raise taxes, when I signed this pledge in 1994, 
unemployment was 6 percent, and the federal deficit was $4 trillion instead of 
today’s $14 trillion. The number one movie was Lion King. The world was 
different. To say that you have signed for life, no matter what the 
circumstances are, I believe would be an abdication of my responsibility.39 
 
 All said, however, citing changed circumstances does not automatically excuse 
flip-flopping. Some might argue a promise—no matter the circumstances—is still a 
promise one is obligated to uphold. (As Norquist said in response to LaTourette, 
“Commitments in principle don’t have an expiration date.”)40 Even if one is not 
persuaded by the claim that promises must be upheld even after circumstances have 
changed, it is still necessary to determine if circumstances really have changed, if what 
has changed is relevant to the policy or belief under re-evaluation, or if circumstances 
have changed enough to merit a switch in position. And even in the event of changed 
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circumstances, citizens may legitimately wonder if a flip-flop understood as a corrective 
act calls for a re-examination of the flip-flopper’s original position and the judgment and 
motivations that informed that position. (Along these lines, it’s fair to wonder if Bush 
should have made his “no new taxes” pledge in 1988 if some of his advisers believed he 
might have to break it. And if he knew economic circumstances suggested he was going 
to have to walk back that pledge, one can wonder if he intentionally misled voters with a 
false promise to enhance his own electoral prospects.)41 
 With all this in mind, it is possible now to review Jindal, Christie, and Walker’s 
flip-flops on Common Core. The fact is Common Core did not change much from when 
the governors adopted the program to when they rejected it, which makes the reasons 
they gave for flip-flopping dubious. Common Core was always a set of prescriptive 
national standards keyed to international benchmarks. States had discretion in building 
curricula around those standards, but the point was to establish a consistent set of 
standards across states to raise standards and educational achievement nationwide. It’s 
hard for the governors to claim they lost faith in the program upon learning just how 
prescriptive and nationalized Common Core was since that was the kind of program they 
signed up for in the first place. If the governors claimed they only learned this after 
Common Core had been implemented in their state, then it seems legitimate to question 
just how carefully they evaluated the program prior to adopting it. Because the nature of 
Common Core did not change over time, the flip-flop does not reflect well on those who 
claimed they changed their minds because the program changed. Such an excuse suggests 
the governors were either negligent in their initial assessments of the program or 
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ultimately abandoned a program that consistently met their established standards for what 
constituted good state educational policy.  
 There may be a little more room for the governors to flip-flop on Common Core 
when it comes to the idea that the federal government’s implementation of the program 
grew too heavy-handed for their states. This suggests there may have been extra 
administrative burdens added to the program that they had not anticipated, making the 
program too onerous to carry out and comply with. It is not entirely clear what these 
unforeseen administrative burdens were, however, or if they went beyond the extra work 
that a reasonable person would expect to deal with during a transition to a new program. 
Some might also argue this claim alone is a relatively minor complaint that does not 
warrant a complete reversal on Common Core. 
 It is hard not to see these flip-flops on Common Core as electorally motivated. 
When Jindal, Christie, and Walker adopted Common Core in their states, the program 
was popular and at the cutting edge of the education reform movement. By the time the 
governors turned on Common Core, the initiative had grown unpopular (particularly 
among Republicans, whom their presidential aspirations relied upon) and the education 
reform movement had worn out its welcome. It may even have been that the governors 
didn’t really have any overriding convictions concerning education policy in the first 
place; maybe they just concluded they would follow whatever policy was popular at the 
moment in order to remain aligned with popular opinion on an issue that wasn’t a priority 
for them to begin with. 
 And frankly, it’s fair to wonder if there’s anything wrong with that. So far it has 
been argued politicians ought to pursue policies that correspond to their understanding of 
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the public good and should not abandon that pursuit for the sake of their own political 
survival. Yet when politicians flip-flop to improve their political advantage, that also 
means they have in all likelihood aligned their views with a position that is in some way 
more popular than their old position. And in a democracy—a form of government that is 
supposed to be responsive to the people—what exactly is wrong with a politician 
endorsing the preferences of the people? The citizens of a democracy may even praise a 
politician for listening to the people and changing his or her position on an issue in order 
to better reflect the views of the people. And if the people themselves can flip-flop on an 
issue like Common Core, why shouldn’t their representatives—particularly those they 
otherwise admire—be able to do the same? How many people would actually prefer a 
politician who remained defiantly out-of-step with the people’s views? 
 There are limitations to such an approach. A politician shouldn’t abandon a core 
principle in the face of popular opposition, just as they shouldn’t sacrifice key democratic 
principles to political expediency. But there is something to admire in a politician who 
confesses they are willing to be swayed by the public’s preferences, especially when the 
public steps forward to say a policy isn’t working or does not correspond with their 
understanding of the public good. The politician may need to eat some humble pie in 
such a case, but citizens may come to respect a politician who admits the people’s 
evaluation of a policy ought to carry some weight in a democracy. It’s basically an 
admission the public good is not a dictate but a collaboration. 
 The three governors here don’t quite reach that justification for a flip-flop, 
however. While they do seem intent on letting the people know they hear their 
grievances, Jindal, Christie, and Walker seem more interested in blaming Obama and the 
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federal government for executing a bait and switch on educational policy than in 
admitting their own role in implementing the policy. By shifting blame out of state, it 
appears they hoped to avoid the wrath of their fellow partisans, but a quick study of the 
issue shows they had as much ownership over Common Core in terms of both policy and 
rationale as anyone else. They’re going to take a reputational hit either way as flip-
floppers, so instead of appearing shifty by bluffing, why not simply admit to hearing the 
pleas of the people in the hope of being seen as a responsive leader? Trying to justify the 
flip-flop with a flimsy excuse only compounds the problem associated with their reversal. 
 Or they could have simply stood by their initial conviction that Common Core 
was good educational policy that reflected their understanding of the public good. That 
also may have been an unpopular move, but it would have reinforced their reputation as 
someone averse to flip-flopping on core principles and devoted to the public good. It 
could have fostered trust and a grudging respect rather than suspicion. As one Republican 
governor from a traditionally Democratic state said in 2015 in what was interpreted as a 
swipe at Scott Walker, “[Building support is] not about pandering, it’s not about flip-
flopping on issues. People want folks who they believe believe in what they say and don’t 
change…. The fact is you don’t have to change your positions.”42 
 That governor? Chris Christie of New Jersey.
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 Politics is rife with hypocrisy. For various reasons (of both the honest and 
motivated kind) we are not always consistent in our reactions to that observation. 
Sometimes we accept the presence of political hypocrisy as an inevitable, somewhat 
lamentable, but largely inconsequential side effect of politics that cannot be eliminated 
without simultaneously depriving politics of many of the features that make it a 
beneficial social undertaking. At other times, we recoil in disgust at hypocrisy’s 
prevalence in politics, regarding it as proof of politics’ inherently foul and even 
irredeemable nature. On other occasions, we conclude we need not resign ourselves to a 
politics inundated with hypocrisy, and that it remains possible to practice and even expect 
a purer, less hypocritical politics that would earn people’s admiration and respect. 
 Various scholars have addressed the issue of hypocrisy in politics, but, despite 
their insights, their conclusions have been either broadly conceptual or applicable to 
specific circumstances. Someone looking for more practical guidance concerning how to 
assess a range of allegedly hypocritical behavior will find many gaps in their arguments. 
This study offers a more systematic and comprehensive examination of the issue, one 
drawn from real world case studies and organized typologically to form a sort of “case 
law” concerning hypocrisy. This approach allows for a more direct engagement with 
political hypocrisy as it is encountered by citizens on a day-to-day basis while also 
allowing for a more direct comparison between cases and types. The goal is to develop a 
framework for assessing political hypocrisy that is more nuanced, specific, and applicable 
to daily encounters with hypocrisy than past works. 
191 
 
 The most basic type of hypocrisy found in politics is a violation of principle, 
which occurs when someone acts in a way that is inconsistent with their own beliefs or 
principles concerning the right or proper way to act. In this way, the hypocrite is accused 
of wrong-doing according to the hypocrite’s own standards. This is a powerful 
condemnation in liberal democratic societies where it is often difficult to resolve moral 
debates between rival autonomous moral visions. Someone who violates a held principle 
potentially damages their credibility as a moral actor and the trust they have built with 
others as a moral agent. An accusation of hypocrisy can be used in such circumstances to 
reassert the notion that politics ought to be guided and restrained by principle rather than 
merely serve the ambitions of the power-hungry or the whims of the powerful. (See “The 
Torture Report.”) 
 Most instances of political hypocrisy, however, do not involve the violation of a 
single isolated principle. Instead, most accusations of political hypocrisy actually pivot 
on a conflict between principles, with the would-be hypocrite essentially accused of 
giving a principle of lesser moral significance priority over a principle of greater moral 
significance. It is not always easy to ascertain which principle ought to take priority over 
another, though, as some situations present conflicts between equally significant political 
principles. To head off the accusation of hypocrisy in these cases, public figures need to 
determine not which principle must be rejected but rather which principle in a particular 
situation should take priority over the other. That typically requires public figures to turn 
to other standards and principles for guidance. These guiding standards and principles 
should be applied consistently across cases. Consequently, any analysis of an alleged 
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hypocrisy also requires a careful analysis of the alleged hypocrite’s decision-making 
process. (See “Supreme Rationale.”) 
 It is unsurprising, then, that evaluations of accusations of hypocrisy inevitably 
involve a review of the rationale behind the accusation as well as the rationale used by 
the accused to defend themselves against the accusation. This leads some critics of 
hypocrisy to trade accusations of moral inconsistency for accusations of logical 
inconsistency. In these situations, the accuser implies the hypocrisy at hand is not the 
result of a deliberately immoral decision (even if it produces a result the accuser would 
consider immoral) but of faulty reasoning. Framing an allegation of hypocrisy as a logical 
inconsistency is appealing for a number of reasons, most notably as a way to suggest that 
someone’s beliefs and actions are not consistent with what a rational assessment of the 
public good should lead them to believe. Still, people should be careful about conflating 
the two concepts, since there does seem to be a big difference between an act of 
“hypocrisy,” which is a moral error, and a “logical inconsistency,” which, if taken at face 
value (rather than as a contrived attempt to justify a position) is best understood as a 
mental error. In such cases, it may be more accurate to describe the offender as 
“mistaken” rather than a “hypocrite,” with judgment centering on their mental acuity 
instead of their moral fiber. Furthermore, it is important to remember that people’s 
reasoning will often lead them to different conclusions concerning their moral 
obligations, the terms that condition their moral obligations, which moral obligations take 
priority over others, and whether or not a particular action qualifies as hypocrisy. 
Regardless, the discovery of a logical inconsistency may be a sign that the person making 
the illogical claim is behaving hypocritically. (See “The Consistent Life Ethic.”) 
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 Most instances of political hypocrisy involve some sort of double standard. A 
double standard occurs when public actors excuse themselves or their political allies from 
following a principle or standard they expect other similarly situated people to follow. 
Double standards resemble basic violations of principle, but in the case of double 
standards, the violator still expects or has expected others—typically their political 
opponents—to follow the violated principle. Hence the “double” standard: One for 
themselves and their allies, and one for everybody else. 
 More than any other form of hypocrisy, double standards reveal how people’s 
aversion to hypocrisy is connected to people’s instinctive aversion to unfairness. 
Someone accused of deploying a double standard is accused of playing favorites when 
there is an expectation for impartiality or equal treatment. Consequently, when it comes 
to evaluating double standards in relation to hypocrisy and politics, the first question that 
ought to be asked is what expectation for fairness accompanies the double standard under 
scrutiny, with the general rule being the greater the expectation for fairness, the greater 
the demand to avoid the improper inconsistency attendant to hypocrisy. Interestingly, 
however, the greater the expectation for fairness, the more likely the incident in question 
won’t be described as an act of “hypocrisy” but in stronger terms like “injustice,” 
“discrimination,” “prejudice,” or “bias.” 
 People seem to reserve the accusation of hypocrisy instead for political situations 
in which the pursuit of partisan preference, the expression of favoritism, and strategic 
political maneuvering are more permissible but in which a certain expectation for fairness 
and other public-spirited norms remains. Democratic politics is inherently competitive—
parties and politicians constantly compete with one another for political power, after 
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all—and neither the pursuit of political advantage nor the pursuit of political preference is 
necessarily problematic. Yet politics is not a competitive free-for-all, and there is an 
expectation—often expressed in unwritten rules, norms, and conventions—that politics 
should ordinarily be conducted according to principles that prevent politics from 
devolving from a competition of ideas concerning the best way to manage public affairs 
to a game of political hardball played only for the sake of acquiring power, marginalizing 
the opposition, and rewarding oneself and allies with the material fruits of victory. 
Partisans often find themselves torn between, on the one hand, bending democratic norms 
in order to advance a partisan agenda that they believe embodies the public good and, on 
the other, honoring the norms and standards that informally govern the public sphere but 
that leave their partisan ambitions vulnerable on the field of political competition. In 
nearly all circumstances, however, partisans should prioritize the rules and norms that 
govern a competitive democratic political society over the pursuit of power and their 
partisan agenda. Accusations of hypocrisy and of double standards are often used in 
politics to accuse someone of inappropriately prioritizing their personal or partisan 
ambitions over their civic responsibilities to promote the public good and honor the 
public-spirited norms and principles that shape and preserve democratic societies. 
 While politicians do not want to develop a reputation for hypocrisy, engaging in a 
double standard is sometimes useful in politics when it comes to calling out the bad 
behavior of other politicians. Because partisans are unlikely to publicly object to the 
inappropriate behavior or conduct of their fellow partisans, it often falls to opposition 
politicians to offer the critique even though other opposition politicians are just as likely 
to commit the same offenses. Without these critiques—which should be offered with 
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humility since neither party can achieve ethical perfection but should be issued 
nonetheless given the expectation for ethical behavior and good conduct that 
accompanies service in public office—inappropriate political behavior could easily go 
unchecked. (See “The Latte Salute.”) 
 Some may argue that political hypocrisies and double standards derived from the 
violation of norms and unwritten rules are largely insignificant since such norms and 
rules are informal agreements that have no legal authority. In other words, because no 
one is actually obligated to honor them, violating them is permissible and always within 
the realm of possibility, thus rendering any accusation of hypocrisy (which depends upon 
the violation of a held principle) moot. But people are expected to honor unwritten rules 
and norms in many aspects of life including politics, where they are often used in the 
absence of more specific formal procedures or to dull the edge of strict legalistic 
processes. Most importantly, unwritten rules and norms help foster the civic habits and 
virtues necessary for the operation and maintenance of democratic institutions. Because 
these rules and norms remain unwritten, though, the parties to these rules and norms are 
not as beholden to them as they would be to formal rules and law. Faced with an abuse of 
power, for instance, a party may exercise their discretion and violate an unwritten rule. 
Under ordinary circumstances, however, such norms and unwritten rules should be 
honored; if they are violated, an accusation of hypocrisy can be used to reassert the 
significance of democratic norms within a democratic society. (See “Confirmation 
Bias.”) 
 In the event that unwritten rules and norms can no longer effectively regulate 
political competition and politics devolves to a winner-take-all game of political hardball, 
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political rivals may establish mediating institutions to oversee their political conflict. 
Once all sides accept the regulatory authority of these rules and agencies, it is incumbent 
on politicians to accept their rulings even when the do not rule in their favor. Failing to 
do so while expecting otherwise of their opponents leaves them seriously exposed to the 
charge of a double standard. (See “Settling the Score.”) 
 Another type of double standard often found in politics involves instances of 
personal failings, or moments when a politician’s private behavior is inconsistent with 
values they have publicly embraced and that are presumably attached to the politician’s 
vision of the public good and the good society. The political implications of personal 
failings, however, are not always clear. A private indiscretion does not necessarily 
unfairly disadvantage an opponent or alter policy outcomes within the competitive 
political arena. A personal failing may simply reflect poorly on the character and 
reputation of the hypocrite. Consequently, it becomes important to determine when a 
double standard involving a discrepancy between a politician’s private and public life 
becomes politically significant. 
 One can make a strong argument that a politician’s private conduct ought to have 
little bearing on a citizen’s assessment of the politician’s public record. This isn’t simply 
a matter of saying a politician is entitled to a private life outside the public eye or that a 
person’s private behavior ought to have no bearing whatsoever on evaluations of a 
person’s suitability to serve in government. It is instead to argue that what should matter 
most in peoples’ evaluations of politicians is the politician’s political record. Yet the 
premises upon which citizens grant a politician the authority to lead—specifically 
whether a politician is selected to advance a specific policy agenda or entrusted to serve 
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in public office on account of the quality of their character—can implicate a politician in 
hypocrisy. A politician who promoted him- or herself as uniquely qualified to serve the 
public given their personal character and values who in turn becomes a hypocrite by 
violating those values in their private life would likely lose their credibility as a leader. 
(See “The Kissing Congressman.”) 
 The final type of hypocrisy commonly found in politics is the flip-flop. A flip-flop 
occurs when someone changes their position on an issue or principle, typically to a 
position nearly opposite their original position. Compared to double standards, flip-flops 
tend to be riskier for politicians since those who invoke double standards almost always 
do so to their allies’ advantage or benefit while disadvantaging their opponents. Flip-
flops, on the other hand, sometimes alienate a politician’s supporters, and even when a 
politician changes a position in order to better align themselves with their supporters, a 
flip-flop can still raise questions about the politician’s judgment concerning the public 
good, their devotion to their new position, and their sense of conviction. Many worry that 
a flip-flopping politician is someone who puts their own political survival ahead of their 
commitment to the public good. 
 Yet few would argue it is impermissible for politicians to change their minds. 
Perhaps the most legitimate reason for flip-flopping involves changed circumstances—
i.e., the acquisition of new information, exposure to new perspectives, or revelations 
about the consequences of political action—that are significant enough to prompt a 
politician to alter a position or belief as it relates to the public good. Few people would 
probably want a politician so inflexible or afraid of becoming a hypocrite that they would 
never alter their positions even in the face of information or perspectives that render their 
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positions untenable or unwise. In fact, shifts in popular opinion may even excuse some 
flip-flops since democracies should reflect the will of the people, although politicians 
shouldn’t abandon core principles in the face of popular opposition nor sacrifice key 
democratic principles to political expediency. 
 Changed circumstances do not automatically excuse flip-flops, however. It still 
remains necessary to determine if circumstances really have changed, if what has 
changed is relevant to the policy or belief under re-evaluation, or if circumstances have 
changed enough to merit a switch in position. The preeminence and depth of commitment 
to the original position should also be taken into account. (See “Uncommon Core.”) 
 This study marks the first steps toward the formulation of a sort of case law 
concerning hypocrisy in politics. Additional case studies that expand on the ideas 
contained in this study were developed but excluded from this work out of a concern for 
length. The case studies that were included, however, could be considered foundational, 
as they represent the different types of hypocrisy commonly found in politics, illuminate 
aspects key to an understanding of political hypocrisy, and draw attention to the major 
considerations involved in assessments of political hypocrisy. Taken together, these eight 
case studies lead to two major conclusions regarding hypocrisy in politics. 
 First, the accusation of hypocrisy tends to be used in politics in situations in 
which someone’s allegedly improperly inconsistent behavior could reasonably be 
excused given certain conditions and circumstances. Unlike inconsistencies related to, for 
example, the unequal (and therefore unjust) application of the law to similarly situated 
people or instances of racial discrimination—both of which carry a heavy social sanction 
and are widely regarded as impermissible—the use of the term “hypocrisy” in politics is 
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more commonly reserved for situations in which someone might plausibly claim their 
apparently inconsistent behavior is actually permissible. These include (but are not 
limited to) situations in which the competitive nature of politics allows for partisanship, 
the expression of favoritism, and the pursuit of partisan advantage; rules are informal 
rather than legally codified and obeyed as a matter of convention and honor; and public 
officials have the leeway to act according to their own discretion. This does not mean 
allegedly hypocritical behavior is always excused in these situations, as there may still be 
a strong expectation for public actors to treat all political participants fairly and to honor 
their word; it’s just that in such situations, certain circumstances may justify or allow for 
behavior that may be regarded as inconsistent with a public actor’s earlier words and/or 
deeds. Accusations of hypocrisy are most frequently used in this political context to 
challenge allegedly inconsistent behavior. 
 Secondly, and following on from the previous insight, accusations of hypocrisy in 
politics are often used to reassert the norm of public-spiritedness, which holds that 
democratic politics ought to be motivated by and seek to preserve values (such as 
impartiality; fairmindedness; honesty; and principled, reasonable governance) that 
correspond with the public good. When someone charges another person with political 
hypocrisy, their allegation frequently amounts to an accusation that the alleged hypocrite 
has inappropriately prioritized the pursuit of political power and self-, group-, or partisan 
interests over a broader notion of the public good and the well-being of society at large. 
Whether the accusation can be described as a violation of principle, a logical 
inconsistency, a double standard, a personal failing, or a flip-flop, the underlying 
assertion is often that the alleged hypocrite has (often out of a desire to gain a competitive 
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political edge or to secure a political reward) attempted to advance a personal or partisan 
interest at the expense of the public interest in a way contrary to the spirit of selfless, 
high-minded public service. 
 The discovery of hypocrisy frequently draws people’s attention to the moral 
character of the alleged hypocrite, who is often vilified by the accuser and a shocked 
public as (among other things) a rotten, duplicitous, amoral human being. That is a 
natural if somewhat superficial reaction in the realm of politics, however, as such a 
visceral response is often exactly what a political opponent desires, as they would like 
nothing more than to demonize a rival. While an accusation of political hypocrisy is 
certainly meant to raise questions about the character of the accused, it needs to be 
remembered such an accusation is made in reference to both a set of civic virtues it is 
believed the accused ought to possess as a public servant and a set of public-spirited 
principles it is believed the accused ought to have abided by. In this way, an accusation of 
hypocrisy in politics is actually a reassertion of a set of virtues and values foundational to 
life in a democratic political society as well as a healthy reminder to both the accused and 
the accuser—particularly in a politically polarized society—that some political values 
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